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ABSTRACT
The recent popularity of Online Social Media sites (OSM) like Facebook and Twitter have
led to a renewed discussion about user privacy. In fact, numerous recent news reports and
research studies on user privacy stress the OSM users’ urgent need for better privacy control
mechanisms. Thus, today, a key research question is: how do we provide improved privacy
protection to OSM users for their social content? In this thesis, we propose a systematic
approach to address this question.
We start with the access control model, the dominant privacy model in OSMs today.
We show that, while useful, the access control model does not capture many theoretical and
practical aspects of privacy. Thus, we propose a new model, which we term the exposure
control model. We define exposure for a piece of content as the set of people who actually
view the content. We demonstrate that our model is a significant improvement over access
control to capture users’ privacy requirements. Next, we investigate the effectiveness of
our model to protect users’ privacy in three real world scenarios: (1) Understanding and
controlling exposure using social access control lists (SACLs) (2) Controlling exposure by
limiting large-scale social data aggregators and (3) Understanding and controlling longitu-
dinal exposure in OSMs, i.e., how users control exposure of their old OSM content. We
show that, in each of these cases, the exposure control-based approach helps us to design
improved privacy control mechanisms.
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KURZDARSTELLUNG
Die Popularität von sozialen Netzwerken (SN), wie Facebook, haben zu einer erneuten
Diskussion über die Privatsphäre geführt. Wissenschaftliche Publikationen untersuchen die
Privatsphäre und zeigen wie dringend SN Benutzer besseren Datenschutz benoötigen. Eine
zentrale Herausforderung für in diesem Bereich ist: Wie kann der Schutz der Privatsphäre
von SN Benutzern und ihren Inhalten garantiert werden? Diese Doktorarbeit schlägt Ansätze
vor, die diese Frage beantworten.
Wir untersuchen das Privatsphäremodel, das Access Control Modell, in SN. Wir zeigen
auf, dass das Access Control Modell theoretische und praktische Aspekte der Privatsphäre
nicht erfasst. Deshalb schlagen wir das Expositionssteuerunsgmodell vor und definieren
Exposition für einen Inhalt als die Menge der Personen, die einen Beitrag ansieht. Unser
Modell stellt eine bedeutende Verbesserung zu dem Access Control Modell dar. Wir unter-
suchen die Effektivität unseres Modells, indem wir den Datenschutz der Benutzer in drei
realen Szenarien schützen: (1) Verständnis und Steuerung der Exposition von Inhalten mit
Sozialen Access Control Listen (SACLs), (2) Steuerung der Exposition durch Begrenzung
der umfassenden sozialen Datenaggregation und (3) Verständnis und Steuerung von Langzei-
texposition in SN, z.B. wie Benutzer Exposition alter Inhalte begrenzen. In diesen Fällen
fürt Expositionssteuerungsmethoden zu einem verbesserten Privatsphäresteuerungsmecha-
nismus.
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Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy. The savage’s whole
existence is public, ruled by the laws of his tribe. Civilization is the process of
setting man free from men.
—Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 The fundamental shift in content sharing due to On-
line Social Media sites (OSM)
Online social media sites (OSM) are systems like Facebook or Twitter where users share
their personal content (e.g., photos, status updates, and social contacts). These systems
have become hugely popular in the last few years. In fact, these OSMs have become the
de facto portal to access the internet for millions of users. According to a recent Nielson
survey [142], an average 35 to 49 years old OSM user visits these sites 7 hours a week and a
heavy user visits these OSMs 3 hours per day.
Since OSMs have made it easy for any user to create, publish, distribute and consume
content, the amount of data shared on OSMs has also grown massively since the inception
of OSMs. For instance, Facebook users uploaded 4.75 billion pieces of content daily (on
average) in May 2013 [54]. Much of the personal user generated content shared in OSMs—
which we call social content in this thesis—is intended to have a limited audience. For
example, a user’s vacation photos uploaded on Facebook are often intended to be viewed
primarily by family and close friends.
However, the huge popularity of these sites (which facilitate the sharing of social
content) has also resulted in a fundamental shift in the patterns of content exchange in the
online world. Previously, a small number of organizations (e.g., newspapers, companies,
governments or universities) published content on the web and in general users were
content consumers. The content was mostly public, with open sharing and universal access
permissions. In contrast, in OSMs, today, social content is created and shared by end
users. The result of this fundamental shift is that, instead of just being content consumers,
individual end users are now required to be content managers. Thus, in addition to creating
and uploading social content, OSM users are also expected to manage the privacy of content
themselves. Consequently, today OSM users are facing a privacy management crisis.
1.2 Privacy management crisis in OSMs
Today for every piece of data shared in OSMs—every photo, status update, friend request
and video—a user must decide which of her friends, group members, and other Facebook
users should be able to access the data. Given the per-Facebook-user average of 130 friends
and 80 groups in recent years [103]—compounded with the average 90 pieces of content
uploaded per Facebook user per month—it is unsurprising that OSM users are in the midst
of a privacy management crisis, wherein the task of simply managing access to their content
has become a significant mental burden for many users [103].
The privacy management crisis is illustrated by user privacy concerns and anecdotal
privacy horror stories covered in numerous popular media and well as in research studies [35,
38, 87, 106]. Researchers have even tried to measure the extent of the privacy management
crisis in OSM users. Liu et al. [103] conducted a user survey with 200 users to check the
degree to which a user’s intended privacy settings match the actual privacy settings of the
uploaded content. In the survey, for each user, Liu et al. presented ten random photos the
user previously posted on Facebook; then for each photo they ask—“who, ideally, would
you like to be able to view and comment on the photo?” The responses from users constitute
the intended privacy setting for each photo. Finally, Liu et al. checked the actual privacy
settings (programmatically collected using the Facebook API) of those pictures and compare
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the actual privacy settings with the users’ intended privacy settings (as revealed by the
survey). They found that the actual and intended privacy settings match for only 37% of
photos in their survey, and when there is a mismatch, the actual privacy settings almost
always (in 77% of cases) reveal content to more users than intended. Their survey results
further suggested that while poor privacy defaults cause photos to be shared with more users
than expected, users who are cognizant enough to modify their default privacy settings still
have significant difficulty ensuring their actual privacy settings match their intended privacy
settings.
In summary, these results demonstrate that the privacy management crisis is an acute
problem for OSM users today, emphasized by the widespread mismatch of user’s actual and
intended privacy settings [103]. This crisis is further aggravated by the tremendous increase
in the user base of OSMs, as well as the continuous increase in the amount of content shared
on these sites. Thus, there is a dire need to address this privacy management crisis.
1.3 Challenge: Providing better privacy controls to users
An obvious way to alleviate the privacy management burden for OSM users is to provide
them better privacy controls. However, managing privacy is a complex issue and OSM users
have different privacy management requirements depending on the threat model, i.e., from
whom she is protecting privacy of her content. More specifically, the privacy management
requirements of users can be divided into two broad categories based on the threat model:
1. Managing privacy of social content from OSM operators and their associates: OSM
users need to manage data privacy from OSM operators themselves or their associates (e.g.,
advertisers in OSMs who leverage OSM’s infrastructure to serve personalized ads). Prior
research investigated multiple dimensions of this requirement: Guha et al. [82] and Baden
et al. [23] consider hiding content from OSM operators themselves via encryption. Meng et
al. [113] investigated privacy leak for OSM users via mobile in-app advertisements. Goga et
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al. [78] even considered privacy leaks via cross correlation of data from multiple OSMs. In
other words, this privacy management requirement is an active research topic pursued by
other researchers and their research is complementary to the goal of this thesis.
2. Managing privacy of social content from other users: When an OSM user uploads a
piece of content, she needs to manage privacy of the uploaded social content from other
users in OSM. Failure to do so (e.g., due to setting wrong access permissions) leads to
privacy violations. For example, a privacy violation happens when office colleagues of a
user view and react to a rant about the workplace (actually intended for close friends) or
even when an inappropriate but harmless post from a user is viewed and misinterpreted
by strangers and consequently causes serious damage to the user as retribution [139]. In
addition to the cases where users wrongly set privacy of their content, failure in managing
privacy of social content can happen for multiple other reasons, e.g., strangers digging up a
user’s old content, automatic aggregation of content from OSMs or even system provided
features like Facebook News Feed or Facebook timeline.
In this thesis, we are particularly interested in addressing this privacy management
requirement—how to improve the current privacy management mechanisms in OSMs which
aim to control the privacy of social content from other OSM users. These mechanisms
can be leveraged either by OSM users or can be deployed proactively by OSM operators
themselves. Note that it is very unlikely that the current privacy management crisis will
be solved automatically by the privacy management mechanisms deployed today (which
have been in place for years now). Thus the key research challenge in this space is: How do
we provide improved privacy controls to OSM users for managing privacy of their social
content from other users?
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1.4 Thesis research: Understanding & controlling user pri-
vacy in OSMs via exposure
The high-level goal of this thesis research is to improve privacy controls in OSMs by
developing a systematic, expressive and practical framework. First, we review privacy
violations systematically in order to come up with a broad model which can then be used
for investigating and improving privacy control. We accomplish this goal by introducing
exposure control, a model to capture privacy violations in OSMs and in the general online
world. Second, we show that our model is expressive enough to capture multiple important
privacy violation scenarios from real-world OSMs. We review theoretical privacy definitions
as well as anecdotal privacy violation examples from the real world to show that exposure
control significantly extends access control, the dominant privacy model in OSMs, in two
ways—(i) Exposure control captures more facets of existing theoretical privacy definitions
than access control and (ii) Exposure control captures more privacy violations from the real
world compared to exposure control. Finally, our model is practical: it is feasible to use
exposure control to design and deploy privacy management mechanisms for controlling
exposure. We demonstrate the practicality of exposure control in this thesis by investigating
three important privacy management scenarios from the real world and proposing improved
privacy management mechanisms to better control exposure for each of these scenarios.
In the rest of this chapter, first, we will briefly review the related work in this space and
then give a high-level overview of the specific contributions of this thesis.
1.5 Related work
A rapidly growing number of reports in both academia and the popular press emphasizes the
problem of managing privacy in popular OSMs. As we mentioned earlier, the reported cases
include examples of users wrongly setting the privacy of their content, people digging up
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old content, automatic aggregation of content from OSMs and even privacy concerns with
system-provided features like the Facebook News Feed or the Facebook timeline. However
many of these incidents are anecdotal and from a technical standpoint we need to first define
what is privacy and how is privacy enforced in OSMs today.
1.5.1 What is privacy?
Privacy is a complex concept which has multiple dimensions. There are extensive discus-
sions, especially in the legal, social and psychology research community, for defining exactly
what is privacy. We briefly state the major definitions below; we will expand on each of
these definitions in Chapter 2.1.
Warren and Brandeis [168], presented one of the very first definition of privacy in their
1890 law review article. They defined privacy as “right to be let alone” for individuals.
However, their definition captures only a basic aspect of privacy and more modern definitions
aimed to capture more complicated aspects. Westin’s theory of privacy [169], proposed
in 1967, captures how people protect their privacy by “temporarily limiting access of
others to themselves”. Westin defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others.” Westin viewed privacy from a legal aspect and other
researchers further tried to capture the aspects of privacy from the sociological point of
view. Specifically, Altman, a social and an environmental psychologist, presented his
definition of privacy [12, 13, 14] using social interactions. According to Altman privacy
is a process of boundary control to ensure “the selective control of access to the self”.
Moreover, he identified that privacy is dialectic and dynamic. In recent times, with the
advent of digital media and the networked world, researchers tried to extend Altman’s theory.
Specifically, around 2002-2003, Petronio (in her CPM theory [128]) viewed privacy as a
rule-based mechanism for managing boundaries and Palen and Dourish [127] extended
Altman’s theory as a tension between three specific boundaries in the networked world.
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More recently, Solove presented a data-centric view of privacy and presented a taxonomy
of privacy violations [146, 147]. Finally, one of the most recent definition came from
Nissenbaum [24, 124]. She presented privacy as the preservation of “contextual integrity”.
All of these privacy theories are aimed at understanding what privacy is. A subsequent
step is to design privacy preserving mechanisms in data sharing systems like OSMs in order
to enforce privacy. Currently, the dominant model for privacy management in OSMs is the
access control model.
1.5.2 How is privacy enforced in OSMs today?
The aforementioned privacy definitions are intended to systematically define the theory of
what privacy is. However, definitions are not enough; a subsequent step is to actually design
privacy control mechanisms for OSMs. Today, privacy is primarily enforced by access
control mechanisms provided by OSM operators. When users upload content, they a priori
specify who should be allowed to access their content. Options for allowing access can vary
from allowing all of the internet users to access a piece of content (e.g., the “public” privacy
setting in Facebook) to allowing no one but the uploading user to view the piece of content.
We will discuss in detail in Chapter 2.2.1 how access control captures different facets of the
theoretical privacy definitions.
Intuitively, OSM users feel that privacy is violated when some unexpected entity actually
views a particular content. Today, the access control model requires an OSM user to specify
the entities who can view their content. The OSM operator can commonly view all the
content. Thus, the access control model captures privacy violation scenarios in which an
entity from outside the list of specified entities accesses the content.
Recent work [93, 20, 32] argues through anecdotal examples that access control is
insufficient to meet the definition of privacy. boyd et al. [32] presented an example where
Facebook users felt their privacy was violated when Facebook launched their News Feed
feature. However, the News Feed did not violate any access control policy, but users still
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perceived a privacy violation since more people are actually viewing their content due
to the News Feed. Facebook quickly reacted [101] after the surfacing of user concerns
with News Feed, providing more fine-grained access control mechanisms on Facebook.
However, researchers have shown that in spite of the availability of granular access control
mechanisms, Facebook users still severely underestimate the number of users who actually
view their content [27, 103]. Other work [20] discussed privacy violations in the context of
data aggregators, showing that these aggregators were collecting only public data and were
not violating any access control. However, these data aggregators violate user privacy. Thus,
even though access control is an important and necessary component of privacy management
mechanisms, it is not sufficient. To fill this gap, in Chapter 2 we propose and formalize a
new privacy model which captures the aforementioned privacy violation scenarios as well
as the ones captured by the access control model. We call our model exposure control.
1.6 An overview of thesis contributions
In the paragraphs below, we provide a brief overview of our thesis contributions. Our
contributions can be divided into two broad parts, First, we propose exposure control, an
improved and more inclusive privacy model to better capture users’ privacy needs.
Then, We investigate three important real-world scenarios where either the users or the
OSM operators try to manage privacy of the user generated content. Specifically, in this thesis
we investigate controlling exposure using Social Access Control Lists (SACLs), controlling
exposure from large scale third party data aggregators and controlling longitudinal exposure.
We acknowledge that there might be other venues where exposure control is quite important,
e.g., limiting the exposure of content in the face of search in OSMs. We leave investigating
how to control exposure in those scenarios for future work.
We start with a brief overview of our exposure control model.
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1.6.1 Exposure control: A new privacy model
We start with the observation that access control is the most widely used method by OSM
users to ensure the privacy of their content from other users. However, access control cannot
capture many of the privacy violations in real-world OSMs as pointed out by the Facebook
News Feed example earlier.
We argue that the main reason is in the real world, OSM users often care more about
who actually accesses (i.e., views) content, as opposed to just who can access the content.
Thus, a user might feel their privacy is violated even when a publicly shared rant is viewed
by her boss. We define the exposure set (or simply exposure) of a piece of content as the set
of users who eventually view the piece of content.
Intuitively, mechanisms like the Facebook News Feed increase the exposure of content
(more people actually viewing uploaded content) and hence users feel their privacy is
violated. Thus, in this work we note that one should actually control exposure to manage
privacy. Furthermore, we show that exposure control captures more facets of the theoretical
definitions of privacy compared to access control—thus establishing that exposure control is
an improvement over access control. Our model enables us to investigate scenarios in the
real world where privacy management is important. However, exposure control mechanisms
should be designed differently than access control. Particularly, the designs should be based
on privacy requirements in different real-world scenarios. We individually investigate three
such scenarios to design better exposure control mechanisms.
1.6.2 Understanding and controlling exposure using SACLs
Today, a common way for users to control the exposure of posted content is by specifying
social access control lists (social ACLs, or SACLs) and allowing only a subset of their social
contacts to access a content. The majority of OSM operators today provide fine-grained
mechanisms for specifying SACLs, allowing users to restrict their sensitive content to a
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select subset of their friends. However, it remains unclear how these SACL mechanisms
are used today. In order to design better privacy management tools for users, we need
to first understand the usage and complexity of SACLs specified by users. To do so, we
conducted the first large-scale study of fine grained privacy preferences of over 1,000 users
on Facebook, providing us with the first ground-truth information on how users specify
SACLs on an OSM. Overall, we find that a surprisingly large fraction (17.6%) of content is
shared with SACLs. However, we also find that the SACL membership (whether a social
contact belongs to a SACL) shows little correlation with either profile information or social
network structure; as a result, it is difficult to predict the subset of a user’s friends likely to
appear in a SACL and automate the SACL creation process. On the flip side, we find that
SACLs are often reused, suggesting that simply making recent SACLs available to users is
likely to significantly reduce the burden of privacy management on users.
1.6.3 Controlling exposure by limiting large-scale social data aggrega-
tors
We argue that when a user uploads her social content in OSM, she most likely does not
intend her content to be viewed by certain users. A prime example of such unwanted views
are the ones coming from large-scale third party data aggregators like Spokeo. In this case,
the OSM operators might proactively want to control exposure of user generated content
by limiting the large-scale third party data aggregators. In this work, we propose Genie, a
system that can be deployed by OSMs operators to defend against large-scale social data
aggregators (or crawlers) in OSMs.
Genie identifies crawlers by exploiting the fact that the browsing patterns of honest
users (i.e., non-crawler users) and crawlers are very different: even a crawler with access to
many accounts needs to make many more profile views per account than an honest user, and
the crawler needs to view the profiles of users that are more distant in the social network.
Genie works by deriving a credit network [50, 75] from the social network (created using
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friendship relations in OSM). In brief, credit is associated with links in the social graph, and
a viewer must “pay” credits to the viewee, along paths in the social graph, when viewing a
profile. Experiments using real-world data gathered from Renren (a Chinese OSM) show
that Genie frustrates large-scale crawling while rarely impacting honest users; the few honest
users who are affected can recover easily by adding a few friend links.
1.6.4 Understanding and controlling longitudinal exposure in OSMs
We note that the exposure set of a piece of content, i.e., the users who actually view the
content, increases with passing time. Thus, controlling longitudinal exposure becomes more
challenging with the passage of time. In fact, users’ privacy preferences for sharing content
are known to evolve over time [25]. There can be many reasons for such temporal changes
in privacy preferences—e.g., the sensitivity or relevance of shared content changes with
time; the biographical status of users (e.g., married) and their friend relationships change
over time. The challenge of managing longitudinal privacy for a user refers to the difficulty
in controlling the exposure of the user’s socially shared data over time. This challenge
becomes more complex over time as the set of content shared in the past grows larger and
new technologies like archival (timeline-based) searches make it easier to access historical
content shared under outdated privacy preferences. Our study, using data from Twitter,
finds that a significant fraction of users withdraw a surprisingly large percentage of old
publicly shared data—more than 28% of six-year old public posts (tweets) on Twitter are
not accessible today. The inaccessible tweets are either selectively deleted by users or
withdrawn by users when they delete or make their accounts private.
We also found a significant problem with the current exposure control mechanisms—
even when a user deletes her tweets or her account, the current mechanisms leave traces
of residual activity, i.e., tweets from other users sent as replies to those deleted tweets or
accounts still remain accessible. We show that using these residual activities one can recover
significant information about the withdrawn tweets or even characteristics of the deleted
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accounts. To make users more aware of the flaws in the existing exposure control mech-
anisms, we designed a Twitter app, deployed at http://twitter-app.mpi-sws.
org/footprint/, where anyone can login with their Twitter account and check the
residual activities around their posts.
We further found that the difficulty of improving longitudinal exposure control mech-
anisms arises from the fact that there are multiple parties (aside from the user who posts
the content) who are affected by longitudinal exposure control mechanisms. For example, a
user who reports hate speech posted by some other user might not like to see the hate speech
withdrawn since in that way the user who posted the hate speech might evade accountability.
We investigate this phenomenon in depth by performing a survey of deletion ecosystem of
OSMs. We identify the longitudinal exposure control mechanisms, as well as the actors
involved in this ecosystem. Laying the groundwork in this manner, we identify concrete
research questions for assessing and improving longitudinal exposure control mechanisms.
Finally, we propose and evaluate three longitudinal exposure control mechanisms to augment
and improve Twitter’s deletion ecosystem.
1.7 Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we present the model of exposure control and analyze the merit of exposure
control relative to existing privacy theories.
In Chapter 3, we present how users today control exposure by specifying Social Access
Control Lists (SACLs) and how we can help these users.
In Chapter 4, we present Genie, a system to control data exposure by limiting large-scale
third party data aggregators in OSMs.
In Chapter 5, we present an investigation of longitudinal exposure, i.e, how users
control exposure for their old content. We point out one very important challenge towards
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improving longitudinal exposure control mechanisms is to understand the nuanced notion of
“ownership of content in OSMs” in the deletion ecosystem of OSMs.
In Chapter 6, we present a systematic analysis of the deletion ecosystem, which involves
actors other than just the content creator. This systematization lays the groundwork for
assessing and improving longitudinal exposure control mechanisms in OSMs. Furthermore,
we propose improved longitudinal exposure control mechanisms for Twitter and evaluate
their merits and drawbacks.
In Chapter 7, we conclude by summarizing our approach for controlling privacy via
exposure control in OSMs and describe directions for future work in this space.
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CHAPTER 2
Exposure control: A new privacy model
In order to provide OSM users better privacy management mechanisms for protecting their
data from other users, we first need to understand what does privacy mean in OSMs. We
already hinted at answers to this question in Chapter 1.5.1 by briefly describing seven privacy
theories. In this section we will further expand on different aspects of privacy as pointed out
by these theories. However this theories present an understanding of “what” privacy is. A
subsequent step is to actually build mechanisms for preserving privacy. Thus in this section
we review the dominant model for privacy management in OSMs—the access control model.
We investigate the aspects of privacy definitions captured by the access control model and
point out that while effective, the access control model still does not capture certain crucial
aspects of privacy. To that end, we introduce our model of exposure control and examine
the usefulness of our model to manage privacy in OSMs. We start this chapter by exploring
what we mean by privacy in OSMs.
2.1 What do we mean by privacy in OSM?
Privacy in general is acknowledged to be a complex issue which might vary in different
scenarios or even from one individual to another. In fact, the word “privacy” is an example of
an untranslatable lexeme [17] and many languages do not have a specific word for “privacy”
(e.g., Russian). In spite of this complexity (or perhaps encouraged by the complexity), for a
long time legal and philosophical scholars have tried to systematically understand and define
privacy. These privacy definitions date back long before the advent of OSMs—Warren and
Brandeis were one of the first to systematically define privacy in their influential 1890 law
review article “The Right to Privacy” [168] as the “right to be let alone”. However, definitions
of privacy have evolved over the years and even now researchers are still attempting to
understand all the dimensions of privacy and are still presenting new definitions. Thus, we
start with a chronological review of the prominent definitions in our context: understanding
privacy in OSMs. Note that the goal of our review is not to compare different privacy
definitions and theories, but rather to understand the different aspects of privacy captured by
these theories.
2.1.1 Privacy as right to be let alone
The first publication in the United states to advocate a right to privacy appeared as an
article in Havard law review [168] by Warren and Brandeis in 1890. They argue that
the contemporary adaptation of instantaneous photography in society and the widespread
circulation of newspapers violated a basic right which was not captured by the law at that
time. They pointed out that this unaddressed right of an individual is his “right to privacy”.
Warren and Brandeis reviewed the contemporary existing legal rights of individual and
checked if they sufficiently captured the right to privacy. They found that the law of slander
and libel (forms of defamation) did not capture the right to privacy since those laws “deal
only with damage to reputation.” In their view, even when some personal information of a
person is widely circulated (e.g., via gossip columns in newspapers), defamation law only
protects an individual when the individual suffers a direct effect in his or her interaction
with other people. They mentioned that “however painful the mental effects upon another of
an act, though purely wanton or even malicious, yet if the act itself is otherwise lawful, the
suffering inflicted is damnum absque injuria.”1 They also reviewed intellectual property laws
and concluded that “the protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed
1a loss or harm from something other than a wrongful act and which occasions no legal remedy.
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through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication,
is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let
alone”. Warren and Brandeis further elaborated their idea of the right to privacy as: “where
protection has been afforded against wrongful publication, the jurisdiction has been asserted,
not on the ground of property, or at least not wholly on that ground, but upon the ground of
an alleged breach of an implied contract or of a trust or confidence”.
In the case of OSM content sharing, the definition by Warren and Brandeis captures a
basic aspect of privacy requirement of the OSM user. Namely, an OSM user should have
the right (and ways) to enforce who can (or cannot) see their content (i.e., letting them be
alone). This definition, albeit the first of its kind, is from a different era and does not capture
many aspects of privacy which are very important in OSMs. For example, the authors
explicitly mentioned that “the right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter
which is of public or general interest”. However, even when information in OSMs (e.g., a
Facebook profile picture) is accessible to the public (and needs to be publicly available, e.g.,
for finding the Facebook profile of a specific user), an OSM user might feel that her privacy
is violated if her public profile picture is posted and discussed in an online forum like Reddit.
These feelings of privacy violation may specifically arise if the picture is discussed out of
context and viewed by people she did not imagine would see/distribute her picture while
uploading the picture. Furthermore, according to this definition, the right to privacy ceases
upon the publication of the information by the individual. However, as the example above
shows (public Facebook profile picture posted in Reddit), even when users post their content
publicly, they have an expectation of privacy. Over the past century, scholars have thus
subsequently refined the definition of privacy.
2.1.2 Westin’s definition of privacy
Alan Westin’s theory of privacy [169], proposed in 1967, captures how people protect their
privacy by temporarily limiting access to themselves by others. Westin noted that privacy,
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in addition to other needs, enables people to adjust emotionally to their daily interactions
with others. For Westin privacy is (i) a dynamic process, i.e., people regulate privacy to
fulfill their momentary needs and requirements and (ii) a non-monotonic function, since
people can have too little, sufficient or too much privacy. Notably, according to Westin’s
theory, privacy is neither self-sufficient nor an end in itself, but it helps people achieve their
overarching end of self-realization.
Specifically, Westin defined privacy as: “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others. [Moreover] ... privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal
of a person from the general society through physical or psychological means”.
In his theory, Westin proposed four functions or purposes of privacy. These functions
essentially try to address the why of privacy: Personal autonomy is the desire for an
individual to avoid manipulation, domination, or being exposed by others. Emotional
release is the release of an individual from the tensions of social life, e.g., role demands, the
management of losses, etc. In other words, privacy (alone or with other means) provides
“time out” to an individual from social demands and hence enables emotional release. Self-
evaluation is the function which concerns integrating experience into meaningful patterns
and exerting individuality on events. Examples of such situations are processing information
and supporting the planning process (e.g., the timing of disclosures). The final function,
Limited and protected communication, has two aspects: interpersonal boundaries are created
by limiting communication; protected communication fulfillls the desire for sharing personal
information with specific trusted individuals.
According to Westin, these four functions are achieved by four key states of privacy.
These four states necessarily provide the how of privacy in Westin’s theory.
1. Solitude: refers to the state of being free from observation by others.
2. Intimacy: refers to the state of limiting communication within a small group to achieve
a close, relaxed and frank relationship.
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3. Anonymity: refers to the freedom from identification and from surveillance in public.
4. Reserve: refers to the desire to limit information disclosure to others and others
recognizing and respecting that desire.
Specifically, Westin’s theory suggests that in OSMs, privacy management mechanisms
should try to enable OSM users to achieve these key states. Westin further viewed privacy
in individual, group, and organizational levels. The privacy states and functions presented in
Westin’s definition have inspired further research [110]. These investigations into Westin’s
theory support (to varying degrees) the validity of Westin’s definition of privacy (i.e., states
and functions) to the current day.
However, Westin’s theory did not clearly identify the inter-dependency within his
four functions and did not discuss whether those functions are fundamental or some key
dimensions of privacy underlie these functions. To that end, some researchers have tried
to understand privacy from a different angle—they explored interpersonal communication
patterns to understand privacy.
2.1.3 Altman’s privacy theory
Altman offered [12, 13, 14] another point of view on the characteristics of privacy, which is
different from Westin’s theory. Altman is a social and an environmental psychologist and
social interaction is at the heart of his theory. According to Altman, privacy is neither static,
nor it is a withdrawal process for the individual. Altman presented privacy as the “selective
control of access to self” regulated as dialectic and dynamic processes. There are boundaries
between privacy and publicity and these boundaries are constantly changing based on an
individual’s social interactions (thus dialectic processes). Due to these interactions, an
individual’s boundaries also change over time (thus dynamic processes).
More concretely, Altman pointed out five properties of privacy: (i) privacy involves
a dynamic process of interpersonal boundary control. (ii) Altman pointed out that an
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individual’s desired and actual levels of privacy differ. (iii) privacy is a non-monotonic
function; there is an optimal level of privacy (desired level = actual level). However, there
can be too much privacy (desired < actual) or too little privacy (desired > actual). (iv)
privacy is bi-directional, involving inputs from others (e.g., via a social conversation) and
outputs to others (e.g., by sharing a privacy concern with friends). (v) finally, privacy
operates at both the individual and group level.
Altman pointed out that there are multiple behavioral mechanisms for regulating privacy
(e.g., cultural norms), and those mechanisms operate as a coherent system. Note that Altman
viewed privacy as a social process. Thus, his theory pointed that properly understanding
privacy will require understanding the interplay of people, the social interactions, the
physical environment and also understanding the temporal nature of social phenomena. In
fact, he pointed out, privacy has a cultural context, specifically, the psychological aspects of
privacy are culture specific.
Altman’s theory is one of the prominent theories of privacy today and it provides a fairly
general understanding of privacy as social processes. However, a central issue with Altman’s
theory is that it is not clear if the interpersonal boundary in Altman’s theory is a metaphor or
a theoretical construct. This issue becomes even more important when researchers want to
apply Altman’s theory to concrete real-world systems like OSMs. Thus, some recent efforts
to understand privacy explore the specific boundaries and their regulations in the real world
in order to extend Altman’s theory.
2.1.4 Petronio’s Communication Privacy Management (CPM) theory
Petronio attempted to extend Altman’s dialectical and dynamic conception of privacy (as
tensions between opening and closing boundaries) to the realm of digital communications.
To that end, she presented her Communication Privacy Management (CPM) theory [128].
CPM theory suggests that individuals regulate their privacy by regulating privacy boundaries
that can range from complete openness to complete closeness. An open boundary means
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an individual is willing to grant permission to access private information. On the other
hand, a closed boundary signifies an individual’s desire to conceal private information.
The relationships between these boundaries are dialectical (as in Altman’s theory), since
individuals constantly adapt their level of privacy and disclosure to internal and external state.
Moreover, Petronio’s theory postulates that individuals achieve their desired levels of privacy
via the use of privacy rules. That is, if an individual wishes to change her privacy boundaries,
she users a rule-based privacy management system that regulates the degree of boundary
permeability (how much information is shared). This rule-based management system allows
CPM theory to consider how decisions are made about revealing and concealing private
information.
Five propositions underpin the CPM theory. They are stated below:
1. Privacy in CPM theory is defined in terms of ownership; thus, when people believe
some information belongs to them, they consider that information private.
2. Since individuals believe that they own their private information, they also believe
that they also have the right to control the distribution of that information.
3. People develop and use privacy management rules to control the distribution of
information. These privacy rules are influenced by people’s cultural backgrounds,
their gender, the context of the communication (e.g., telling personal details while
asking for help after an accident), motivation (e.g., by reciprocity of information
sharing) and based on the assessed risk-benefit trade-off of disclosing information.
4. Once an individual shares private information, a collective privacy boundary is formed
and others receiving that information becomes co-owners of that information. From the
point of view of the original owner, co-owners share fiduciary responsibilities to jointly
control this private information in a way that is consistent with the original owner’s
rule. Privacy rule co-ordination between the original owner and co-owners revolves
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around permeability, co-ownership responsibilities, and linkage rules. Furthermore,
these privacy rules also change over time.
5. Finally, when the privacy rules are not coordinated between the original owner and
co-owners, there is a possibility of boundary turbulence, which can lead to privacy vio-
lation. In other words, boundary turbulence occurs when co-owners fail to effectively
manage the flow of information to honor the desire of the other owner.
To summarize, Petronio extends Altman’s original proposal of privacy regulation via her
CPM theory by concretely pointing out rule-based processes of boundary regulation. This
extension can be realized in OSMs by giving users the ability to specify who should be able
to access their data. However, other researchers have contested this rule-based depiction of
privacy and pointed out that privacy as a concept is too complicated to capture via a set of
rules. To that end, they proposed another extension of Altman’s theory.
2.1.5 Palen and Dourish’s extension of Altman’s theory to the net-
worked world
Palen and Dourish [127] contested the extension of Altman’s theory by Petronio. They
pointed out that “Privacy management is not about setting rules and enforcing them; rather, it
is the continual management of boundaries between different spheres of action and degrees
of disclosure within those spheres. Boundaries move dynamically as the context changes.
These boundaries reflect tensions between conflicting goals; boundaries occur at points of
balance and resolution”. Palen and Dourish specifically extended Altman’s theory to the
modern day networked world, where new types of communication technology (e.g., OSMs)
are revolutionizing the way people interact and consequently changing our understanding of
privacy.
Specifically, Palen and Dourish pointed out that a world driven by information tech-
nology brings forth key changes in communication: “The significance of information
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technology in this view lies in its ability to disrupt or destabilize the regulation of boundaries.
Information technology plays multiple roles. It can form part of the context in which the
process of boundary maintenance is conducted; transform the boundaries; be a means of
managing boundaries; mediate representations of action across boundaries; and so forth”.
To that end Palen and Dourish pointed out three boundaries which lie at the core of their
theory.
1. The Disclosure Boundary: Privacy and Publicity This boundary captures the ten-
sion of control of individuals over their information: individuals selectively disclose
information to maintain a balance between openness and closeness. Thus, privacy
does not only consist of making all information secret, but rather it requires the ability
to control which information is disclosed to the public and which is not. For example,
academics maintain their public web page to disclose information about their research.
However, these same academics might like to keep the details of their personal life out
of public view. However, the disclosure boundary is not totally under an individual’s
control. For example, a friend might post a picture of a recent wild party without the
subject’s knowledge, or a Google search might reveal an individual’s past activities
(e.g., Usenet posts), which do not represent how the individual has changed over the
years. Thus, aside from disclosure boundary Palen and Dourish identified two more
privacy boundaries to address these cases.
2. The Identity Boundary: Self and Other The identity boundary captures the social
nature of privacy regulation and identifies tensions not in an individual’s total control.
In any information exchange, there are originators of information and recipients.
Thus, the tension at the identity boundary arises from the fact that in a networked
world, information can be easily interpreted without context (e.g., via viral sharing
of a picture). Consequently, if the recipients interpret a piece of information quite
differently than what the original uploader had in mind, the uploader’s privacy might
be violated.
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3. Temporal Boundaries: Past, Present and Future Lastly the temporal boundary
represents the dynamic nature of privacy. A piece of information disclosed in the
past by an individual might wrongly represent the current state of the individual.
Thus, Palen and Dourish presented temporal boundaries as—“while past and future
interpretations of information disclosure are out of our control, the way in which
current privacy management is oriented towards events in the past or future is a matter
of active control and management. Our response to situations of disclosure, or our
interpretation of information we encounter, is framed and interpreted according to
these other events and expectations. We negotiate boundary locations as we act in the
world.” Hence temporal privacy control in a networked world involves revisiting old
content and determining their disclosure boundaries.
Note that both Petronio’s CPM theory and Palen and Dourish’s theory are extensions
of Altman’s theory of privacy. However, with the advent of social media and in general
novel communication platforms like the internet, other aspects of privacy are also starting to
become important. One such example is how to maintain the balance between an individual’s
privacy and societal necessities like surveillance in public places. Another example would
be the case of a Facebook user. Although she is ok with her Facebook profile picture being
public, she might not be comfortable with publishing this picture on the first page of the New
York times. To address these issues two more recent privacy theories have been proposed.
2.1.6 Solove’s taxonomy of privacy
Solove [146, 147] pointed out the broadness and complexity of the idea of privacy and
some of the struggles people face while defining and approaching privacy as a legal and
social construct. Solove’s idea of privacy is data-centric—it revolves around data collection,
processing, dissemination and invasion. He uses Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘family resem-
blances’ as a way to capture the notion of privacy people have in their mind. Solove pointed
out that privacy has many meanings; however, just like family resemblances, they are all
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related. Solove provided a rich taxonomy of privacy [146] as the core of his theory. He
noted different disruptions in each phase (data collection, processing, dissemination and
invasion), which are important when identifying privacy violations. The basic structure of
his taxonomy is:
1. Information collection: surveillance (the watching, listening to, or recording of an
individual’s activities), interrogation (pressuring of individuals to divulge informa-
tion).
2. Information Processing: aggregation (gathering together information about a per-
son), identification (connecting information to an individual), insecurity (problems
caused by the way information is handled and protected), secondary use (use of data
for purposes unrelated to the purposes for which the data was initially collected with-
out the data subject’s consent), exclusion (failure to provide individuals with notice
and input about their records).
3. Information Dissemination: breach of confidentiality (breaking a promise to keep
a person’s information confidential), disclosure (revealing true information about a
person to others), exposure (revealing another’s nudity, grief, or bodily functions),
increased accessibility (amplifying the accessibility of information), blackmail (threat
to disclose personal information), appropriation (use of the data subject’s identity
to serve the aims and interests of another), distortion (the dissemination of false
information about a person).
4. Invasion: intrusion (invasive acts that disturb one’s tranquility or solitude), decisional
interference (the government’s incursion into the data subject’s decisions regarding
her private affairs).
Solove uses his taxonomy to explain the reason for privacy violations in different
scenarios, e.g., during surveillance. Note that Solove’s taxonomy covers the privacy concerns
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not only in the context of OSMs, but captures the broader privacy concerns in our data-driven
world. However, Solove’s taxonomy categories do not explicitly identify the dynamic nature
of privacy and the social norms that control privacy.
2.1.7 Nissenbaum’s “privacy as contextual integrity”
Contextual integrity (CI) is a theory of privacy developed by Nissenbaum in [24, 124]. CI
provides a normative model of privacy, i.e., CI points out what are the normal behaviors that
preserve privacy. CI comprises four descriptive claims:
1. Privacy is preserved by appropriate flow of information.
2. Appropriate flow of information conforms to contextual information norms.
3. Each contextual information norm consists of five independent parameters: data
subject, sender, recipient, information type, and transmission principle.
4. Conceptions of privacy are based on dynamic ethical concerns that evolve over time.
CI provides a framework to argue about violation/preservation of privacy and allows for
the evolution as well as alteration of informational norms, often due to novel socio-technical
systems like OSMs. The CI framework states that for any given social context (offline
or online), there are informational norms defining appropriate flows for various types of
information. Privacy violations result when these norms are broken. A prime example of the
effectiveness of CI is to explain the phenomenon of “privacy in public”. OSM users might
upload personal content which is accessible to everyone in the internet (e.g., a Facebook
profile picture). However, those users feel their privacy is violated when a third party
crawler collects this “public” information and puts it in a torrent [83]. According to CI, the
contextual integrity is violated in this case, since it does not conform to the transmission
principles (the user did not consent for it to be collected and put in a third party database).
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Thus, even if a piece of information is shared with the public, there is some notion of privacy
of that information.
2.1.8 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed seven privacy definitions, proposed at different points in time
and capturing different dimensions of privacy. We note that one key aspect of privacy
captured in these definitions is the user’s expectation/desire of who would see their content
and how the content is further re-used. This expectation is personified by Palen and
Dourish’s “identity boundary” and Nissenbaum’s “informational norms.” However, all of
these definitions and theories are designed to understand what is privacy; a subsequent step
is to make these definitions actionable by incorporating privacy by design into the systems.
Next, we investigate access control, the dominant privacy model in current OSMs, and we
discuss the extent to which access control captures elements from different definitions of
privacy.
2.2 Current model for controlling privacy in OSMs:
Access control
In OSMs and in general in computing systems, privacy has typically been accomplished
via access control, which requires enumerating the users, groups, or roles who are or are
not able to access information. The popularity of OSMs has led to a renewed discussion
about whether access control is a satisfactory model for user privacy. To that end, first let us
rebiew what aspects of privacy are indeed captured by the access control model.
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2.2.1 Capturing privacy definitions via the access control model
We reviewed definitions and theories in Chapter 2.1, which deals with understanding different
aspects of privacy. Now, we check which elements of those theories, i.e., which dimensions
of privacy, are captured by access control and which elements are not captured.
Our application scenario is simple: an OSM user (or uploader) is uploading her content
to a social media site.2 In our scenario, a user is concerned about privacy of her own content
and consequently about her privacy. In the access control model, she manages privacy by
allowing or denying access to others via including/excluding users in access control lists.
She can also change the access control of her uploaded content at any point of time in the
future. Note that the privacy theories we mentioned earlier are generic; not all of their
characterizations of privacy conform to our scope (e.g., violating privacy by interrogating a
user). We identify the relevant elements (in our application scenario) of privacy from each
theory and review the effectiveness of access control in capturing those elements of privacy.
We summarize our review in Table 2.1.
Aspects of Warren and Brandeis’s theory [168] captured (and not captured) by access
control: Warren and Brandeis defined privacy as the right to be let alone. Given that while
uploading a piece of content, users can enumerate other users, groups, or roles who are
or are not able to access this information, these uploaders can exercise their right to be let
alone. For example, if an OSM user does not want her office colleagues to be able to see her
vacation pictures, she can enforce privacy by simply denying her office colleagues access
to her vacation pictures. However as we mentioned in Chapter 2.1.1, this theory is the first
of many theories and it captures only a basic requirement of OSM privacy management
mechanisms. Other more recent theories better capture the complex nature of privacy. Hence,
we next focus on those theories.
2Note that in this thesis, we are interested in how users can better protect the privacy of their own uploaded
content. Thus, investigating how content uploaded by user A violates the privacy of user B (e.g., when user A
unwittingly publishes a picture of a homosexual party night and tags user B, who is a local school teacher) is
out of the scope of this thesis.
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Aspects of Westin’s definition of privacy [169] captured (and not captured) by access
control: Recall from Chapter 2.1.2 that Westin provided four key states of privacy: solitude
(the state of being free from observation by others), intimacy (limiting communication
within a small group to achieve a close, relaxed and frank relationship), anonymity (freedom
from identification and from surveillance in public) and reserve (desire to limit information
disclosure to others, and others recognizing and respecting that desire). An ideal privacy
management model should enable users to achieve these key states. Out of these states,
anonymity is out of our scope of discussion because anonymity deals with the relationship
between user identity and content, whereas we are mainly interested in the privacy of the
content itself. Out of the other three states, the access control model captures two: (i)
solitude—a user can exclude specific people from accessing their content. (ii) intimacy—
when the user wants an intimate interaction, she can allow access to her content for only a
small group.
Unfortunately, access control does not enforce reserve. For example, even if a user
uploads a photo to Facebook and makes it accessible to everybody in the internet, her desire
might be that this content is only meant for identifying her Facebook profile. However, web
crawlers who mechanically aggregate and mine public data can just collect this picture and
add it to their database of profiles for future background checks by hiring managers. Thus
the desire of users of how to use her content cannot be captured and enforced by access
control.
Aspects of Altman’s privacy theory [12, 13, 14] captured (and not captured) by access
control: Altman defined privacy to be “the selective control of access to the self”. Chap-
ter 2.1.3 pointed out that according to Altman there are five properties of privacy. Out
of these properties, access control captures three properties: (i) Access control enables
OSM users to control the dynamic process of interpersonal boundary control, since a user
can allow or deny access to her content and can change those access control lists over
time. (ii) Users can also maintain the bi-directionality of privacy by changing the access
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control settings based on her social interactions. (iii) Finally users can enforce privacy at the
individual or group level by allowing or denying users based on individual preference (e.g.,
show birth date to only close friends) or as a group (e.g., share office party pictures with all
office colleagues).
However, access control does not capture the frequent scenario [103] that the access-
control settings a user chooses does not match the user’s intentions (i.e., the desired privacy)
due to the inherent usability difficulties of specifying access-control policies. Moreover,
Altman stated that privacy is a ‘dynamic’ process, whereas access control is static. Because
temporal changes in privacy have been observed frequently [25], the access control model
does not sufficiently capture this dynamic nature.
Aspects of Petronio’s Communication privacy management (CPM) theory [128] cap-
tured (and not captured) by access control: Petronio’s theory is based on five propositions
(Chapter 2.1.4). Out of these propositions the access control model addresses the first three:
(i) the access control model acknowledges the ownership of the original uploader since only
she (barring the OSM operator) can allow or deny access (ii) Users can specify who can
access their content, thus capturing the right to control the distribution of content. (iii) The
access control model enables users to specify access control lists for OSM content (i.e., lists
of people who are allowed/denies to access the content), thus capturing privacy management
rules.
The two remaining propositions, however are not captured by the access control model.
First, the access control model does not properly address co-ownership of OSM content,
i.e., the access control model enforces that everybody that has access to the content are
co-owners of that information. However, intuitively, the user might only desire to have only
a small subset as co-owners, specifically the people she intends the content for, e.g., a user
might only want her Facebook public profile picture to be seen by a few friends; she may not
want stalkers to collect her pictures. Second, this loose idea of co-ownership in the access
control model can result in boundary turbulence (while not violating access control), when
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some non-intended people view the user’s content and consequently the flow of information
deviates from the user’s expectation. In other words, the access control model does not
concretely capture the user’s desired audience.
Aspects of Palen and Dourish’s extension of Altman’s theory to the networked world [127]
captured (and not captured) by access control: Palen and Dourish discuss three bound-
aries related to privacy as part of their theory (Chapter 2.1.5). Access control captures two
out of these three boundaries: (i) The access control model captures disclosure boundary,
since access control enables users to pick and choose the people and disclose the content
only to them. (ii) Furthermore access control partially enables users to control tension
at the temporal boundary. Conceptually, diligent users could manage the tension at the
temporal boundary by revisiting access control settings regularly, but this requires a huge
time investment from users and is ripe for mistakes.
However, the access control model does not capture the identity boundary. Intuitively,
tension at the identity boundary occurs when some of the audience of OSM content mis-
interpret the content (e.g., reading a post on political opinion out of context). We stress
that it is extremely hard for a user to anticipate such misinterpretation. However, she might
be relatively certain that her intended audience for a particular content are not going to
misinterpret that content. Access control forces uploaders to specify the right audience a
priori which might not always be possible.
Aspects of Solove’s taxonomy of privacy [146, 147] captured (and not captured) by
access control: Solove provided a taxonomy of privacy violations in data flow which can
be used in real-world data-driven systems like OSMs. However, he considered a generic
data-driven system, so not all privacy violations Solove mentioned are applicable to OSMs.
Recall that there are four broad categories of data flow pointed out by Solove (Chapter 2.1.6):
information collection, information processing, information dissemination and invasion. Out
of them invasion of an individual in OSMs (e.g., by forcing a user to divulge her Facebook
password) is again out of the scope of our discussion. Out of the other three categories the
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access control model concretely captures only information collection; the access control
model enforces that only the people a user explicitly allowed can access a piece of OSM
content.
Information processing can result in privacy violations that are not captured by access
control. For example, access control does not stop user data aggregation or inferences based
on that data. Third-party crawlers like Spokeo cause this violation through their use of
public OSM data. The access control model also does not address the dangers of information
dissemination. In fact, it does not capture the scenarios when privacy violations are caused
by increased accessibility of data. However, Facebook faced privacy violation accusations
due to their timeline feature, which makes digging up a user’s historical content extremely
easy (thus increasing accessibility).
Aspects of Nissenbaum’s “privacy as contextual integrity” [24, 124] captured (and not
captured) by access control: Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity (CI) model (Chapter 2.1.7)
of privacy postulates that privacy is preserved by maintaining only appropriate flows of
information that conform to contextual information norms. A privacy violation occurs when
the contextual informational norms are violated. Access control captures a very basic idea
of contextual integrity for a piece of content: access control ensures privacy only when the
informational norms are very concretely specified by users via access control lists (list of
users who are allowed/denied to access the OSM content).
However, contextual integrity takes much more nuanced forms than captured by access
control. For example, earlier work [126] pointed out that many OSM users do not concretely
understand what are the correct informational norms, often due to the novelty of these
OSMs. However, the same work revealed that people still have an implicit idea about how
contextual integrity should be preserved (e.g., a user’s location, although publicly posted
in OSM, should only be revealed to the people who are close to the user). One prime
example of this scenario is the “privacy in public” scenario. CI pointed out that there are
implicit informational norms and hence appropriate information flows associated with even
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public information. However, the access control model assumes that public information
is accessible to anybody and thus access control does not enforce any constraints on who
should see the information or how they should use it.
Summary: Our review of access control in light of privacy theories revealed that access
control does capture many aspects of privacy in OSMs. However, the access control model
still misses some important dimensions of privacy. Specifically, an important aspect of
privacy mentioned in the modern privacy theories is “user desire”, which is not captured by
access control. Users desire/expectation is captured by reserve in Westin’s theory, identity
boundaries in Palen and Dourish’s theory, desired level of privacy in Petronio’s theory or the
informational norms in Nissenbaum’s theory. However, access control does not sufficiently
capture user desire for a number of reasons. First, with access control, users must a priori
specify precisely who can or cannot access information by enumerating users, groups, or
roles—a task that is difficult to get right. Second, access control fails to separate who
can access information from who actually does, because it ignores the difficulty of finding
information. Third, access control does not capture if and how a person who has access to
some information redistributes that information. We summarized the dimensions of privacy
encapsulated in the modern theories of privacy, distinguishing among those that are captured
by the access control model and those that are not, in Table 2.1. However, since access
control is quite useful in designing privacy preserving mechanisms in OSMs as well as
generic online systems, we ask: are there cases of privacy violations in OSM in the real
world that concretely point out the shortcomings of access control?
2.2.2 Case studies of real-world privacy violations not captured by the
access control model
OSMs provide privacy controls based on access control and require users to allow or deny
access to their content by specific users or groups. Recently, there have been a number of
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Privacy definition / theory Aspect(s) captured by access
control
Aspect(s) NOT captured by ac-
cess control
Warren and Brandeis’s the-
ory [168]—privacy as the
right to be let alone.
The right to be let alone, given
OSM users know a priori the ex-
act set of people with whom they
want to share content.
-
Westin’s definition of pri-
vacy [169]
Solitude (being free from observa-
tion by others) and intimacy (small
group seclusion for members to
achieve a close, relaxed, frank re-
lationship).
Reserve (desire to limit disclo-
sures to others).
Altman’s privacy theory
(“the selective control of ac-
cess to the self”) [12, 13, 14]
Dynamic interpersonal boundary
control (e.g., changing access con-
trol over time), bi-directionality,
individual/group level.
The difference between desired
and actual levels of privacy and
consequently the notion of opti-
mal privacy (i.e., when desired =
actual).
Petronio’s Communication
privacy management (CPM)
theory [128]
Ownership of information and pri-
vacy rules created by users.
The boundary turbulence due to
mismatch of privacy rules by
owner and co-owners (in effect,
mismatch between desired privacy
and actual audience).
Palen and Dourish’s exten-
sion of Altman’s theory to the
networked world [127]
Tension at disclosure boundary
(selective disclosure of personal
information) and temporal bound-
ary (via change of access control
over time).
Tension at identity boundary (how
would recipients interpret a piece
of information).
Solove’s taxonomy of pri-
vacy [146, 147]
Information collection methods
like surveillance (the watching, lis-
tening to, or recording of an indi-
vidual’s activities).
Information processing (e.g.,
aggregation—gathering together
of information about a person)
and information dissemination
(e.g., increased accessibility—
amplifying the accessibility of
information).
Nissenbaum’s privacy as con-
textual integrity [24, 124]
Informational norms which are ex-
plicitly specified by users via ac-
cess control lists.
Situations like “privacy in public”
i.e., implicit informational norms.
Table 2.1: The aspects of different privacy definitions which are captured by access control
and the aspects which are not captured by access control.
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incidents that call into question whether access control is the right mechanism with which to
implement privacy. We list a few here; this list is by no means exhaustive.
1. When Facebook introduced the News Feed—a feature that automatically presents updates
from friends when a user logs in, as opposed to requiring the user to visit the friends’ pages—
users objected strongly and accused Facebook of privacy violations. Strictly speaking, News
Feed did not change the access control policy; all users who viewed content through the
News Feed had access to the content before. However the change from a pull mechanism to
a push mechanism resulted in users feeling that their privacy had been violated.
2. There was a similar outcry of privacy violations when Facebook introduced Timeline, a
feature that indexes a user’s content by date of upload and allows users to quickly browse
content by upload date. As with the News Feed, Timeline did not change the access control
policy of any content. Instead, Timeline made accessing old (and potentially embarrassing)
content significantly easier.
3. Google’s Street View project—providing photos of houses and other property taken from
public street—has also been accused of violating the privacy of users. In the U.S., there is
no legal expectation of privacy on a public street (i.e., Street View photos can legally be
posted publicly), but many users feel uncomfortable that Street View has made information
easily and widely accessible that previously was visible only to those physically present.
4. Data aggregator Spokeo links together public information from different services (e.g.,
government databases, sites like LinkedIn, etc). While each individual piece of content
that Spokeo aggregates is publicly available, users have complained that their privacy is
violated when this information is linked together. For example, Spokeo cross-references
users’ addresses with property records, allowing others to quickly estimate someone’s wealth
using public information.
While perceptions of privacy and what constitutes a privacy violation are subjective,
most people would likely agree that each of the incidents above affect someone’s privacy.
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However, the take-away from all of these incidents and others is that none of them involved
a violation of access control. As a result, we argue that privacy is not adequately captured
by access control alone, and the research community should re-consider how to improve the
access control model and reason about user privacy.
2.2.3 Goal: A more inclusive privacy model
In this thesis, we carefully reconsider the issue of privacy in the age of the web and social
media. We propose a model of privacy based on exposure, where the exposure of a piece of
information is defined as the set of principals (people) who are expected to eventually know
it.3 Users implicitly reason about the exposure of various pieces of information; a violation
of exposure occurs when the set of users who become aware of a piece of information
is much different from what the user expected. In fact, recent work [27] by Facebook
researchers have shown that such exposure violations are commonplace; e.g., many users
significantly underestimate the number of users who actually view their content.
For example, consider the case of a user’s public Facebook page being linked to from
a high-profile web site such as the New York Times. Strictly speaking, there is no access
control violation; the user’s profile was previously publicly visible. However, a significant
change of exposure occurs as the set of people expected to see the page increases from a
small set of users likely to visit the user’s page to the much larger set of New York Times
readers. We argue that exposure naturally captures the privacy change of such an incident,
and makes clear why access control alone is insufficient. Note that our model of exposure
control (i.e., controlling the entities who actually view the content) can be interpreted as a
simple improvement over access control (controlling the entities who can access the content).
We will compare access control and exposure control in more detail later in this chapter.
3Note that our definition of the term exposure is quite different from the term exposure in Solove’s taxonomy
(Chapter 2.1.6). Solove defined exposure as revealing one’s nudity, grief, or bodily functions. However, in this
thesis, we define exposure to refer to the set of entities who actually view content.
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We discuss mechanisms that could increase user’s control over privacy by moving from
access control towards exposure control, and describe how these mechanisms could be built
into today’s content sharing systems.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Chapter 2.3, we provide a
more formal definition of exposure and compare the exposure control model with more
traditional access control. In Chapter 2.4, we describe approaches that could provide users
with improved privacy via exposure controls. We expand upon our proposal to control
exposure via prediction in Chapter 2.5 and explore the feasibility of controlling exposure
via prediction. Finally, we summarize our findings in Chapter 2.6.
2.3 Defining exposure
In this chapter, we propose a simple model for exposure control.
Let I be an item of information (e.g., Alice’s date of birth is Jan 1, 1980). Informally,
I’s exposure is the set of principals we expect to eventually learn I . The exposure set
includes principals who learn I directly from Alice or indirectly from a third person with
knowledge of I , and those who infer I from other knowledge available to them.
More precisely, we define the prominence PI(t) as the set of principals who are aware of
I at time t.4 I’s exposure EI = lim
t→∞
PI(t). Note that EI is always finite, because the set of
principals (i.e., the world’s population) is finite. However, the exposure of most information
items, even if they are publicly accessible, is much smaller than the world’s population,
because they are of interest to only a small community.
Normally, PI(t) is unknown for t > currentT ime. Future values of PI(t) must be
estimated using a probabilistic model, which captures how information spreads among
principals; the exposure is given by the expected steady-state prominence predicted by the
model. An example of such a model is discussed in Chapter 2.5.
4Prominence is assumed to be a monotonically non-decreasing function of time. That is, we ignore that
people forget or misplace information.
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2.3.1 Aspects of exposure
The exposure of an item I is influenced by two factors:
1. The set of principals NI that meet the preconditions required to learn I . (Preconditions
include the expertise, access to the tools, and knowledge of initial leads required to discover
or infer I .)
2. The subset of principals in NI that is sufficiently motivated to actually learn I .
For instance, if learning I requires correlating several pieces of related information, traveling
to a particular location or performing a measurement, then it is likely to be learned only
by principals with the necessary resources and a strong interest. If, on the other hand, I
is online and indexed by a search engine, then it can be learned by anyone with access to
the Internet, the expertise to use a search engine, knowledge of appropriate keywords, and
sufficient interest to actively issue a search query. Lastly, if I is posted on the front page of
the New York Times, then all principals who visit the site on a daily basis will likely learn I
serendipitously, even if they are only mildly interested.
The exposure of an item of information may change over time. For instance, when a
little-known website is listed on Slashdot, the set of users likely to discover the information
contained in it increases dramatically and unexpectedly. Such events cause a discontinuity
in the prominence function PI(t), and thus a potential change of exposure.
2.3.2 Privacy violations covered by exposure
Whether the release of information about a person is considered a privacy violation by that
person is subjective and deeply rooted in the person’s culture, history, situation, the nature
of the information, and the specific set of people who learned the information.
In general, however, a person is more likely to feel violated if she is surprised by the
fact that certain people have learned the information. There are two relevant cases. A person
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Figure 2.1: Access control and exposure of an information item I shown as a Venn diagram.
typically has some expectation about (a) the set of people who know or are likely to learn
an item of information, and (b) a specific set of people they expect should not and will not
learn the information. A person tends to feel their privacy is violated if the actual exposure
of an item includes many more people than the expected exposure [46], or if people in the
second set learn the information.
An example of the former case would be if Alice finds out that a picture showing her
dancing wildly at a party has been seen by all of her friends, family and colleagues, when
she expected that it would become known only to the people who had attended the party.
An example of the latter case would be if Alice’s work colleagues find out that she is gay
(even though she shares this information freely with her friends and family, and she makes
no attempt to hide it from people she encounters in her life outside of work).
Exposure captures these concerns because it reflects the set of people likely to find
out the information. In general, the exposure control model captures the privacy violation
scenarios where the expected exposure of users deviated from actual exposure.
2.3.3 Comparison with access control
Figure 2.1 contrasts access control and exposure using a Venn diagram. In the access control
model, the set of principals is partitioned into those who are able to access I and those
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who are not. Access control does not capture how many principals with access permissions
actually access the information, nor does it account for principals without permission who
nevertheless learn the information, either by inferring it from other information they can
access, or from another principal with access.
We want to highlight two specific aspects of exposure control. First, although our general
notion of exposure captures the privacy violation due to inference/re-sharing, measuring
extent of such inferences is a hard problem and designing OSMs to protect against such
attacks is even harder. So we will limit ourselves in this thesis to exploration of exposure
control when there is no inference/re-sharing attack. Our assumption essentially makes the
exposure set a subset of users who can access information I . Other researchers [117, 34]
investigated inference/re-sharing attacks in OSMs and their work is complementary to ours.
Second, exposure control is an extension of access control (since exposure is a subset
of who can access I by our simplified assumption above). Thus in practice, we envision
exposure control augmenting access control in order to provide better privacy management
mechanisms to OSM users. Specifically, a user can (ideally) control the exposure of a piece
of content by including only the set of people who would actually view the content in the
access control list of the content (e.g., very close friends). However, setting such perfect
access control lists at the time of content creation might be difficult of even impossible for
the user (exemplified by a plethora of OSM content shared publicly today). To that end, we
review the additional aspects of privacy that our exposure control model captures which are
not captured by access control alone.
2.3.3.1 Aspects of privacy definitions additionally captured by exposure control
Earlier, we reviewed which aspects of privacy are captured and not captured by access
control (Table 2.1). Here we describe the additional notions of privacy that we can capture
with exposure control. We summarize our findings in Table 2.2:
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Aspects of Warren and Brandeis’s theory [168] additionally captured by exposure
control: Warren and Brandeis theory of privacy as the right to be let alone. As we mentioned,
this early theory captures only a basic requirement of privacy, and the access control model
already captures this basic requirement.
Aspects of Westin’s definition of privacy [169] additionally captured by exposure con-
trol: Exposure control additionally captures the state of “reserve” (desire to limit information
disclosure to others and others recognizing and respecting that desire), which is not captured
by access control. This is because the exposure control model integrates users’ intentions,
not just the reality of their access control setting, as part of the expected exposure set. Thus,
even if an OSM user uploads a photo to an OSM and sets the access control to the public
setting (all of the internet), she might expect the exposure set of the photo to contain only
her close friends and family. Her expected set likely does not include web crawlers.
Aspects of Altman’s privacy theory [12, 13, 14] additionally captured by exposure
control: Unlike access control, exposure control captures the difference between desired and
actual levels of privacy using the notion that privacy violations might occur when expected
exposure deviates from actual exposure. Thus exposure control indeed distinguishes between
desired and actual levels of privacy. Moreover, just like Altman’s theory, exposure control
also strives to keep the actual exposure the same as the expected exposure, thus allowing a
notion of “optimal level of privacy” (when actual exposure = expected exposure).
Aspects of Petronio’s Communication privacy management (CPM) theory [128] addi-
tionally captured by exposure control: Our exposure control model captures two proposi-
tions of Petronio’s theory which were not captured by the access control model. First, when
an OSM user uploads her content, her expected exposure set consists of only the people who
are expected to view the content. Thus, via this expectation, users are restricting the set of
co-owners to the expected exposure set and not all people who just can access the content.
Thus, the co-owners in the exposure control model are much more restricted and closer to
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user expectations. Second, exposure control captures the idea of having an optimal set of
co-owners (i.e., expected exposure set = actual exposure set in exposure control) helps to
maintain less tension while ensuring the desired flow of information for the content owner.
Aspects of Palen and Dourish’s extension of Altman’s theory to the networked world [127]
additionally captured by exposure control: Recall that the access control model does not
capture tension at the identity boundary (when some of the audience of OSM content
misinterpret the content) in Palen and Dourish’s theory. Exposure control helps to capture
this boundary because the aim of the exposure control model is to help users align their
actual exposure with the exposure they expect. We argue that users originally expected their
content to be actually viewed by people in their expected exposure set. Thus, there is lower
risk of tensions at identity boundaries when exposure control is in place along with access
control.
Aspects of Solove’s taxonomy of privacy [146, 147] additionally captured by exposure
control: Exposure control captures some privacy violations in the information processing
and dissemination phase that are not captured by access control. For example, access control
does not recognize the danger of aggregating and mining public data or even the privacy
risks of easy accessibility (e.g., advanced search functionality) of data. However, exposure
control argues that aggregation or increased accessibility potentially increases the actual
exposure of content—since these mechanisms make content easier to learn. Hence, exposure
control captures these additional privacy violations that are not captured by access control.
We note that even our exposure control model does not capture some privacy violations
pointed out by Solove. Examples include insecurity, secondary use, exclusion, disclosure,
appropriation, distortion and decisional interference. Capturing these privacy violations in
OSMs is part of our future research directions.
Aspects of Nissenbaum’s “privacy as contextual integrity” [24, 124] additionally cap-
tured by exposure control: Exposure control catches the more nuanced idea of contextual
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informational norms compared to the access control model, thus better capturing the notion
of privacy as contextual integrity (CI). The reason is that the exposure control model argues
for controlling actual exposure, so that it is the same as user’s expected exposure. Thus
expected exposure partially captures the past experience of users (which plays a role in
following the expectation). For example, exposure control captures the idea of “privacy in
public”: CI pointed out that there are implicit informational norms and hence appropriate
information flows associated with even public information. The exposure control model
points out that even for public content (anybody can access the content), the user will still
have an expected exposure of how many people will actually view the content. Thus, she
still has some notions of expected exposure even for public content.
However some aspects of CI are not captured by exposure control. Since the exposure
control model relies on the user’s expected exposure, if the user has no prior expectation
of what exposure her content should have, then the exposure control model can not help
them. However, CI captures possible violations even in this case, since the contextual
informational norms can be set by society at large and ethical concerns even without that
particular user’s expectation.
Summary: From these discussions, we note that our exposure control model considerably
extends access control by capturing a key aspect of privacy—a user’s expectation or desire
about who views her content. We explicitly capture the notion of this user intention
mentioned in privacy theories (e.g., reserve in Westin’s definition, identity boundary in
Palen and Dourish’s theory, desired level of privacy in Petronio’s CPM theory or some
implicit informational norms in Nissenbaum’s theory). We summarize our findings on the
additional aspects of privacy captured by exposure control in Table 2.2. These aspects were
not captured by the access control model alone. This table clearly demonstrates the benefit
of designing OSM systems with mechanisms for controlling exposure. Let us now revisit
the real-world privacy violations from Chapter 2.2.2 to further check the effectiveness of
exposure control.
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Privacy definition / theory Additional aspect(s) captured by exposure control
Warren and Brandeis’s the-
ory [168]—privacy as the
right to be let alone.
-
Westin’s definition of pri-
vacy [169]
Reserve (desire to limit disclosures to others), since exposure con-
siders the user’s expected exposure while controlling exposure.
Altman’s privacy theory
(“the selective control of ac-
cess to the self”) [12, 13, 14]
The difference between desired and actual levels of privacy and
consequently the notion of optimal privacy (i.e., when desired =
actual). This is because actually the people who saw a content is
the actual privacy and expected exposure is the desired privacy.
Petronio’s Communication
privacy management (CPM)
theory [128]
The boundary turbulence due to mismatch of privacy rules by
owner and co-owners. Since exposure control model captures, in
effect, the tension between desired exposure (from the owners)
and actual exposure (affected by co-owners).
Palen and Dourish’s exten-
sion of Altman’s theory to the
networked world [127]
Tension at identity boundary. Since the people in expected expo-
sure set will possibly interpret a piece of information as the user
intended.
Solove’s taxonomy of pri-
vacy [146, 147]
Information processing (e.g., aggregation—gathering together of
information about a person increases actual exposure of content
and violate privacy without violating access control) and infor-
mation dissemination (e.g., increased accessibility—amplifying
the accessibility of information also increases actual exposure by
making the content easier to find).
Nissenbaum’s “pri-
vacy as contextual in-
tegrity” [24, 124]
Situations like “privacy in public”,i.e., some implicit informa-
tional norms. Since the implicit informational norms can be
partially captured by the expected exposure of a content.
Table 2.2: Additional aspects of different privacy definitions captured by exposure control.
The aspects of privacy captured by access control (in Table 2.1) and exposure con-
trol in aggregate captures most aspects of existing privacy theories.
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privacy violations we discussed in Chapter 2.2.2. Recall that these violations are not captured
by the access control model alone.
1. Exposure captures the changes caused by the introduction of the Facebook News Feed:
Prior to its introduction, the exposure of an item I on Alice’s profile was the number of
unique users who visit Alice’s Facebook page during I’s lifetime, which could be much
smaller than the set of users NI with permission to access I , particularly if Alice chose to
make I public. With the News Feed, in contrast, I’s exposure includes all of Alice’s friends
plus any user in NI who Facebook deems potentially interested in I . I is pushed to these
users, who will learn I serendipitously the next time they log into Facebook.
2. Similarly, the introduction of Facebook’s Timeline pushes selected information about
a person’s history to a set of principles in NI that Facebook deems interested. Previously,
finding such information would have required a user in NI to visit Alice’s profile and scroll
potentially deep down into her historic News Feed.
3. Google Street View has made available online, in an aggregated and searchable fashion,
public information that was previously available only to principals who were physically
present at a particular geographic location. Exposure reflects this fact.
4. Spokeo aggregates people’s personal information like name, address, data of birth, income,
property value and family tree, which is available from different online sources, and makes
it available and searchable under the person’s name and place of residence. By making it far
easier to learn this information, its exposure is increased.
Thus, in short, exposure control captures real-world privacy violations that the access
control model does not capture. However, exposure control still has its own set of limitations.
2.3.4 Limitations of exposure control
Our model of exposure has a number of limitations. First, it focuses on an individual item
of information. When considering a collection of personal information about a person, for
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instance, additional aspects of privacy like the credibility or authenticity of the information
come into play, which are not captured in our model. Second, there are aspects of privacy
theories which are still not captured by exposure control; these cases include some aspects
of Solove’s privacy taxonomy (insecurity, secondary use, exclusion etc.) as well as the
implicit contextual norms that are deep-rooted in social processes. For example, suppose an
OSM user is not aware that she is being stalked by ex girlfriends/boyfriends/strangers (and
thus include the stalker in her expected exposure set). However stalking is still violating
current social norms and thus constitutes a violation of contextual integrity.
2.4 Managing privacy via exposure
In this part, we discuss how the concept of exposure can be leveraged in practical systems to
enable users to better manage their online privacy. We mention three strategies to control
exposure below. In this section, we will expand upon one of these strategies. We will
systematically investigate the rest of the strategies in details later in this thesis (Chapters 3,
4, 5 and 6).
2.4.1 Controlling exposure via setting conservative access control
OSM users can naturally control exposure by meticulously choosing a subset of their friends
who they expected to view the content and only including that subset in their access control
list. We refer to these subsets of users who are able to access a particular piece of content as
social access control lists (social ACLs, or SACLs); by definition, a SACL is a proper subset
of a userâA˘Z´s friends who are selected by the user to access a piece of content. Note that
this solution is not perfect, since entities outside of SACL can often infer a particular piece
of information from other available information. However, the ubiquity of access control
mechanisms in OSMs makes this approach readily available to users. To that end, our work
sheds light on how users are deploying conservative SACLs in the real world, allowing only
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a subset of their social connections to access a particular piece of content. Furthermore,
based on our understanding we propose mechanisms to help users specify their SACLs and
control exposure. We present this work in Chapter 3.
2.4.2 Controlling longitudinal exposure
Earlier we mentioned the temporal dimension of exposure, in which a piece of content can
be seen by more and more people as time passes. This longitudinal exposure may be quite
concerning to OSM users, especially if they think that others may view and interpret some
past content totally out of context. To that end, a natural way to control longitudinal exposure
for users is to simply withdraw their past content. We further investigate the withdrawal
of past content in OSMs and how we can improve longitudinal exposure in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6.
2.4.3 Controlling exposure via prediction
The former two strategies of exposure control are primarily user-driven, e.g., users them-
selves set SACLs or users control their longitudinal exposure by withdrawing historical
content. However OSM operators can be more proactive in designing their systems to
control exposure, e.g., by predicting the expected exposure of a content while creation using
past history and minimize deviation of actual exposure from that prediction. In Section 2.5,
we develop a general methodology of controlling exposure via prediction. In Chapter 4 we
will thoroughly investigate one simple case of such exposure control—controlling exposure
by limiting large-scale social data aggregators.
2.5 Generic framework to control exposure via prediction
There are two important notes to make before we discuss exposure control via prediction.
First, our goal is to propose a general methodology that could be broadly applied to control
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(a) Niche video with total 471 views (b) Popular video with total 6,101,294 views
Figure 2.2: Popularity growth patterns of two Youtube videos. The popularity of the niche
video stabilize and becomes predictable within a year, but the popularity of the
popular video exhibits an uprise and shows steady growth.
exposure of users’ information in a variety of online systems. Thus, our discussion is
not specific to any one system. Second, there are several interesting research questions
that remain to be investigated through a concrete implementation and deployment of our
proposal. However, such a full-blown deployment-based study is beyond the scope of this
thesis and we view the deployment challenges of our generic framework as specific future
research directions.
2.5.1 Predicting exposure
Modeling and predicting the growth in popularity of information on social Web sites like
Facebook photos, Twitter posts or YouTube videos [100, 86, 154] has received significant
research attention recently. These studies use empirical data of how information became
popular in the past to build models for information propagation that can predict the future
popularity of similar information. Popularity growth models are relevant because they can
predict he cardinality of exposure. The prediction models vary from very simple models that
extrapolate from the historical growth in popularity of a single piece of information; to more
complex models that take into account various factors including attributes of the information
(e.g., quality, type, and length of a video), historical data about the spread of other similar
pieces of information, and the effectiveness of different information dissemination channels
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(e.g., social links between users or personalized recommendations or search results). More
sophisticated models with higher prediction accuracy have been developed over time. While
a detailed discussion of these models is beyond the scope of this work, we make two general
observations that are relevant to our discussion:
1. Prediction accuracies are higher for less popular (niche) information than they are for
more popular information. For example, it is easier to predict the future popularity of
YouTube videos with a few hundred views after 1 year than those with few million views
after 1 month [154]. As shown in Figure 2.2(a), the dissemination of niche videos tends to
stabilize to a predictable rate sooner than those of popular videos.
2. Most models cannot anticipate the occasional sharp, disruptive jumps in popularity that
arise due to unanticipated events, such as when a piece of information goes viral or when
it is featured on a prominent site [136]. Figure 2.2(b) shows an example YouTube video
whose number of views experienced a sharp jump on day 60 due to coverage on popular
media and blogs.
2.5.2 Making the predictions transparent
We argue that system operators (e.g., Facebook or YouTube administrators) should make both
past popularity data and predictions for the (cardinality of) exposure of users’ information
transparent to the user. Currently, some systems provide users with a limited view of the
popularity of the information they upload. For example, Facebook and YouTube allows
users to check the number of views or “Likes" for their posts. However, no site today
explicitly provides estimates of the future popularity of a piece of information. For example,
neither Facebook nor YouTube offer guidance on how many and which people might see a
photo over the next week. We see this as a missed opportunity because (i) the site operators
are often in the best position to make such predictions as they have the best access to
all the empirical data on how information disseminates through their sites and (ii) such
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estimates would enable users to (re)calibrate their expectations for the future exposure of
their information and check for potential privacy violations.
When providing estimates for the exposure of a piece of information, it would also be
useful to estimate the likely exposure through different dissemination channels separately.
For example, Facebook might choose to provide estimates of views a user’s photo might
achieve through updates on personalized news feeds versus graph search versus profile
browsing [70]. Doing so would enable users to understand the predicted exposure of their
content, and to modify the sharing settings if it does not match their expectations.
2.5.3 Controlling exposure
Providing users with more accurate exposure estimates for their information does not by
itself eliminate the risk of privacy violations. System designs need to enable users to tune
(i.e., increase or decrease) the exposure to the values they desire. Further, systems should
be designed to also prevent the actual prominence from deviating significantly from the
predictions (after they are tuned to desired values). Below we propose mechanisms to
achieve the above two goals.
Tuning exposure: When a user finds that the predicted exposure of her information is
different from what she desires, there need to be mechanisms that would allow her to tune
the exposure. A user could do this in several ways: first, she could enable or disable one or
more dissemination channels. For example, on Facebook, one could opt-in/-out of being part
of “directory or graph search.” Such opt-in/-outs from one or more dissemination channels
could help users manipulate their exposure to desired levels.
Second, users can resort to more expansive or restrictive access controls (i.e., who
is allowed to see or not see a piece of information) to change the exposure of a piece
of information. For example, to increase exposure of a piece of information originally
shared with her 1-hop friends, a Facebook user might choose to make it available to 2-hop
friends (i.e., friends of friends). To decrease exposure, the user might choose to make it
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available to only a subset of 1-hop friends (e.g., friends with whom the user shares a common
university affiliation). By changing access controls, the user can expand or contract the list
of potential viewers and thereby, change the list of predicted viewers. Thus, we envision
access control being used in conjunction with exposure control to more closely match the
user’s expectations.
Limiting divergence from predictions: Even after a user tunes the exposure to match her
expectations, unanticipated events (e.g., the information goes viral and is featured on the
front page of a popular site) might cause the actual exposure to deviate significantly from the
predictions and consequently, the desired exposure. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2.5.1,
no model can accurately predict such occasional disruptive changes to the prominence of a
piece of information.
To contain privacy violations in such scenarios, we propose that systems adopt tripwires
that automatically make a piece of information inaccessible whenever the actual exposure of
a piece of information deviates significantly from the predicted exposure and notify the user
of the unanticipated divergence. Upon notification, users can explicitly choose to keep the
information inaccessible or re-enable access to the information (and readjust the tripwires).
Alternately, systems can allow users to specify tripwires that upper-bound the views (e.g.,
no more than 10 views per day or 50 views in total) to a piece of information.
We believe that tripwire mechanisms can be easily enabled in current systems like
YouTube or Facebook. In fact, YouTube already allows users to limit the total number of
views to their videos to a preset value of 50 (effectively providing a limited form of exposure
control) [176].
2.5.4 Feasibility of controlling exposure via prediction
There are a number of interesting research questions that need to be studied through a
concrete implementation and deployment of our proposal of managing privacy via exposure.
Such a detailed study is the subject of our future work and beyond the scope of this work.
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Figure 2.3: Prediction of number of people accessing a content in three scenarios: scenarios 1,
2 and 3 corresponds to prediction of public YouTube video views, Facebook group
post views and photo likes on personal Facebook photos respectively. The relative
error of prediction decreased from scenario 1 to 3.
However, we discuss two important concerns that one might have about the feasibility of a
practical deployment of our proposal: (i) our ability to accurately predict the future exposure
of a piece of information and (ii) the overheads associated with fine-tuning exposure.
2.5.4.1 Accuracy of exposure predictions
There is ongoing research on predicting information propagation and dissemination in online
systems. These works leverage the ability of sites to gather and analyze detailed historical
information about the exposure of billions of pieces of information posted by hundreds
of millions of users to make accurate predictions. For example, in a recent study [27],
Facebook researchers were able to predict the audience size of a new post by a user within
an 8% error margin, using data such as the number of friends and the likes and comments
the post received. To illustrate the ability to make such predictions in different scenarios, we
conducted a small-scale study in three different real-world scenarios, each using different
access control policies—(i) public posts on sites like YouTube, (ii) posts limited to members
of Facebook groups and (iii) personal posts limited to one’s Facebook friends.
In each of these scenarios, we used linear regression [102] for predicting the future
popularity using past information and then measure the relative error of our prediction.
Relative error is defined as
∣∣1− Predicted valueActual value ∣∣. The lower the relative error, the more accurate
the predictions. In each of the scenarios, we show how system operators can use different
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types of past information to predict the future popularity of a content with low error, i.e,
high accuracy.
Scenario 1: Predicting future popularity of public YouTube posts. We analyzed the past
number of daily view for publicly posted YouTube videos to predict their future popularity.
Specifically, we collected data about the number of daily views that 50 randomly chosen
YouTube videos obtained in their first 6 months. We used this historical data to predict how
many views the videos will get the immediate next day.
Scenario 2: Predicting future popularity for new posts in Facebook groups. Next, we tried
to predict the number of views for a new post in an open Facebook group [61] using the
popularity of older posts in the same group [55]. We collected popularity data for the posts
of 50 open Facebook groups and predicted the number of views for the latest post in each of
these groups using the popularity of older posts.
Scenario 3: Predicting future popularity of personal posts limited to one’s Facebook friends.
We collected data about the pictures shared by 50 Facebook users (randomly selected users
of a Facebook application [71] created by authors) with their friends along with the number
of “Likes” on those pictures. Using this data, we predicted the number of “Likes” a user
would get on a future photo shared with the same access control policy. We performed this
prediction for the latest photo of each user.
We present the distribution of relative errors in predictions for each of these scenarios in
Figure 2.3. Note that, intuitively the set of people who can learn about the content decreases
from scenario 1 to scenario 3. Figure 2.3 shows that consequently the relative error decreases
from scenario 1 to scenario 3. However, even in the case of scenario 1, where the videos
are public and the information can spread through multiple possibly unknown channels, for
75% of the videos the relative error is less than 0.1 (i.e. actual value is within ±10% of the
predicted value).
Our study, while conducted at a very small scale, hints at the potential for accurately
predicting the future popularity in different real-world scenarios. We plan to conduct larger-
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scale studies in the future. Furthermore, there is significant ongoing research on predicting
information propagation and dissemination in online systems and new techniques are being
proposed [31, 70, 86, 27]. As the field advances, we expect the accuracy of predictions to
improve as well.
2.5.4.2 Overheads associated with fine-tuning exposure
At first glance, it would appear that supporting exposure control would require users to
check and fine-tune the exposure for every single piece of their information separately,
which raises usability concerns. In practice, users might want to organize all their pieces of
information into a small number of groups, each with a different level of desired exposure.
So when a new piece of information is uploaded, they can easily set its exposure to the
desired level by choosing the appropriate exposure group. The overheads involved here
would be no greater, if not lower, than the overheads involved with configuring privacy
settings of uploaded content in social media sites today.
2.5.5 A special case: Controlling exposure by limiting large-scale so-
cial data aggregators
We note that a OSM operators can deny access proactively to entities who they can predict to
most likely not be in the expected exposure set of a user. Of course the prediction overhead
is minimal in this special case for the OSM operators. A practical manifestation of this
situation occurs when third party large scale data aggregators, i.e. crawlers (e.g., Spokeo)
aims to collect public user data from OSMs. Although the data is public, the OSM operator
can (with high confidence) predict that a crawler is not in the expected exposure set of a
piece of public user generated content and take steps to limit access of the crawler and
fine-tune the exposure. Today OSM operators control exposure to crawlers by putting rate
limits on number of views from particular IP addresses or particular accounts. However
their technique cannot stop crawlers who leverage fake (Sybil) or compromised accounts.
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We will revisit this scenario in Chapter 4 to propose a system for OSM operators to control
exposure from large scale third party data aggregators.
2.6 Discussion
We argue that access control, the traditional model for managing privacy, is inadequate in
today’s online world. In this work, we propose a model for information privacy based on
exposure to fill the gaps left by access control. A key difference compared to access control
is that exposure captures the principals who actually learn a piece of information rather than
who can directly access a piece of information. We believe exposure is an intuitive measure
that captures the privacy implications of publishing information and strengthens privacy
management in OSMs.
We discussed how the concept of exposure can be leveraged in practical systems to
enable users to manage their online privacy better. We propose three strategies from the real
world—(i) controlling exposure via SACLs, i.e., social access control lists (ii) Controlling
exposure via prediction, a special case of which is controlling exposure from large scale
third part crawlers (ii) controlling longitudinal exposure. We will investigate each of these
scenarios to demonstrate the effectiveness of exposure control in the next chapters, starting
with exploring how exposure can be controlled using SACLs.
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CHAPTER 3
Understanding and controlling
exposure using SACLs
OSM users can naturally control exposure by meticulously choosing the subset of their
friends who they expected to view the content and only including that subset in their access
control list. Today, while much OSM content is shared with default settings (e.g., visible
to all of a user’s friends or even to everybody on internet), certain sensitive content is
indeed often shared with subsets of friends. For example, on Facebook, users may explicitly
enumerate friends to allow or deny the ability to view a photo, or create friendlists for the
same purpose. We refer to these resulting sets of users who are able to access content as
social access control lists (social ACLs, or SACLs); by definition, a SACL is a proper subset
of a user’s friends who are selected by the user to access a piece of content. Due to the
privacy-sensitive nature of the content the SACLs protect, one of the hardest parts of using
today’s OSM privacy management tools is defining appropriate SACLs for different pieces
of content. Thus for effective exposure control the OSM operators needs to simplify the
SACL specifications for the OSM users.
Many prior studies have examined the privacy concerns that arise when users share
content on Facebook, such as the problem of “over-sharing” content with default settings that
make the content visible to everyone in the network [103]. As a solution, researchers have
proposed grouping friends into subgroups based on their relationship type (e.g., high school
friends, work colleagues, family) or community structure in the one-hop network of the user,
and sharing content with specific subgroups [59]. However, most of these approaches rely on
small scale user studies where they conduct a survey to understand the privacy preferences
of users to evaluate their technique. None of these approaches have been evaluated on
how well they capture real privacy preferences specified using SACLs. Given that content
shared with SACLs is likely to be the most privacy sensitive (and therefore, likely the most
important), having an understanding of the SACLs in-use is crucial to designing improved
privacy mechanisms for OSM users.
In this work, we make three contributions: First, we conduct the first large-scale
measurement study of use of SACLs in OSMs. Using a popular Facebook application
installed by over 1,000 users, we collect a total of 7,602 unique SACLs specified by users.1
We find that over 67% of users are sharing at least some of their uploaded content using
SACLs, and that 17.6% of all content is shared with a SACL; these observations underscore
the important and unstudied role that SACLs play in users’ privacy management.
Second, we focus on understanding the membership of SACLs (i.e., how are the friends
who are allowed to view a piece of content similar to each other, but different from other
friends?). Examining the in-use SACLs that we collected, we find that for less than 10%
of SACLs all the members of the SACL share a common profile attribute. Moreover, we
find that only 20% of SACLs show strong community structure in the links between their
members. Taken together, these results suggest that SACLs are likely to be difficult to detect
automatically. This result is surprising given the existing work on automatically grouping
friends based on network structure or attributes for better privacy management [112, 59];
We suspect that this difference occurs because these prior studies did not evaluate their
techniques against ground-truth data about fine-grained content sharing in OSMs.
Third, we explore the difficulty faced by users in specifying SACLs today. Overall, we
find that the complexity of SACLs (as defined by the number of terms2 a user must select
1Our study was conducted under Northeastern University Institutional Review Board protocol #14-01-09.
2When creating a SACL, a user can specify either individual friends or pre-created lists of friends; we refer
to both of these as terms.
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when creating a SACL) is quite high for a non negligible fraction of our users: over 18% of
users specify more than 5 terms per SACL on average. We observe that there is significant
room for improvement in reducing the burden of specifying SACLs, and we find that simply
allowing users to re-use previously used SACLs reduces much of the user overhead: for
the vast majority (> 80%) of users, 90% of their content is shared with fewer than 5 unique
SACLs.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Chapter 3.1 presents background
and related work on SACLs and OSM privacy. Chapter 3.2 describes how we obtained our
SACL data set, and Chapter 3.3 provides some high-level statistics on SACLs. Chapter 3.4
explores the relationship between SACL members, while Chapter 3.5 investigates the user
overhead in specifying SACLs today. Finally, Chapter 3.6 present a discussion of our
findings and future directions.
3.1 Background and related work
In this chapter, we first provide some background on how OSMs have evolved in help-
ing users to manage their data privacy today. Our focus is on the fine-grained privacy
management tools that enable the sharing of privacy sensitive content on OSMs.
In this work, we focus on the largest OSM as of March 2014—Facebook. Up until
2005, Facebook split users on the site into different regional networks (based on geography,
workplace or educational institution). By default, each user would share all of her content
with everyone in the regional network and the service lacked any concrete privacy controls
for sensitive data. By 2009, Facebook had 300 million [58] users and some regional
networks grew too large (e.g., in India and China) to be used for privacy settings. There
were widespread demands for better privacy management mechanisms for users [33], and
by the end of 2009, Facebook rolled out more fine-grained privacy controls.
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3.1.1 Mechanisms for privacy management
In December 2009, Facebook made an important change which allowed users to set access
control policies for content they publish on a per-post basis [68]. For example, a user can
share a particular photo with only family members and close friends. This change allowed
users to customize their privacy settings on a per-content basis, instead of simply adopting
the default privacy setting offered by Facebook, which allows access to “everyone” (all users
on Facebook) [64].
Facebook introduced an additional mechanism called friend lists [73] to complement
their existing fine-grained privacy controls. Users can create friend lists and add a subset of
their friends to each of these lists. For example, a user can create a list called “co-workers”
and manually add all of her friends who are co-workers into that list. This allows the user
to group her friends into different lists that might be meaningful to her in terms of sharing
content. Now, instead of handpicking individual friends for specifying a privacy setting for
each content, users can use their pre-created friend lists for specifying privacy settings (e.g.,
share this photo with “soccer buddies” list). Friend lists are private to the user who creates
them.
By October 2010, Facebook observed that only a small percentage (5%) of Facebook
users had ever created friend lists [74]. This could be due to the manual effort required
of the users to create and maintain friend lists. To help users further, Facebook started
automatically creating friend lists for the user and populated the lists with a specific subset
of the user’s friends [57]; these lists are called smart lists. This automation is done by
leveraging the profile attributes of the user and the user’s friends, e.g., employer, location,
family and education information provided by users. An example would be a list called
“Family” that automatically groups all the friends of the user who have marked the user as
a family member. In addition, Facebook also creates two empty smart lists for the user,
“Close Friends” and “Acquaintances”. However, instead of auto-populating these two lists,
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Facebook only shows friend recommendations to the users based on the interaction between
the user and her friends. In this work, we will refer to all of these Facebook-created smart
lists as Facebook lists. Moreover, when using the term lists we are referring to both the
user-created friend lists as well as Facebook lists.
So far, we observed that there are different ways in which a user can specify which
friends have access to a piece of content on Facebook today. In the rest of the work, we
will use the term social access control lists (social ACLs or SACLs) to refer to such privacy
policy specifications. A more precise definition is below.
Social access control lists (SACLs): A SACL is a privacy policy specification attached
to a piece of content containing a proper subset of the user’s friends; friends specified in
the SACL have access to view and perform other actions on the content (e.g, liking or
commenting). SACLs can be specified using different mechanisms provided by Facebook:
allowing or denying access to individual friends one by one, specifying friend lists, using
Facebook lists, or using a combination of handpicked friends and lists.3
It is important to note that SACLs only encompass custom settings by users and do not
include the Facebook pre-defined access permissions: “everyone" or “public" (share with all
Facebook users), “regional network" (share with everyone in a regional network, deprecated
in 2009), “all friends-of-friends" (share with all friends-of-friends), “all friends" (share with
all friends), and “only me” (only visible to the user who uploaded the content).
3.1.2 Related work
Now that we understand the background of this work, we discuss related work along three
directions.
3Facebook also allows users who are tagged in a specific post to see the content [67, 69]. However, since
users did not specify tagged friends explicitly through the privacy management interface, we do not consider
them to be the part of SACLs. We leave exploring privacy expressed through tags to future work.
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Understanding privacy awareness of users Researchers have studied the privacy aware-
ness of OSM users [48, 152, 92]. These studies examine the profile information sharing
behavior of users over a long period of time (e.g., 7 years) to understand if users’ attitude
towards their data privacy changes over time. Dey et al. [48] and Stutzman et al. [152] have
shown quantitative evidence that Facebook users are sharing fewer profile attributes (such as
hometown, birthdate and contact information) publicly over time. Social media discussions
about Facebook privacy [52, 141, 140, 153, 39] and Facebook regularly rolling out new fine
grained privacy management features [66] for the last few years have caught users’ attention
and potentially increased their concerns about available privacy controls.
How effective are users in managing their privacy settings? Recent studies have ex-
plored how effective users are in managing their privacy settings. Studies have shown that
there exists a mismatch between desired and actual privacy settings when users share content
on Facebook [103, 85, 107, 29, 27]. Liu et al. [103] conducted a user survey about privacy
preferences for photos uploaded by users on Facebook. They found that privacy settings
match users’ expectations only 37% of the time, and when wrong, users are exposing their
content to a much wider audience (e.g., all friends, friends-of-friends or even everyone
on Facebook) than they intended. While the exact reason for incorrect privacy settings is
hard to infer, it could be due to poor privacy management user interfaces or the significant
cognitive burden required to manage privacy of their sensitive content.
Techniques for better privacy management Several techniques have been proposed to
reduce the burden on users when managing their privacy settings. We can organize work in
this space into two high level categories: (1) The first approach is to assist in automatically
pre-defining grouping of friends that might be meaningful to the user for sharing sensitive
content later. Facebook allows the user to pre-define such friend groupings using the friend
list feature. But friend lists on Facebook have to be manually specified by the user today
and this user overhead could be reduced by these approaches. (2) The second approach is
to help the user on the fly to specify SACLs while sharing content. They predict SACL
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specifications with some input from the user. For example, if the user gives the name of a
few friends that he wants to share content with, these approaches can automatically predict
the remaining members of the SACL or provide recommendations of other possible SACL
members. Now we will explain different proposals that fall in the above two categories.
PViz [112] is a proposal from first category that can automatically detect friend lists for
a Facebook user and use it for better privacy policy visualization for the user. It leverages
the network structure of the subgraph (where friendship relations are represented as edges
and OSM users as nodes) induced by the user’s friends (i.e., the user’s “one-hop subgraph”)
to detect friend lists using a modularity-based community detection algorithm. Using
information extracted from friends’ profile, it can also automatically assign a label to
each detected list. This helps the user to understand the composition of a list. Based on
these predefined lists, PViz points out to users which of her friends from a list can view a
particular content. PViz presents a user study based on 20 users, who find PViz useful for
understanding their existing privacy settings better.
However, many previous works [15, 174, 59] fall in the second category. They focus on
recommending friends on the fly to the users as the user starts sharing a piece of content and
selects a few intended friends. Privacy Wizard [59] is one example of such a tool. Privacy
Wizard leverages network structure and profile attributes (like gender, age, education, work,
etc) to recommend friends for inclusion in a privacy setting. The process starts as the user
tags a few of her friends as “allowed” or “denied” for a content. It then uses a machine
learning algorithm to classify the remaining untagged friends into an allow or denied
category. The authors designed a survey experiment with 45 Facebook users and 64 profile
data items to evaluate the accuracy of their tool. They observed that on average if a user tags
25 of her friends, the wizard configures her privacy setting with high accuracy. However
in their experiments they did not look into the ground truth data on how a user actually
specifies SACLs while sharing sensitive content.
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We conduct a large scale study comprising of 1,165 users and all their uploaded content
to focus on the privacy settings used by users. Most prior work tries to approximate ground
truth privacy preference data by asking user privacy preferences explicitly, most of the time
via surveys or via a combination of surveys and profile data collection using apps [92].
However, none of these studies looked into the “ground truth” data on SACLs (i.e., how a
normal user would share their content using SACLs without any external intervention). To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to look into ground-truth data on users’ usage
of SACLs to propose insights on how to assist users to reduce the overhead of specifying
SACLs.
3.1.3 Key questions
While fine-grained privacy controls put users in better control of their data privacy, it is not
clear how users are using these privacy mechanisms. In this work, we take a first look at
SACLs specified by 790 Facebook users (users who created at least one SACL) for 212,753
pieces of uploaded content. Our analysis focuses on the following key questions:
• How are users using SACLs today? We analyze how often SACLs are specified by
users and how different types of content are shared using SACLs.
• Is SACL membership predictable? We analyze characteristics of SACL members to
understand if they have something in common that other friends of the user do not.
Our analysis explores whether members have similar profile attributes, exhibit strong
social network connectivity with each other, or share similar activity levels. If we
are able to separate out SACL members from among all friends, we may be able to
automatically create SACLs for users.
• What is the user overhead in specifying SACLs? We examine the overhead that users
spend specifying SACLs today. The intuition is that, the more work required to create
SACLs, the less usable the privacy mechanisms are.
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• What is the potential for reducing user overhead? Based on our insights gained
from analyzing SACL membership, we quantify the potential for further reducing the
complexity of SACL specifications. Our findings serve as guidelines for designing
better privacy management tools in the future.
3.2 Dataset
Now we describe the dataset we have collected about in-use SACLs on OSMs today.
3.2.1 Collecting data about SACLs in Facebook
Obtaining data at scale about user privacy specifications is quite challenging. In Chap-
ter 3.1.2, we observed that most previous work used small-scale data about user privacy
preferences. There are two main challenges in collecting large-scale data: First, we need
permission to view the user SACLs. This is challenging as private settings on Facebook are
private to the user; they cannot be obtained by crawling publicly visible user profiles. To
address this challenge, we use the Facebook API [62], which offers methods to collect data
about in-use privacy settings (provided the user gives us permission to do so). We therefore
developed a Facebook application that helps users to better manage their privacy settings,
and recruited users for the application. The Facebook application requests consent from
the user to collect data about their SACL specifications for our research study. The data
collection was performed under an approved Northeastern University Institutional Review
Board protocol.
The second challenge is recruiting large number of users for the study who can provide
consent to access their private SACL information. The traditional approach for recruiting
users rely on personal communication (e.g., via email) or through an open call posted on a
public bulletin board at a university or research lab. In such cases, the number of users that
could potentially be recruited is usually limited to a few tens or hundreds. Another approach
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is to use online crowdsourcing platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) [111].
However, using a Facebook application violates the AMT policy that workers should not be
required to download and install an application [16].4 Instead, to recruit a variety of users at
scale, we leverage the Facebook advertising platform.
3.2.1.1 Facebook application: Friendlist Manager
We developed the Facebook app “Friendlist Manager" (or FLM) [72, 105] that helps the
user to automatically create and update friend lists that could be used for specifying SACLs.
This application reduces the user burden of manually creating friend lists. FLM automates
list creation by leveraging the network structure in the “one-hop subgraph” of the user. It
uses network community detection algorithms [30, 117] to find overlapping communities in
the one-hop subgraph. We found that users found FLM to be helpful; 480 (41%) of our users
allowed FLM to update at least one of their lists. It is important to note that for the analysis
in this work, we only consider the content users shared and members of friend lists users
had before installing FLM; this ensures that usage of our app does not impact the results.
When installing FLM, we request permission to access the following types of user data:
basic user profile details including workplace, education, current city and family; privacy
settings (including SACLs) used for all uploaded content (photos, videos, statuses, notes,
music, questions, Shockwave Flash Player (SWF) movies, and checkins); and the friends,
friend lists, and Facebook lists of the user. Should the user choose to not grant us access to
their content, they are still allowed to use the application.
3.2.1.2 Recruiting users
To recruit users, we set up an advertisement for FLM on the Facebook advertising platform.
The Facebook advertising platform allows us to reach out to the large Facebook population
and target users with specific demographics. Our ad included the following text:
4Our data collection methodology requires users to install a Facebook application.
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Need help to better organize your list of friends? Give FLM a try!
Starting from June 20th 2012, we ran five ad campaigns for 10 days targeting 10
countries where English is an official language: USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
India, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, and Philippines. In total, 232 users installed
our app during this period. After this initial push, our app received a steady stream of
new users through August 2013; in total, we observed 1,007 additional users after the
advertising campaign ended. We believe FLM also spread “virally", with users “liking" or
recommending the app to their friends. While it is hard to trace the source of these new
1,007 users, we found that 59 of them were friends of users who installed FLM through
ads. The remaining users likely found FLM through search tools (e.g., Google Search) or
through word-of-mouth based propagation.
Overall, a total of 1,239 users installed our application. For the purpose of this study,
we only focus on the 1,165 users (94%) who gave us permission to access all the data we
required for our research study.
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Figure 3.1: (a) Cumulative distribution of number of pieces of content uploaded by users using
SACLs. A significant fraction (67.8%) of users in our dataset upload at least one
content using SACLs. (b) Cumulative distribution of percentage of content per
user shared using SACLs. More than 200 users in our dataset uploaded more
than 30% of their content using SACLs. (c) Cumulative distribution of number
of unique SACLs specified by each user who upload at least one content using
SACLs.
3.2.1.3 User bias
One potential issue with user studies is a bias in the user population. In our case, it is
challenging to obtain a random set of Facebook users. This is a fundamental issue with most
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user studies, and the common methodology is to carefully characterize the users under study
to understand how diverse the users are in terms of demographics. Our user population is
by no means random, and we report the demographics and behavior of users below. We
believe that the users who installed FLM are those who are interested in creating friend lists
to better manage their privacy settings. It is known that Facebook has been promoting friend
lists as a way to more efficiently specify privacy preferences [57]. Thus, our user sample is
most likely biased towards privacy-aware Facebook users. Additionally, ads can only be
shown to users when they are logged in to Facebook; we are therefore likely to get users
who are active on Facebook.
3.2.1.4 Ethical considerations
The data we collected in FLM is highly privacy sensitive, and we took great care to respect
users’ privacy. First, we conducted our study under Institutional Review Board approval.
Second, we only report aggregate statistics here, and in any future works. Third, we will
never release any non-aggregated data to third parties. All of these steps were also included
as part of FLM’s Privacy Policy (provided to users when installing FLM).
3.2.2 FLM user demographics
We now examine the demographics of users who installed FLM and allowed us to collect
their data. Users usually self-report their location, age, gender and education on their profile.
We examine the “current location” attribute to estimate the location of users at a country
level and find that 952 (82%) users have provided location information. According to this
information, users are from 75 countries covering six continents. There were 19.2% users
from North America, 18.1% from Europe and 35.5% from Asia. The top five countries were
United States (20%), Pakistan (14%), India (7%), Brazil (7%), and Philippines (6%). Thus,
we have users from a diverse set of geographic locations.
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Next, we examine the age of users. Our users ranged between 18 and 65 and older,
with the median age being 29; this distribution is in-line with the overall U.S. Facebook
population [125]. Only 1.2% of users did not specify their gender and for the rest, we
observed a strong male bias with 76% of our users being male; this differs from the overall
U.S. Facebook breakdown of 47% male [125]. Finally, for the education level (reported
by 73.8% of users), 67.8% of users have been to college, while 5.9% of them have been to
graduate school. All these statistics demonstrate that we have a diverse set of users in our
dataset.
As our users are recruited from a social network, one additional concern is that the users
might be a “close-knit" group of friends (in terms of friendship), and not a more general
sample of the user population. To evaluate whether this is the case, we check how closely
related our users are by examining the number of users who are friends on Facebook, and
the number of user pairs with at least one common friend. Out of the 678,030 possible
pairs of users [
(
1,165
2
)
], 44 (0.01%) were direct friends and 1,266 (0.19%) were not direct
friends but had at least one friend in common. Thus, while our population does show some
correlation with the social network (unsurprising, given the viral spreading we observed
before), the user population is not strongly biased towards one small region of the entire
Facebook social network.
Finally, we examine the activity of users in terms of uploaded content. Overall, our
1,165 users have an average of 518 friends (median 332), and uploaded on average 1,040
pieces of content (median 506). 1,003 (84%) users have uploaded more than 100 pieces of
content. Only 39 (3.3%) users have uploaded fewer than 10 pieces of content while 3 (0.2%)
of them have uploaded none. When we look at activity of users over time, we observe that
the activities of our users spanned over 8 years from 2005 to 2013. We further find that
90% of users have been active for more than 20% of weeks since they joined Facebook.
Our analysis of users suggests that we have a fairly diverse population most of whom are
actively uploading content on Facebook.
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3.3 SACL usage
We begin by examining the usage of SACLs by OSM users. Specifically, we investigate how
often and for what types of content users specify SACLs.
1. How widely are SACLs used? We first examine how often different users share content
with SACLs, using the FLM user set described in the previous chapter. Figure 3.1(a) presents
the cumulative distribution (CDF) of the number of content shared using SACLs per user.
We observe that a majority of our users are using SACLs for content sharing: 790 (67.8%)
users out of 1,165 shared at least one piece of content using a SACL. In total, these 790
users uploaded 212,753 pieces of content using SACLs; this content accounts for 17.6% of
all content uploaded by all 1,165 users. In the remainder of the work, we focus only on these
790 users and the content they uploaded using SACLs. We note that the fraction of users
using SACLs in our dataset is comparable to that reported for Google+ [94], where 74.8% of
the users used SACLs. However, these Google+ users shared significantly more (67.8%) of
their content with SACLs. This difference in the percentage of shared contents in Facebook
and Google+ is likely due to the differences in user interface between the platforms. We
leave a full exploration of the comparative use of SACLs across online social media sites to
future work.
Next, we observe that users use SACLs to different extents. In particular, we examine
the percentage of content that each user shares with SACLs in Figure 3.1(b) (i.e., for each
user, what fraction of their content is shared with a SACL?). We observe a biased distribution
across users, but a significant fraction of users select SACLs for much of their content: 20%
of users share more than 30% of all their content using SACLs.
Thus, we observe that SACLs are widely used by our users for sharing content, which
encourages us to further explore the composition of SACLs and complexity of SACL
specification in the following chapters.
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Total Number Percent
Content type content shared with shared with
items SACLs SACLs
Status 786,800 139,112 17.7%
Photo 264,714 45,308 17.1%
Video 111,676 20,880 18.7%
Album 26,527 4,415 16.6%
SWF 9,794 1,554 15.9%
Note 8,500 883 10.4%
Checkin 3,224 548 17.0%
Question 374 25 6.7%
Music 355 27 7.6%
Offer 9 1 11.1%
Total 1,211,973 212,753 17.6%
Table 3.1: Distribution of the number and percentage of content shared with SACLs across
different types of content.
2. How many SACLs do users need to create? Having observed that SACLs are widely
used, we now investigate how many different SACLs users create from amongst their friends.
Figure 3.1(c) shows the cumulative distribution of the number of unique SACLs specified by
each user. A large fraction (75%) of the users use less than 10 SACLs, and 20% of the users
use only a single SACL. However, there are 5 heavy SACL users, who have used more than
100 unique SACLs. We find that these are heavy users of privacy settings and use different
combination of a small number of lists and a set of handpicked friends to specify multiple
SACLs for multiple pieces of content. Overall, most users only require a limited number of
SACLs to share sensitive content; we leverage this finding later in Chapter 3.5 to reduce the
user overhead in specifying SACLs.
3. Does SACL usage vary with content types? Facebook allows users to upload a variety
of content types. Table 3.1 presents a breakdown of the total number of content items of
different types, and the fraction of those items shared with SACLs. We are interested in
understanding if users are biased towards a few types of content when using SACLs. The
third and fourth columns of Table 3.1 show the number and fraction of each type of content
shared using SACLs. We observe that SACLs are used across all nine different types of
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SACL created using
only only both lists
lists friends and friends
Number of Users 593 555 213
Percent of users
using SACLs 75.9% 71.1% 27.3%
Percent of SACLs 33.5% 44.3% 22.2%
Percent of content
shared with SACLs 61.4% 27% 11.6%
Table 3.2: Distribution of the number of users using different mechanisms to create SACLs
while sharing contents.
content. In fact, 10-20% of almost all types of content are shared with SACLs. Questions
and music are shared least often with SACLs; we suspect that these types of content tend to
be more public and are usually not privacy sensitive. This widespread use of SACLs across
all types of content further justifies looking deeper into SACL membership and complexity,
with the goal of increasing the usability of SACLs.
4. How are SACLs created? Facebook users can construct their SACLs in different ways.
As mentioned in Chapter 3.1.1, while creating a SACL the user may allow or deny access to
individual friends, or lists, or use a combination of friends and lists. Table 3.2 shows the
distribution of number of users using different mechanisms to create SACLs. We observe
that more than 70% of users are creating at least one SACL by individually selecting their
friends and more than 44% of SACLs fall in this category; this is surprising, as selecting
friends individually is a somewhat tedious task. Interestingly, only 27% of SACL content
is shared with such SACLs; users share the majority of their content with SACLs created
using lists.
5. How many users are in SACLs? Next, we examine the size of SACLs (i.e., how many
of a user’s friends are in different SACLs). Figure 3.2 presents a CDF of fraction of the
SACL owner’s friends that the SACLs contain. We observe that the distribution exhibits
three distinct regions, described below:
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1. Include only few friends: The first region is highlighted in gray on the left side of
the graph; this region contains SACLs with between 0% and 5% of the user’s friends.
This region contains 25% of all SACLs. In the remainder of the work, we refer to
these as include few SACLs.
2. Exclude only few friends: The next region is highlighted in gray on the right side
of the graph; this region contains SACLs with between 95% and 100% of the user’s
friends. This region contains 26% of all SACLs. In the remainder of the work, we
refer to these as exclude few SACLs.
3. Include subset of friends: The final region is in the middle of the graph; this region
contains between 5% and 95% of the user’s friends. This region contains the plurality
(49%) of the SACLs. In the remainder of the work, we refer to these as include
subset SACLs.
As we suggest below, the distribution of SACL sizes is very likely influenced by the interface
for SACL specification. We use our categorization in the rest of the chapter when we try
to characterize the SACL members across different features. However, for exclude few
SACLs we also want to see whether we can characterize the excluded friends; for these,
we also examine the excluded members of exclude few SACLs. The plurality of include
subset SACLs shows that our users are not simply including or excluding a handful of their
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of friends included in SACLs. SACLs in the left gray region are the
include few SACLs, SACLs in the right gray region are exclude few SACLs,
and the SACLs in middle white region are the include subset SACLs.
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friends, but are often including large subsets of their friends. This result further motivates
the need to understand how these subsets are selected.
Overall, our observations suggest SACLs are being widely used today by a majority
of our users to control access to a non-trivial fraction of their content. SACLs are used at
different rates by different users, but they do appear to be used to share many different types
of content. Finally, SACLs show wildly different sizes, with many SACLs containing few or
almost all of a user’s friends. With this understanding, we turn to examine the membership
of SACLs in the following chapter.
3.4 SACL membership
We now take a closer look at the membership of SACLs. In other words, are the members
of a given SACL distinguishable from the SACL creator’s other friends? (e.g., do the
members share a profile attribute?) This question is interesting to examine, as any automatic
detection of SACL membership would only work if the SACL members were distinguishable.
Moreover, existing work [59, 112, 174] hypothesizes that profile attributes, network structure,
and user activity can help us to automatically detect clusters corresponding to SACLs; we
aim to see if this is true using our dataset of real-world fine-grained privacy settings.
3.4.1 Methodology
Our analysis in this section explores the possibility of characterizing SACL members as
a group across three features: (i) profile attributes, (ii) social network structure, and (iii)
activity. In other words, we would like to see whether the SACL members form a distinct
cluster among the friends of the user. To do so, we form clusters based on these three
features and then examine how closely the SACLs of the user match our cluster (e.g., we
form a cluster of all user’s friends who attended the same high school and then look to see if
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this cluster matches any SACL). To compare our automatically detected clusters and the
user’s SACLs, we address three separate questions:
1. Do the automatically detected clusters match SACLs? Once we have the clusters of
friends for a given feature, for each SACL, we try to find the best matching cluster. To
compute the “goodness" of a match, we use the F-score metric [109] which provides a
measure of detection accuracy. It is computed as the harmonic mean of precision and recall;
F-score varies from 0 to 1, with 1 representing a perfect match.
Unfortunately, a low F-score does not necessarily imply that SACLs are not correlated
with automatically detected groups. For example, the members of a SACL could be split
between two automatically detected groups; in this case, the F-score for both groups would
be quite low, but the F-score of the union of the groups would be quite high. Looking deeper
into this issue takes us to our next question.
2. How distributed are the SACLs across clusters? In order to check how widely the
SACL members are spread across the clusters we use the metric entropy[43]. For a given
SACL and a cluster c from a set of automatically detected clusters C, we can compute p(c),
the probability of a SACL member belonging to c. Then we measure the entropy of the
SACL as
−
∑
c∈C
p(c) log2 p(c)
A higher value of entropy signifies more diversity within the SACL members (i.e., they are
spread across more clusters).
To be able to compare across the SACLs which belong to different users (with different
numbers of clusters and friends per cluster), we normalize the entropy using maximum
possible entropy per SACL. A SACL will have maximum entropy when its members are
uniformly distributed across all clusters [43]; in this case the entropy will be log2 |C|, where
73
|C| is the number of clusters in C. We therefore calculate normalized entropy as
−
∑
c∈C p(c) log2 p(c)
log2 |C|
Normalized entropy for a SACL ranges from 0 to 1. A normalized entropy close to 1
indicates that a SACL is uniformly spread across the maximum number of clusters and a
normalized entropy close to 0 indicates that all or most of the SACL members are part of
one cluster.
3. How are SACLs different from random groups? One outstanding issue remains:
We are examining the entropy of SACLs, but we would really like to measure what’s the
likelihood of selecting the members of a SACL by pure chance. For example, suppose all of
a user’s friends attended the same high school; in this case, the “high school" cluster (all
friends in a single cluster) would perfectly match any large SACL.
To measure the uniqueness of SACLs relative to random groups, we use the Adjusted
Rand Index (ARI) [134] to determine the similarity between SACL and automatically
detected clusters. ARI is a similarity metric normalized against chance and varies from -1 to
1. An ARI of 0 indicates no better similarity than a random group, a negative ARI implies
worse similarity than a random group, and an ARI of 1 indicates exact similarity. For each
SACL, we calculate at the ARI provided by the most similar cluster. If most of the SACLs
have ARI close to 0, then the automatically detected clusters are no better in detecting the
SACLs than simply using random groups.
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Figure 3.3: Correspondence between the attribute-based clusters and SACLs, with the cumulative
distributions of (a) F-score, (b) Normalized entropy, and (c) ARI. Figure 3.3(a) shows
only 15% of the automatically generated attribute-based communities have a F-score of
more than 0.6, indicating low number of SACLs showing high match. Figure 3.3(b) shows
that larger SACLs are spread across multiple such clusters and have higher normalized
entropy. The reverse is true for include few SACLs and excluded members of exclude
few SACLs. However, Figure 3.3(c) confirms that more than 40% of these SACLs show
better similarity with attribute-based clusters than random groups.
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Figure 3.4: Correspondence between the network communities and SACLs. Figure 3.4(a) shows
21% of network communities have a F-score of more than 0.6, indicating a relatively
poor match between network communities and SACLs. Figure 3.4(b) and Figure 3.4(c)
confirms that though the larger SACLs have higher entropy (i.e., they are distributed
across multiple communities), more than 90% of these SACLs show better similarity with
network-based clusters compare to random groups.
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Figure 3.5: Correspondence between the activity-based clusters and SACLs. Figure 3.5(a) shows 47%
of the automatic attribute clusters shows a F-score of more than 0.6, indicating compar-
atively strong match between activity communities and SACLs. However, Figure 3.5(b)
shows that the larger SACLs have higher entropy, and Figure 3.5(c) shows that only 4%
have ARI more than 0.3. As a result, random groupings of friends the same size as SACLs
would likely show a degree of similar matching.
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3.4.2 SACLs and user attributes
We first explore whether SACL membership is correlated with a common profile attribute.
To do so, we leverage the profile attributes provided by Facebook users, focusing on four
attributes: workplace, education, current city, and family. We choose these attributes
as they have been shown be most strongly correlated with groupings of users in social
networks [117]. Using these attributes, we group the friends of a user into clusters who
share a common attribute. We report results for all attribute groups in aggregate for brevity;
the results are similar when considering each attribute type alone.
We begin by using the F-score metric to check how many of the SACLs exactly match
the attribute-based clusters. We present the cumulative distribution of F-scores across all
SACLs in Figure 3.3(a). The figure shows that only 15% of all SACLs have a F-score of
more than 0.6, indicating a good match for a small subset of SACLs. The result is even
worse for very small SACLs (include few or the excluded members of exclude few), with
only 10% of such SACLs having a F-score more than 0.6.
We explore the reason for the low F-scores by analyzing the normalized entropy of
these SACLs in Figure 3.3(b). The figure shows that the small SACLs have a low entropy
(with 20% of include few SACLs with entropy 0) indicating they are mostly part of single
attribute-based clusters (this is unsurprising, given that these SACLs are small). On the other
hand, the larger SACLs show a high entropy with 35% of exclude few SACLs having an
entropy of more than 0.8. These results suggest that our attribute clusters are overestimating
the smaller SACLs (indicated by low entropy and low F-score) and underestimating the
larger SACLs (indicated by high entropy and low F-score).
Finally, we examine whether SACLs match attribute clusters better than random groups
using ARI. As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, an ARI of 0 indicates similarity no better than
random groups. Figure 3.3(c) presents the cumulative distribution of ARI across all SACLs;
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we observe that 68% of all SACLs have ARI larger than 0, indicating they have more
similarity with attribute-based clusters than a purely random set of friends.
Overall, our results suggest that only a small number of attribute clusters serve as a
close match for SACLs. However, the SACLs do show some correlation with attribute
groups when compared to random subsets of the user’s friends. Next, we look into the
correlation between SACLs and the social network to see if network-based clusters more
closely approximate the SACLs.
3.4.3 SACLs and network structure
In order to explore whether the SACLs correspond to the network structure, we first identity
clusters of the user’s friends that are tightly connected in the social network (these clusters are
often called network communities). Specifically, we extract all of the friendship connections
between the user’s friends, and then use a community detection algorithm that has been
shown to work well in grouping a user’s friends into a small set of clusters [105]. This
algorithm is a combination of a global community detection algorithm [30] and a local
community detection algorithm [117] to detect overlapping communities.5. Our results were
similar with these algorithms, and so we omit the results for brevity.
We begin by examining how many of the SACLs exactly match one of the social
network-based clusters. Figure 3.4(a) presents the cumulative distribution of F-scores
across all SACLs. The figure shows that 21% of all SACLs have a F-score of more than
0.6, indicating a good match for 21% of SACLs. This is significantly higher than the
attribute-based clusters in the prior section, but still does not show a strong correlation.
We next analyze the normalized entropy of these SACLs in Figure 3.4(b). Similar to the
attribute-based clusters, the network communities tend to overestimate smaller SACLs and
5We note that there are a large variety of community detection techniques in the literature. To make sure
our choice of algorithm did not bias the results of our analysis, we performed the same analysis with two
additional community detection algorithms [40, 130] similar to ones used in earlier work on unsupervised
detection of privacy settings [112, 59]
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underestimate larger SACLs, but at a much lower rate. We verify these findings using ARI
in Figure 3.4(c). We can observe that 98% of all SACLs have ARI more than 0, indicating
almost all of the SACLs have more similarity with community based clusters than a purely
random set of friends.
Overall, the network communities show better match with SACLs compared to the
attribute clusters. However, still only a small fraction of SACLs have strong correlation
with network communities, making it unlikely that network communications could be
used to infer SACLs for sharing content. Next we will look into the correlation between
activity-based clusters and SACLs.
3.4.4 SACLs and user activity
For our final user feature, we examine whether the membership of SACLs is correlated with
the strength of the link between the user and their friends. As a proxy for link strength, we
use activity; this is a common way to estimate how closely connected two users are [19].
For each user, we collected data about four different types of interaction between the user
and their friends: (i) posting on the user’s wall, (ii) liking the user’s posts, (iii) commenting
on the user’s posts, and (iv) being tagged in the user’s status and photos. We observe that
94% of the users who used SACLs have at least one such interaction with their friends.
Using this data, we cluster each user’s friends by activity (i.e., frequency of interaction)
and see whether the activity-based clusters matched the SACLs. We use the same algorithm
as prior work [19] to find the activity clusters. The algorithm is essentially a k-means
algorithm modified to automatically find the optimal number of clusters. As a result, all
friends with a similar number of interactions will be put in one cluster. After running the
algorithm, we find that the median number of clusters across all users is four.6
6Interestingly, this observation matches Dunbar’s sociological study [51, 84] where the number of Dunbar’s
circles, the number of activity-based clusters in people’s offline network is also four.
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As before, we begin by examining the cumulative distribution of the F-score in Fig-
ure 3.5(a); we observe that 47% all SACLs have a F-score of greater than 0.6. This is even
better than network-based communities. The larger SACLs (e.g., exclude few SACLs) show
an even stronger match with high F-scores, but the match is considerably worse for smaller
SACLs (e.g., include few SACLs), with only 3% of such SACLs having a F-score more
than 0.6. Closely examining the activity-based clusters, we hypothesize that our method of
creating activity communities often results in creating a large cluster containing all friends
with low levels of interaction with the user. As a result, this single, large community alone
overlaps with the large SACLs considerably, making their F-score quite high.
To confirm this hypothesis, we also calculate the cumulative distribution of normalized
entropy (Figure 3.5(b)) and ARI (Figure 3.5(c)). We find a poor match between SACLs and
activity-based clusters using both pieces of analysis; the ARI values for the SACLs are very
close to 0 for almost all activity-based clusters (e.g., only 8% of the SACLs have ARI more
than 0.3). This finding confirms that any random groups of the size of larger SACLs will
show the same level of similarity with the activity-based clusters, thus making the clusters a
poor mechanism for approximating SACL membership.
3.4.5 Summary
In this section, we examined the membership of SACLs by trying to correlate SACL
members with attribute, network structure, and activity-based clusters. Our results show
that very few of these clusters show a significant correlation with SACLs, suggesting that
automatically detected SACLs-based on these features are unlikely to be very accurate. This
finding is in opposition to the results from prior work [59, 112, 174], which suggest that it is
possible to use automatically detected clusters to create SACLs. We believe this difference
is due to the fact that these prior works were not able to evaluate their proposals against
ground-truth SACLs. In fact, others have also found [97] that users are able to group their
friends in meaningful groups, but find it difficult to choose the right group to share content
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Figure 3.6: Facebook’s interface for specifying SACLs.
with. Consequently, we explore alternative approaches to increase the usability of SACLs in
the next section.
3.5 SACL specification
We have observed that SACLs appear to be quite difficult to infer automatically. We
now examine the “overhead" (i.e., the amount of work that users must perform) in order
to specify SACLs today. Then, we explore how we can increase the usability of these
SACLs by reducing the user overhead and making SACLs easier to use. If successful, these
approaches would make privacy easier for users to manage, thereby increasing the usability
of OSMs in general.
3.5.1 SACL specification overhead
The act of specifying a SACL—choosing which friends to share content with—induces
cognitive overhead on the user. While there may be multiple dimensions of this overhead
(e.g., deciding whether to include a specific user, using the interface, etc), many of these are
quite challenging to measure. As a first step, we define the SACL specification overhead to
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Figure 3.7: Cumulative distribution of overhead for specifying SACLs. Shown are the dis-
tributions of measured SACLs (Original), measured SACLs taking into account
Facebook’s last-used setting (Last-used setting), the optimal overhead for mea-
sured SACLs (Optimal), and the overhead of our proposed mechanism of present-
ing the user with the last 5 SACLs (Past history). Our proposed mechanism shows
a substantial reduction in user overhead.
be the number of terms used to specify a SACL. Our reasons for doing so is that Facebook
allows users to specify SACLs using an allow/deny interface, where users can select friends
or lists to allow or deny access (a screenshot of Facebook’s interface is shown in Figure 3.6).
Thus, the amount of work the user has to do is proportional to the number of friends/lists that
the user selects to allow or deny. Of course, we recognize there are dimensions of overhead
that this measure fails to capture; we leave the task of characterizing those dimensions of
user overhead to future work.
As an example, consider the screenshot shown in Figure 3.6. In this example, the
user is choosing to allow friends Bob, Carol, the list Football Friends, and the Facebook
list Family. The user is also choosing to deny the list Drinking Buddies. As a result, the
SACL specification overhead for this SACL is five (A total of five terms appear in the allow
and deny settings.) It is important to note that the size of the SACL is different from its
specification overhead: Consider the case of a user only denying access to a single friend.
In this case, the specification overhead is low, but the SACL has many users in it.
We define the average user overhead as the average of all SACL specification overheads
for content shared by a given user. Formally, if a user specifies access to her content
81
{c1, c2, ...cn} with privacy settings {p1, p2, ...pn}, the average user overhead for this user is
∑
i |pi|
n
where |pi| denotes the SACL specification overhead of setting pi. Note that the pi settings
are not necessarily distinct, as multiple pieces of content may be shared with the same SACL.
The best-possible average user overhead is 1, meaning the user only used the SACLs with a
single term when sharing her content.
We present cumulative distribution of the average user overhead in Figure 3.7 with
the line “Original". We observe that users do have significant overhead when specifying
SACLs: 86% of users have an overhead more than 1, and there are more than 150 users
with overhead more than 5. This suggests there is significant potential to reduce the SACL
specification overhead for users, making SACLs more usable.
3.5.2 Last-used setting
Facebook’s default privacy setting for content is set to select the last-used privacy setting [65].
So, if a user selects a SACL for a newly uploaded piece of content, all future pieces of
content will be shared with the same SACL until the user chooses a different privacy setting.
We therefore modify our definition of average user overhead to capture this behavior; if a user
selects the same SACL as the previous piece of content, we define this SACL specification
overhead to be 0. As a result, a user’s average user overhead may be less than one.
We present the cumulative distribution of the average user overhead, taking into account
the last-used setting, in Figure 3.7 with the line “Last-used setting". We immediately observe
a significant reduction in the measured overhead, which we believe more accurately captures
the work a user must do. The figure shows that this simple technique of using last setting as
the default can significantly reduce the user overhead: this technique lowers the overhead by
more than 50% for almost half (48%) of the users. Thus, Facebook’s choice to enable default
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last-used settings is useful in reducing user overhead. For the remainder of our analysis, we
use average user overhead, taking into account the last-used setting, as our baseline.
3.5.3 Optimal overhead
It is important to note that there may be multiple ways of specifying a given SACL: For
example, a user could specify the SACL by only allowing the friends in the SACL. Or, the
user could use an existing list, and exclude the users not allowed to access the content. Or,
the user could allow all friends, and then deny only the friends who should not be able to
access the content. We now examine how close the user’s chosen specifications are to the
optimal specification, in terms of the SACL specification with the minimum overhead.
To do so, for each SACL we observe, we determine the optimal specification overhead.7
We then present the cumulative distribution of average user overhead in the optimal case
in Figure 3.7 with the line “Optimal setting". We observe that there is still room for
improvement from using the last-used setting alone; many users could express their SACLs
in a manner than involves fewer terms.
3.5.4 Using past history
In this section, we explore a generalization of the last-used setting, with the goal of further
reducing the average user overhead. The results in Section 3.3 suggested that there are
certain SACLs that users select to share content with a significant fraction of the time.
Figure 3.8 plots the cumulative distribution of the percentage of content shared with the
top k most frequently used SACLs for each user. For example we can see that if we allow
each user to use their top 5 SACLs, this would cover over 80% of the content for the vast
majority (90%) of users.
7Note that computing the optimal overhead of a setting is a modified version of the NP-hard set cover
problem [96] where the setting is the universe and lists and individual friends are subsets of the universe. We
use a brute force solution to the problem, which is feasible due to small number of subsets in this case.
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Figure 3.8: Cumulative distribution of percentage of content covered by the top k SACLs.
Even if we set k=5, most of the content for the majority of users are covered.
This observation means that we may be able to significantly reduce the average user
overhead by allowing users to choose from their k most used SACLs, rather than just the
last-used SACL. To do so, we calculate the average user overhead, assuming one would
have made it possible for the user to directly use the top 5 most frequently used settings
while sharing content (Should the user re-use these settings, we calculate the overhead as
0). A cumulative distribution of the resulting overhead is shown in Figure 3.7 with the line
“Past history". We immediately observe a dramatic reduction in user overhead (In fact, the
overhead is lowered for 86% of users).
In summary, this approach of leveraging past history has the potential to significantly
reduce the user overhead in specifying SACLs. An OSM operator can create these SACLs
based on user’s past history, and provide them as options to select from, when the user
uploads a new piece of content. Should the user select one of the previously-used SACLs, it
will reduce their overhead and make privacy specification more usable.
3.6 Discussion
OSMs are increasingly popular and users are sharing ever more content on these services.
In this work, we focused on the most privacy-sensitive of these content: the content with
hand-crafted privacy settings selected by the users to effectively control exposure of the
content. We found that these SACLs are surprisingly common (over 17.6% of all content
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is shared with SACLs), but that the membership of these SACLs shows relatively little
correlation with the profile attributes, the social network structure, or the activity level of the
members. As a result, there appears to be little hope of automatically detecting more than a
few of these SACLs. We also found that the act of specifying SACLs is often complicated
for users, but a simple technique like remembering a few of the most frequently used SACLs
is likely to significantly reduce this burden in practice.
However, much work remains to be done. In the remainder of this section, we discuss a
few of the limitations of our study, as well as future directions for exploration.
Understanding motivation for SACLs Our study explores the use of SACLs, but does
not reveal why users create SACLs or how they choose the content to share with SACLs.
Possible reasons include dissatisfaction with the default privacy settings, the sharing of
highly privacy sensitive content, or using SACLs as a mechanism to choose the audience for
a particular content.
Moving target We quantified the way users create in-use SACLs today, but Facebook is
known for changing their privacy interface over time [63]; these changes are likely to impact
the usage of SACLs for individual users. We aim to repeat our analysis as Facebook makes
these changes, hoping to capture resulting changes in user behavior.
SACL accuracy It remains an unexplored question as to which of the friends users would
ideally want to share their content with (i.e., who does the user want to be in a SACL, regard-
less of who is actually in the SACL). Prior work has shown that users often misunderstand
other Facebook privacy settings [103], and we suspect that this would likely hold true for
SACLs as well.
SACL overhead In our calculation of overhead, we took into consideration the number of
terms specified by users explicitly while specifying SACLs, where a term can be a friend list
or an individual friend. However, this quantification does not directly account for the mental
effort required for a user when creating SACLs (e.g., certain SACLs may be easier or harder
to create, even if they have the same number of terms). We leave a full exploration of this
85
effect (possibly via detailed debriefing interviews of a small sample of Facebook users) to
future work.
After, exploring how users can control exposure of their content using SACLs and
devising a way to simplify the SACL specifications using simple caching, we now move into
another mechanism to control exposure. In the next chapter, we check how OSM designers
can help OSM users to control exposure by limiting large scale social data aggregators like
Spokeo.
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CHAPTER 4
Controlling exposure by limiting
large-scale social data aggregators
We described a generic framework (in Chapter 2.5) for controlling exposure in OSMs—
predicting future exposure of a content and limiting actual exposure to the expected value.
A simple application of this generic framework is limiting the privacy violation due to third
party crawlers. OSMs allow users to browse the (public) profiles of other users in the OSM,
making it easy for users to connect, communicate, and share content. Unfortunately, this
functionality can be exploited by third-parties to aggregate and extract data about millions
of OSM users. Once collected, the data can be re-published [83], monetized, and mined
in ways that may violate users’ privacy. For instance, it has been shown that private user
attributes like sexual orientation can be inferred from a user’s set of friends and their profile
attributes [83, 117]; a third party with access to aggregated user data could easily apply
these techniques.
These third-party aggregators, which we refer to as crawlers, represent a significant
problem for OSM operators as well. User data provides OSM operators with a revenue
stream (e.g., via targeted advertisements); stopping crawlers is therefore in the OSM op-
erators’ business interests. Additionally, OSM operators cannot ensure that data collected
by a third party is used according to the operator’s privacy policy. Yet, OSM operators are
likely to be held responsible if crawled data is used in ways that violate the policy, at least
in the court of public opinion. For example, Facebook was widely blamed in the popular
press [47] when a single crawler gathered public profiles of over 100 million users [83].
To that end, OSM operators can predict with high confidence that these third party
crawlers are not in the user’s expected set. Thus, OSM operators need to design effective
mechanisms to thwart large-scale crawling of OSMs [148] in order to help users control
exposure of their content.1 Today, OSM operators typically limit the rate at which a single
user account or IP address can view user profiles [150], in order to discourage large-scale
data collection. Unfortunately, crawlers can circumvent these schemes by creating a large
number of fake user accounts [7], by employing botnets [88] or cloud services[36] to gain
access to many IP addresses, or by using the compromised accounts of a large number of
real users [4].
In this work, we propose Genie, a system that OSM operators can deploy to limit
large-scale crawlers and control exposure. Genie leverages the differences in the browsing
patterns of honest users and crawlers to effectively thwart large-scale crawls of user profiles.
Genie’s design is based on the insight that honest users tend to view the profiles of others
who are well connected and close in the social network (i.e. network induced in OSMs
via friendship relations). A crawler, on the other hand, is limited in his ability to form or
control enough links to be close to all users whose profiles he wishes to view. Genie exploits
this fact by enforcing rate limits in a way that is sensitive to the distance and degree of
connectivity between viewer and viewee.
Using profile view data from RenRen, a Facebook-like OSM that is popular in China [138],
we observe that average social network distance between honest users and the profiles they
view tends to be low (1.62 social network hops). We demonstrate that a crawler, on the other
hand, would require a very large number of well-distributed accounts (e.g., controlling 3%
1Not all large-scale crawls are for nefarious purposes. Researchers, for instance, already tend to obtain the
consent of the OSM operator before doing their crawls for research purposes (e.g., [91, 37]); such authorized
crawlers can be whitelisted even if a defense is in place.
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of all existing accounts in OSM) to be able to view the profiles of all users while maintaining
the same low average distance.
Genie works by deriving a credit network [44, 50, 75] from the social network. In
brief, credit is associated with links in the social network, and a viewer must “pay" credits
to the viewee, along a path in the social network, when viewing a profile. Compared to
conventional per-account or per-IP address rate-limiting, credit networks offers two key
advantages. First, in a credit network, the rate limits are associated with social network links
rather than user accounts or addresses. As a result, a crawler gains little by creating many
Sybil accounts or using many IP addresses [91]. Second, the greater the distance between
viewer and viewee in the social network, the stricter the rate limit is imposed by the credit
network on profile views. Consequently, even crawlers with access to a relatively large
number of compromised user accounts are unable to crawl the network quickly.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We analyze profile viewing data from the Renren social network and show that the
average distance in the social network between a honest viewer and a viewee is
significantly smaller than that of a crawler. Moreover, a crawler interested in crawling
the entire social network is fundamentally unable to blend in with honest viewers
unless he controls a very large proportion of strategically positioned user accounts.
• We present the design of Genie, which leverages credit networks derived from the
already-existing social network to block large-scale crawling activity, while allowing
honest users’ browsing unhindered.
• We demonstrate the feasibility of deploying Genie with an evaluation using large
partial social network graphs obtained from Renren, Facebook, YouTube, and Flickr,
and a mix of real and synthetically generated profile viewing traces. We demonstrate
that Genie effectively blocks crawlers while the impact on honest users is minimal.
• We show that Genie can scale to networks having millions of nodes by scaling up
credit network operations. Thus, Genie is practical on the large OSMs of today.
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4.1 Related work
In this chapter, we describe relevant prior work on limiting large-scale crawls of OSMs and
leveraging social networks to defend against Sybil attacks.
Limiting large-scale crawlers There exist a number of techniques that aim to prevent
crawls of web services. Two techniques commonly used in practice are robots.txt [8],
and IP-address- or account-based rate limiting [135, 80, 161].
robots.txt is a file stored at the web server that indicates a set of pages that should
not be crawled. Compliance with this policy is voluntary; robots.txt consequently
provides little defense against malicious crawlers.
Large websites like Yahoo! often rely on a simple per-IP-address rate limit to control
access to their web services [135]. Each IP address is allocated a maximum number of
requests, which are replenished in 24 hour intervals. Once a user exceeds this limit, the
operator either stops serving the user or may require that the user solve a CAPTCHA [9].
This approach limits the number of views a crawler can perform from an individual IP
address, but is not effective against botnets that control many IPs. Additionally, dedicated
crawlers can bypass defenses like CAPTCHA using available CAPTCHA-solving service
providers [120], and other schemes exist that can bypass IP-address-based rate-limiting
approaches [36, 77].
Online social media sites like Facebook, Google Plus or Twitter [150, 80, 161] often
use account-based rate limits on requests to view profile pages. Similar to IP-based rate
limits, this approach works well if crawlers control at most a small number of accounts; in
the face of Sybils or compromised accounts, it is not effective.
Wilson et al. proposed SpikeStrip [173], a system designed to discourage OSM crawlers.
SpikeStrip uses cryptography to make information aggregation from OSM websites ineffi-
cient. SpikeStrip rate limits the number of profile views allowed per browsing session and
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prevents different browsing sessions from sharing data. Thus, crawlers cannot aggregate or
correlate data gathered by different sessions.
Despite its elegant design, SpikeStrip restricts the functionality of the OSM. For exam-
ple, SpikeStrip does not allow two OSM users to share website links of a common friend.
Moreover, SpikeStrip would require OSMs like Facebook to change the way they use content
distribution networks like Akamai to serve users’ content. Unlike SpikeStrip, Genie does
not affect the OSM functionality or content distribution. As we will show later, Genie can
be deployed with minimal disruption to the browsing activities of honest users.
Social network-based Sybil defenses Recently there have been proposals to leverage
social networks to defend against Sybil attacks [157, 178, 177, 45, 156, 133, 131, 116].
Sybil defense proposals such as SybilLimit [177] or SybilInfer [45] try to detect Sybils
in the network and then block them from the service. However these Sybil detection
mechanisms are not designed to address compromised accounts. Additionally, recent work
has shown that these Sybil detection schemes suffer from limitations due to assumptions
they make concerning the structure of the social network [167, 118].
The design of Genie borrows credit network [44, 50, 75] techniques from Sybil-
tolerant [165] systems like Ostra [116] and Bazaar [131], and uses Canal [166] to manage
credit network operations. In contrast to Sybil detection schemes, Sybil tolerant systems do
not aim to detect Sybil users; instead they minimize the impact of Sybils on honest users.
Genie differs from existing Sybil tolerant systems in two fundamental ways: First, Genie
considers crawlers that have access to both Sybil and compromised accounts; previous work
considered only Sybil attacks. Second, unlike Ostra and Bazaar (which rely on users
to provide feedback on whether a communication is spam or whether a transaction is
fraudulent), Genie infers whether or not activity is malicious by exploiting differences in the
browsing patterns of crawlers and honest users.
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4.2 System and attack model
4.2.1 System model
OSMs such as Facebook, Renren [138], Google+, and Orkut share a common system model:
Users create accounts, establish friend links with other users, and post content (often of
a personal nature). Users have a “home page" on the OSM that links to all of the user’s
content; we refer to this as the user’s profile. The graph formed by the entire set of friend
links forms a social network. In the OSMs of interest to us, forming a friend link requires
the consent of both users.
Users can typically choose to make their data private (i.e., visible only to the user and
the site operator), public (i.e., visible to every user of the social network), or semi-public
(i.e., visible to subsets of the user’s friends or to friends of user’s friends). In practice, many
users choose to make their profile information public [103], despite the private nature of
some of the information posted. Contributing to this choice may be that sites encourage
public sharing [60], that the default privacy setting is “public” [132], that other privacy
choices are not always intuitive [151], and that many users are not fully aware of the privacy
risks [103]. It is these public profiles (that typically represent a large fraction of all user
profiles [98]) that Genie is concerned with protecting.
4.2.2 Attack model
Today, social networking sites tend to impose a rate limit on the profile views a single user
can request, in order to slow down crawlers. However, there are two ways in which a crawler
can overcome these limits.
A crawler can conduct a Sybil attack by creating multiple user accounts, thereby
overcoming the per-user rate limit. It is important to note that while the crawler can create an
arbitrary number of links between Sybil accounts he controls, we assume that his ability to
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form links between his Sybil accounts and honest users is limited by his ability to convince
honest users to accept a friend link, regardless of how many user accounts he controls. The
significance of this point will become clear in the following chapter, where we describe how
Genie leverages social links to limit crawling activity.
A crawler can also conduct a compromised account attack by taking control (e.g., by
obtaining the password) of existing accounts in the system. The crawler can gain access to
such accounts via phishing attacks, by guessing the user’s password, or by purchasing the
credentials of already compromised accounts on the black market. A compromised account
attack is more powerful than a Sybil attack, because every additional compromised account
increases the number of links to honest users that the crawler has access to. Again, the
significance of having access to such links will become clear in the following chapter.
We assume that a crawler with access to compromised accounts cannot compromise the
accounts of strategically positioned users of his choosing. Defending against a crawler who
can access any account of his choosing would require preventing social engineering attacks,
which are outside Genie’s attack model. Instead, we assume that compromised accounts are
randomly distributed throughout the network. Additionally, we assume that the crawler does
not actively form new links involving compromised accounts, as such activity would likely
alert the actual owner of the account that their account has been compromised.
We are concerned about attacks where the crawler greedily attempts to gather as many
distinct user profiles as possible. We assume that the crawler is agnostic to which users he
crawls. Our crawler model captures both third-party crawlers [6] as well as research-oriented
crawlers (e.g., used in studies of Facebook [91], Flickr [115], and Twitter [37]). However,
our model excludes some crawlers that may be interested in repeatedly crawling the accounts
of a small subset of users over an extended period of time, perhaps to gather their changing
profile information. We make no assumptions about the crawler’s strategy, i.e., whether the
crawler employs random walks or BFS or DFS to fetch user profiles. Consequently, we
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simulate attacks employing the strategy that optimizes for the crawler’s goal of fetching as
many distinct user profiles as possible.
4.3 Workload analysis
In this chapter, we compare profile viewing workloads of honest users and crawlers. In later
chapters, we show how Genie can exploit the differences in the browsing behavior of honest
users and crawlers to rate-limit crawlers, while rarely affecting honest users.
4.3.1 Honest users’ profile viewing workload
We obtained anonymized user profile browsing data [91] from the RenRen social net-
work [138], a Facebook-like social network that is popular in China. The data covers users
in RenRen’s Peking University (RR-PKU) network, and includes the links between PKU
users and all other RenRen users. We pre-processed the social network and browsing trace
to only include the subgraph of the PKU users, and then extracted the largest connected
component (LCC) from the social network. Similar to prior work [116, 166], our analysis
only examines users in the LCC (representing 91.2% of the users and 94.3% of the links
from the pre-processed network). The LCC of the RR-PKU network has 33,294 users and
705,248 undirected links.
The data set also includes a trace of all profiles (both friends and non-friends) that
each user browsed during a two-week period during September, 2009. Unfortunately, the
RenRen trace does not provide timestamps or an ordering for profile views. Therefore, in
experiments where we need the profile views to be ordered, we generate a time series by
assigning each profile view a timestamp chosen uniform randomly within the two-week
period covered by the trace. This time series was used in all analyses conducted in the work.
We highlight our key findings below.
94
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
10-1 100 101 102 103
C o
m
p l
e m
e n
t a
r y
 C
D F
Number of views
Requested
Received
Figure 4.1: Complementary cumulative distribution of the number of profile view requests
made and received by RR-PKU users during a two-week period.
1. Most users make (receive) few profile views, but a small number of users make
(receive) a large number of views. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of profile views made
and received by individual users in the RR-PKU network. The plots show a considerable
skew in the distributions: Most (> 90%) users make or receive fewer than 10 views, while a
handful of users (< 0.4%) view 50 or more profiles. In particular, there are three users who
viewed 1,827, 612 and 272 profiles (respectively) over a period of two weeks. These users
show significant crawler-like behavior, and we return to discuss these users in Chapter 4.5.4.
Thus, most users in the social network tend to make or receive views from a small number
of other users in the network.
2. The number of profile views made (received) by users is significantly correlated
with their degree The Pearson correlation coefficients between the rankings of users
ordered based on the number of views they make (receive) and their degree is 0.67 (0.5). The
high correlation coefficient affirms the intuitive hypothesis that users who are more active in
the social network would also have more friends in the network. This finding is consistent
with the profile browsing behavior previously studied in Facebook [22] and Orkut [26].
This observation suggests that the imbalance in user activity, measured as the mag-
nitude of the difference between the number of profile requests made and received by
individual users, divided by their degree would be tightly bounded. Intuitively, this can
be explained as follows: both the number of profile requests made and received by a user
tend to rise or fall with the user’s degree. So, the difference in requests made and received,
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Figure 4.2: Complementary cumulative distribution of the imbalance of RR-PKU users.
divided by the user’s degree would be expected to be small. Figure 4.2 confirms this by
plotting the complementary cumulative distribution of the number of unbalanced views (i.e.,
|Req_made−Req_received|) per friend link for different users. Almost 99.9% users have
an imbalance in viewing activity per friend link lower than 10.
3. Not all profiles views are unique; a small but non-trivial number of views are
repeated. Users tend to repeatedly visit the profiles of others to track updates. In our
two-week trace, we found 17,307 (17.8%) of the profile views to be such repeat views. Our
estimate of the fraction that repeat views represent is likely to be conservative, as we are
restricted to a two-week trace. (One would expect the percent of repeat views to increase
with the length of the workload trace.) However, the implication of the presence of repeat
views is that repeat views decrease the number of distinct profiles viewed by users. For
crawlers, repeat views represent sub-optimal use of resources, as their goal is to view the
profiles of as many distinct users as possible.
Network Users Links Average degree
RR-PKU [91] 33,294 705,262 21.2
Facebook [164] 63,392 816,886 25.7
Youtube [115] 1,134,889 2,987,624 5.2
Flickr [114] 1,624,991 15,476,835 19.0
Table 4.1: Number of users, links, and average user degree in the large-scale social networks
used to evaluate Genie.
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative distribution of hop distance separating viewers and viewees in RR-
PKU network. The profile viewing activities are highly local.
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Figure 4.4: Fraction of requested and received views that lie beyond 2 hop-distances for in-
dividual users. For most users, only a small fraction of their views requested or
received lie beyond 2-hop neighborhood.
4. Users tend to make (receive) profile views of others who are within their immediate
(1 or 2-hop) network neighborhood. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of network distance,
measured in terms of hops, between the viewers and viewees in our RR-PKU trace. We
observe that over 80% of all profile views are between users who are separated by two hops
or less. This observation is consistent with prior studies of the Orkut social network [26], as
well as studies of friendship formation in the Flickr social network [114]. Figure 4.4 shows
the distribution of network distance for profile views made by individual users. For most
users, only a small fraction of profiles they request, as well as a small fraction of users who
request their profiles, lie beyond their 1-hop (direct friends) and 2-hop (friends-of-friends)
neighborhood.
Our analysis considers only a single network, due to the difficulty in obtaining detailed
profile viewing data. However, we note that many of our findings are consistent with prior
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Number of compromised accounts
Network 1 10 100 1000
RR-PKU [91] 26 415 3,638 14,938
Facebook [164] 13 237 2,123 15,970
Youtube [115] 6 26 592 4,129
Flickr [114] 5 613 2,242 16,015
Table 4.2: Strength of crawlers in different social graphs. Each column corresponds to spe-
cific number of random compromised accounts, and the corresponding number of
attack links in different graphs.
studies of other social networks [26, 22, 114, 172], suggesting that our RenRen data is likely
to be representative of other social networks.
4.3.2 Crawlers’ profile viewing workload
We now turn to examining the workload that a crawler would generate when run on the
RenRen network from the previous chapter and three others: the Facebook New Orleans
regional network [164], YouTube [115], and Flickr [114]. Table 4.1 provides more details
on the number of users, links, and average degree in these networks.
We simulate crawlers of varying strength by allowing crawlers to “compromise" 1, 10,
100, and 1,000 randomly chosen users within the network. Table 4.2 shows the number of
links that connect user accounts under the crawlers’ control to honest users in the different
graphs. Note that while a crawler with 1,000 compromised accounts might not seem
particularly strong, it is important to consider the size of the networks. For example, the
crawler controlling 1,000 accounts controls around 0.1% of all users in the YouTube network.
As a point of reference, this would be equivalent to controlling 1,000,000 compromised
accounts in the real-world Facebook network.
To generate the crawling workload, we implement the following strategy for the crawler:
We assume that all crawler’s accounts collude to view profiles of all honest users in the
network. Each honest user is viewed only once, and the crawler’s account nearest to an
honest user will be assigned the task of viewing that user’s profile. This strategy maximizes
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Figure 4.5: Cumulative distribution of the distance of crawler profile views in Flickr with dif-
ferent numbers of compromised accounts. To fully mimic the high locality in hon-
est user views the crawlers have to control more than 1,000 compromised honest
user accounts.
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Figure 4.6: Cumulative distribution of the distance of crawler profile views in Facebook with
different numbers of compromised accounts.
locality in profile views, making the crawler’s workload look as “close" to the honest users’
workload as possible.
We now compare the resulting crawler workload with that of honest users, noting two
important differences.
1. In contrast to honest users’ workload, profile views by crawlers are highly non-
local. Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 shows the locality in profile visits by crawlers with different
attacking capacities for the Flickr and Facebook graphs (the other graphs show similar
behavior and are removed for brevity). For large network graphs like the Flickr and YouTube
samples, we observe that even a powerful crawler with 1,000 accounts has only a small frac-
tion (less than 30%) of requested profiles within the 2-hop neighborhood of the users under
his control. For small network graphs like the Facebook and RenRen samples, the crawler
does have a majority of users (around 80-90%) within a 2-hop neighborhood. However, in
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these networks, 1,000 compromised accounts represent 3% of all users; considering that
controlling 3% would require controlling 29 million user accounts in the current complete
Facebook network, this is a very powerful attack indeed.
Overall, the results indicate that to mimic the high locality in profile views for honest
users, crawlers would fundamentally have to control a very large fraction of all accounts.
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Figure 4.7: Complementary cumulative distribution of the imbalance of RR-PKU users views
per link for crawlers in RR-PKU.
2. In contrast to honest users, crawlers request many more profile views than they
receive. We observe that the median imbalance per link in profile views (shown in Figure 4.7)
is 8.3 for a crawler with 100 user accounts, compared to honest users’ median imbalance
of 0.05. Such an imbalance is necessary, as even with 100 accounts, the crawler makes
significantly more profile views that an honest user. In the next chapter, we present a system
design that exploits these observed differences in browsing patterns of honest users and
crawlers.
4.4 Genie design
In this chapter, we present the design of Genie, analyze its security properties, and discuss
how Genie can be used to maliciously deny service to honest users.
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4.4.1 Strawman
To motivate the need for Genie’s more elaborate approach, we briefly consider a simple
distance-based rate-limiting technique as a strawman design, and show that it is ineffective
against Sybil crawlers. We know from Chapter 4.3.1 that honest users rarely view profiles
outside their neighborhood social graph, whereas the crawlers have to view distant profiles.
Our strawman uses distance based rate limiting to leverage this finding.
In the strawman design each user account is allowed to view user profiles at a maximal
rate r, where viewing a profile K hops away counts as viewing K − 1 profiles. (Thus,
viewing a friend’s profile is not subject to rate-limiting.) The scheme discriminates heavily
against crawlers, who tend to view distant profiles. However, just like the existing rate-
limiting schemes discussed in Chapter 4.1, this design is vulnerable to Sybil attacks. A
crawler can simply create more Sybil accounts to overcome the per-account rate limit. The
same would be true for any per-account or per-IP-address rate-limiting approach, no matter
how much it discriminates against workloads typical of crawlers.
To summarize, if the profile viewing privileges are assigned based only on the viewing
user, then a crawler can view more profiles simply by creating additional Sybils. Instead,
Genie attaches the profile viewing privileges with paths in the network, rather than users, as
we describe in the following chapter.
4.4.2 Genie design overview
Now, we present the design of Genie. Genie relies on a credit network [50, 75] to make sure
Genie’s rate limits cannot be circumvented by using more Sybil accounts. Moreover, Genie
uses the credit network to impose rate limits that discriminate against a crawlers’ workload,
in order to slow down powerful crawlers that use many compromised user accounts.
A credit network is a directed graph G = (V,E), where each edge (u, v) ∈ E is labeled
with a scalar credit value cuv ≥ 0. Each node in Genie’s credit network corresponds to an
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OSM user and there is a pair of directed edges (u, v), (v, u) in the credit network iff the users
u, v are friends in the OSM. Genie allows user s to view user t’s profile information iff the
max-flow between s and t in the credit network is at least f(dst), where f is a non-decreasing
cost function, and dst is the length of the shortest path between s and t in the social network.
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Figure 4.8: Example of Genie on a small credit network. (a) UserA wishes to viewD’s profile;
let us assume this costs two credits. No single path has two credits available, so
both A → B → C → D and A → B → D are debited 1 credit. (b) The state
of the credit network afterwards; note that intermediate nodes B and C maintain
the same total credit available, as debiting from one link automatically adds credit
to the opposite link.
Thus Genie computes the amount of credit charged for a profile view based on the
shortest path length between the viewer and viewee users. However, the credits can actually
be exchanged over any set of paths between the viewer and viewee. For example, Figure 4.8
(a) shows an example of Genie in a small network, where user A wishes to view D’s profile.
A is charged based on the shortest-path distance (two hops) to D, but the credits may be
exchanged over a set of longer, different paths.
If the view is allowed, then the credit value on each link (u, v) on each path pi that
comprises the flow is reduced by cpi; the credit on each link (v, u) is correspondingly
increased by cpi , where cpi ≤ f(dst). An example of this credit adjustment is presented
in Figure 4.8 (b). It is worth noting that Genie rejecting a profile view request does not
necessarily mean the operator must block the user making the request; Genie merely flags
individual views as suspicious. How the provider responds is a matter of policy—normally,
the OSM operator provider would deny or delay the view, effectively slowing down the
suspected crawler’s activity, but not block the user permanently.
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The net effect of this transaction should be that the viewer has f(dst) fewer credits
available while the viewee has f(dst) more credits available for future activity. If j is
an intermediate user on one of the paths pi then the total number of credits available to
intermediate user j is unchanged, though the distribution of credit among links adjacent to
j is different. As long as user j is well connected and can reach other users through any
adjacent link, the change in credit distribution is unlikely to impact the user [44]; if j is not
well connected, then attempted views may be flagged due to a lack of liquidity.2
Social networks exhibit a very high degree of connectivity, ensuring good liquidity in
the credit network for most users. New users, inactive users, or small fringe communities
that have not (yet) established strong connections to the rest of the network may have issues
with liquidity. We will consider this issue in more detail in Chapter 4.5.
Genie leverages three key characteristics of honest user activity identified in Chapter 4.3
to thwart large-scale crawlers.
Leveraging unbalanced view ratios We observed in Chapter 4.3 that honest users have a
balanced ratio of views requested to views received, while crawlers issue many more views
than they receive. Genie allows a user to use credits obtained by being viewed to perform
views in the future. This ensures liquidity amongst honest users with balanced activity ratios
while draining credits from crawlers.
Because honest users do not have a perfect balance of views, even honest users run the
risk of eventually exhausting all of their credit. To address this concern, Genie rebalances the
credits on a pair of links (u, v), (v, u) at a fixed rate rb. For example, this can be implemented
by dividing time into intervals, and at the beginning of each interval
cuv ← cuv − rb2 (cuv − cvu)
cvu ← cvu + rb2 (cuv − cvu)
where 0 < rb ≤ 1.
2Liquidity in the context of credit networks is defined as the capacity to route credit payments [44].
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Leveraging different path lengths Honest users tend to view profiles of other users that
are nearby in the social network; crawling a significant fraction of the social network requires
crawlers to view users who are disproportionately far from the crawler in the social network.
Genie discriminates against crawlers by charging more credits to view distant users. The
cost, in credits, to view a user that is distance dst away in the social network is defined by
the simple cost function f(dst) = dst − 1.
Leveraging repeated views Honest users repeatedly view the same subset of profiles in
the network; crawlers eschew repeat views unless they are re-crawling the network to track
changes. Genie does not charge for repeat views that occur within a given time period. If
user s views the profile of user t within T days of when s was last charged for viewing t
then s is not charged for the profile view; if more than T days have elapsed then s is charged
as normal. A typical value of T would be on the order of months.
4.4.3 Security properties
We now describe the security properties provided by Genie.
Let C ∈ V be the set of user accounts controlled by the crawler and H = V \ C be the
set of user accounts not controlled by the crawler (i.e., the honest users). The crawler’s goal
is to view the profiles of all users in H as quickly as possible. (He can trivially obtain the
profiles of users in C.)
We call a link (c, h) in the social network an attack link if c ∈ C and h ∈ H . The cut
separating C and H (i.e., the set of attack links) is called the attack cut.
To determine the rate rc at which a crawler can view profiles in H , we need only
consider the attack cut, because all of the crawler’s views have to cross this cut. Profile
views within H or within C are irrelevant, because they must cross the attack cut an even
number of times, and do not change the credit available along the cut.
The rate rc is determined by the following factors:
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• A, the size of the attack cut (number of attack links): a powerful crawler has a large
attack cut.
• dh, the average OSM distance for honest profile views.
• dc, the average OSM distance between users in H and the corresponding closest user
in C.
• rc, the expected rate of profile views received by users in C from users in H: per our
threat model, the crawler has little control over this rate, and we can conservatively
assume that it is the same as the expected rate of views received by a user in H .
• rb, the rebalancing rate.
• f , the view cost function.
Using f(d) = d− 1, the maximal steady-state crawling rate
rc = A
rb + rc(dh − 1)
dc − 1
The numerator is the crawler’s “income”, the rate at which he can acquire credits. The
denominator is the crawler’s “cost", in credits, per profile view. As we can see, the maximal
crawling rate increases linearly with the number of attack links, at a slope defined by the
second term. A larger rb, rc or dh increases, a larger dc decreases the slope.
The credit network effectively makes the power of a corrupted account attack propor-
tional to the number of acquired attack links.
A crawler can increase the crawling rate by obtaining additional attack links, which
are difficult to obtain in large quantities. Obtaining an attack link requires forming a social
link with a user not already controlled by the crawler, or compromising a user account
that has social links with users not already controlled by the crawler. Creating more user
accounts by itself is ineffective, because it does not yield new attack links. As a result, the
credit network renders Sybil attacks as such ineffective. Additionally, purchasing many
compromised accounts is unlikely to provide the attacker with much additionally crawling
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ability: many accounts available in underground marketplaces have been observed to not be
well connected users, but rather poorly connected users on the fringes of the OSM [121].
4.4.4 Potential for denial-of-service attacks
A key concern with any credit-based network is a credit exhaustion attack, where an attacker
seeks to prevent legitimate transactions among innocent users. In the case of Genie, there are
two questions to consider. First, can an attacker’s attempt to crawl the network prevent good
users from viewing each other’s profiles? Second, can an attacker target specific users and
prevent them from viewing other users’ profiles, or from having their own profile viewed by
other users?
Due to the properties of the credit network, the severity of the attack (i.e., the rate of
failed profile views the attacker can cause) is identical in each case. However, in a targeted
attack, the attacker can choose to selectively inflict pain on a subset of users. In the following,
we consider both types of attacks simultaneously.
First, we note that the cost function f has a cost of zero credits for a 1-hop profile view.
As a result, profile views among friends are never denied, no matter what the state of the
credit network. Next, we consider legitimate profile views among non-friends.
Let us consider any cut of the social network other than the attack cut. This αβ cut
partitions V into Vα and Vβ , C into Cα and Cβ , and N into Nα and Nβ , respectively. We call
the cut between Cα and Nα the α attack cut, and the cut between Cβ and Nβ the β attack
cut, respectively. Likewise, we call the cut between Nα and Nβ the N -αβ cut, and the cut
between Cα and Cβ the C-αβ cut, respectively. See Figure 4.9.
Now, we consider the question to what extent the activity of nodes in C can impair
nodes in N in their ability to view the profiles of users on the other side of the αβ cut.
Observation 0: Without loss of generality, we can ignore views from users in Vα to
users in Vα, and from users in Vβ to users in Vβ . The paths associated with such views must
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Figure 4.9: Illustration of attack and αβ cuts.
cross the αβ cut an even number of times, which means that they do not change the total
amount of credit available on this cut.
Observation 1: Without loss of generality, we can focus our attention on the case
where the nodes in Cα crawl nodes in Nβ, but nodes in Cβ do not crawl nodes in Nα.
This is because the credit imbalance caused by the crawler’s activities along the αβ cut is
maximized in this case.
Observation 2: The nodes in Nβ cannot be impaired, because the crawler’s activity
increases the amount of credit available to them along the αβ cut. However, nodes in Nα
may be impaired, because the crawling of nodes in Nβ by nodes in Cα reduces the credit
available to Nα along the αβ cut.
Observation 3: The crawler’s activities can reduce the maximal viewing rate available
to nodes in Nα by the ratio of the sizes of the α attack cut and the N -αβ cut. If the α attack
cut is larger than the N -αβ cut, then the crawler can render the nodes in Nα unable to view
the profiles of non-friends in Vβ .
Observation 4: Social networks are known to have a very densely connected core, with
smaller communities connected at the edges [115]. This means that cuts through the core of
the network are very large. An attacker would have to be very powerful (i.e., have a very
large attack cut) to be able to significantly impair such cuts, and thus a large number of
users.
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Observation 5: If the attacker is well connected to a small fringe community, it can
exhaust credit along the cut that separates the small community from the core of the network.
However, by definition this would only affect a relatively small number of users in that
community. Moreover, these users can rectify the problem by adding more links to the core
of the network.
To summarize, an attacker would have to be very powerful to be able to have a noticeable
effect on cuts through the core of the network, which would impact larger numbers of
users. A modestly strong attacker can impair users in small fringe communities. However,
such users can respond by forming additional links to the core of the network. (Recall
our assumption that an attacker cannot compromise the accounts of specific users of his
choosing. If an attacker were able to do this, he could target weakly connected users or
small communities very effectively.)
We will further explore the impact of crawlers on legitimate users empirically in
Chapter 4.5.
4.5 Evaluation
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of Genie over several different social networks.
When evaluating Genie’s performance, we focus on the two primary metrics of interest: (1)
the time required for a crawler to crawl a Genie-protected network and (2) the amount of
honest users’ activity flagged by Genie.
4.5.1 Datasets used
To evaluate the performance of Genie, we need four datasets: (i) a social network graph,
(ii) a time-stamped trace of honest users’ profile views in the form of (X, Y, t) where user
X views user Y ’s profile at time t, (iii) a crawler’s topology (i.e., how the user accounts
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controlled by the crawler are embedded in the network), and (iv) the crawler’s profile
crawling trace.
Social network graphs We evaluate the performance of Genie on social network graphs
taken from four different online social networks: RenRen [91] (RR-PKU), Facebook [164],
YouTube [115] and Flickr [114]), which were introduced in Chapter 4.3.2. Table 4.1 shows
their high-level characteristics.
Gathering and generating workload traces Gathering profile viewing traces for large
social networks is rather difficult, as it requires explicit cooperation from social network
site operators. Unfortunately, many OSM operators are reluctant to share such traces due
to competitive and privacy concerns [123]. Thus, we were able to obtain a profile viewing
trace for the RR-PKU [91] network only.
As a result, we design a workload generator that reproduces the key features of the
original RR-PKU profile viewing trace that we observed in Chapter 4.3. We focus on two
features that capture the correlation between profile view request/receiver user degree, the
number of views per user, and the locality of profile views.
It is difficult to preserve the correlation between both requester and receiver user degrees
and number of interactions while ensuring the locality of interactions because of varying
degree distribution and path length distribution across different networks. Instead, we
generated two synthetic traces: a receiver trace that preserves the correlation between the
receiver user degree and number of received views while ensuring the locality of interaction,
and a requester trace that preserves the correlation corresponding to requester user degree
and number of requests made while ensuring locality of interaction. The high level statistics
of one of the receiver trace workloads is shown in Table 4.3.3
3We note that while the larger graphs have higher number of profile request activities in the trace, the
number of activities do not scale linearly with the number of nodes in the trace. This is to be expected because
larger graphs have a greater fraction of low degree nodes in their network that generate few profile requests, if
any. Our generator faithfully captures the correlation between node degrees and their activity. Other studies of
social networks, such as [164], have observed similar trends.
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Network Users Profile views
RR-PKU [91] 33,294 77,501
Facebook [164] 63,392 98,960
Youtube [115] 1,134,889 984,425
Flickr [114] 1,624,991 1,703,831
Table 4.3: Statistics of synthetic profile view workloads generated for different networks.
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of cumulative distribution of hop distances between different syn-
thetic workloads and the original workload.
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of degree to #views (requested or received) correlation between dif-
ferent synthetic workloads and the original workload.
One concern with our trace generation is that if the social networks are sparse and have
very high average path length, the generated trace may not ensure locality of interaction
while preserving the correlation between user degree and number of interactions. We cross
check whether our traces preserve the intended key features. We do this by testing whether
the newly generated traces preserve the two key features we aim to reproduce: (i) locality
of interactions and (ii) the correlation between user degree and number of profile views
received (or requested). We plot the locality of interactions in Figure 4.10 and the correlation
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between node degree and number of profile views in Figure 4.11 for both the original and
the synthetic workload traces. The curves match quite well for all three social networks
(Facebook, YouTube and Flickr) indicating that the synthetic workload generator retains
the key properties of the original RR-PKU workload. We used 5 synthetic traces generated
using different random seeds for each of the Facebook, Youtube and Flickr networks.
Crawler’s attack topology We model crawlers by simulating the crawler has compromised
the accounts of random users in the social network. We simulate 1, 10, 100 and 1,000
corrupted user accounts in the RR-PKU, Facebook, YouTube and Flickr networks. As the
crawler obtains access to more corrupted accounts in the network, he also acquires many
more attack links to honest users. The varying strength of crawlers on different networks is
discussed in Chapter 4.3.2 and Table 4.2.
Crawler’s profile crawling trace To generate the crawler crawling workload, we follow
the same crawler model discussed in Chapter 4.3.2. This models a crawler that achieves the
lowest average path distance to the crawled profiles, and is the optimal attacker strategy.
Unless otherwise noted, all results are the average across 25 different runs of our simulator
(5 synthetic honest user profile viewing traces, each paired with 5 synthetic crawler traces).
4.5.2 Trace-driven simulation methodology
To evaluate the performance of Genie, first we built a max-flow path based trace driven
simulator. We use the social graph connecting the users to simulate a credit network. For
each profile view in the workload trace, our simulator checks if there exists a set of paths
in the credit network that allow p− 1 units of credits to flow between the viewer and the
viewee, where p denotes the shortest path length separating the viewer and the viewee. To
this end, our simulator computes the max-flow paths [131] between the viewer and the
viewee. If the max-flow is larger than p− 1, then the profile view is allowed and if it is not,
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then the view is flagged. If the profile view is allowed, the credits along the links of the
max-flow paths are updated as described in Chapter 4.4.
A key input to our simulator is the credit refreshment rate, which denotes the rate at
which exhausted credits on the links are replenished. We set the credit refreshment rate in
our simulator by tuning the following two parameters described in Chapter 4.4.2: (i) the
initial credit value, i, assigned to each link in the network at the beginning of the simulation,
and (ii) the credit rebalance rate, rb, which restores some of the exhausted credits on the
links after each time step, say of duration t. We set the parameter rb to 1, which has the
effect of restoring the credit values on all links to i after every refresh time period (2 weeks
in our experiments). So i
t
represents the effective credit refreshment rate, which determines
the number of profile views accepted both for crawlers and honest users. As the value of
credit refreshment rate increases, more profile views will be accepted from both crawlers
and honest users. Thus, the key evaluation challenge that we address using our simulator is:
Does there exist a credit replenishment rate that significantly slows down crawlers, while
flagging few views by honest users?
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Figure 4.12: Complementary cumulative distribution of the imbalance of RR-PKU users
(views are weighted by cost function mentioned in Chapter 4.4). Only 226 (0.7%)
users have an imbalance greater than 12.
For a real-life deployment the OSM operator can estimate initial credits by using past
browsing activity of users. The operator can build a distribution of user activity based on
the imbalance between average number of profile views requested and received (weighted
by the cost function mentioned in Chapter 4.4) made per outgoing link per user. Then the
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operator can pick an initial credit value/link from this distribution so that most (e.g. 99.9%)
users’ activity is allowed, but a few profile views are flagged (probably from super active
users or crawlers). We check this methodology with our current RR-PKU dataset. Our
implicit assumption here is that honest user behavior shows constant trends over time. We
show the weighted imbalance distribution in Figure 4.12. From this figure we can estimate
the number of users affected at a given credit value. For example with a credit value of 12,
our estimate shows that views from 33,068 (99.3%) users will be allowed and 226 users will
have some views flagged. We will see in Chapter 4.5.4 that our estimate is quite good and
indeed 275 users are flagged with this particular credit setting.
Scaling simulations to large graphs While we were able to run our max-flow path based
simulator over the smaller RR-PKU network with 33,000 users, we found it computa-
tionally expensive to scale our simulations to the much larger YouTube and Flickr social
networks with millions of users, links, and profile views. The computational complexity
arises out of three reasons: (i) even a single max-flow computation over a large graph is
expensive, the most efficient algorithms for the maximum flow problem run in O(V 3) [79]
or O(V 2 log(E)) [49] time; (ii) we have to perform millions of such computations, one for
each profile view in the trace, and (iii) worse, the computations cannot be parallelized and
have to be done online and in sequence, as the max-flow computation for a profile view has
to account for credit changes on links in the network due to all prior profile views in the
workload trace.
To allow Genie to be deployed on much larger networks, we leverage the recently
proposed Canal[166] framework. Canal speeds up computations over credit networks and
enables credit operations on very large-scale credit networks (of the order of millions of
users) with low latency (of the order of a few milliseconds or less). Canal uses a novel
landmark routing based technique to pre-compute paths with available credit (between
different users in the network) continuously in the background as new credit operations are
processed. Canal trades off accuracy for speed to achieve this goal. It explores only a subset
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Network Avg. time (ms) 95th percentile
time (ms)
RR-PKU [91] 0.16 0.78
Facebook [164] 0.21 0.86
Youtube [115] 0.46 1.45
Flickr [114] 0.65 1.41
Table 4.4: Average and 95thpercentile time taken by Canal implementation to process one view
request.
of all possible paths between two users to complete a credit network operation between
them. Thus, Canal may not always find sufficient paths with available credit between two
users, even if such credit exists. However, Canal can achieve over 94% accuracy on various
large-scale social networks [166]. Using Canal we were able to use Genie on data from
online social networks including YouTube and Flickr that contain millions of users and
links. We show the latency for processing one profile view with the Canal implementation
of Genie in Table 4.4. Our current Canal implementation runs on a single machine. Results
in [166] shows that, using a single machine with 48 GB RAM and 24 CPU cores, Canal
can support operations on graphs with over 220 million links. Canal could likely be scaled
to networks with a billion links using multiple machines and graph parallel processing
frameworks [81, 108].
Simulating Genie with Canal We implemented Genie using the Canal library. While
processing a profile view, Genie asks Canal for the shortest path length between the viewer
and viewee. It should be noted that Canal can only provide an approximate shortest path
length because it uses a subset of all possible paths between two users. Genie uses this path
length as the basis of charging for the view and then queries Canal again for a set of paths
from viewer to viewee with sufficient credit values. If Canal returns a set of paths then the
view is allowed and Genie deducts credit along the returned set of paths. The view is flagged
otherwise. Canal requires two parameter settings to configure the amount of path data to
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be pre-computed. We use the same settings4 used in the original Canal work [166] (these
settings provided over 94% accuracy when applied to the Bazaar [131] system).
As Canal may fail to find sufficient credit when it exists, but will not find credit that
does not actually exist, deploying Genie with Canal provides an upper bound for the number
of flagged profile views. We now examine how close the Canal estimates are to the true
level of flagged user activity.
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Figure 4.13: Variation of the fraction of user activities flagged with different credit values
in RR-PKU in the presence of a crawler with 10 compromised accounts. We
compare the results obtained using Canal implementation (red solid line) with
those obtained using max-flow based technique (green dotted line). The red solid
line provides a close upper bound for the green line.
To understand the effect of approximation error introduced by Canal in terms of flagged
honest user activities, we compare the Canal implementation output with the output from the
max-flow path based technique. We use the RR-PKU network for this part of the evaluation
as the relatively smaller size of RR-PKU enabled us to use max-flow path based technique.
Figure 4.13 shows the percentage of flagged honest user activity for the two techniques in
the presence of a crawler with 10 compromised accounts. As the amount of credit available
per refresh period increases, the percentage of flagged activity decreases for both techniques.
On average, the absolute difference in flagged activities between the two techniques is only
0.7% of all user activities, suggesting that Canal provides good accuracy. In the rest of our
evaluation we will present results using our Canal implementation.
420 level-3 landmark universes
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4.5.3 Limiting crawlers vs. flagging activity
We now switch our attention to the core tradeoff that is being made as we select the
appropriate credit refreshment rate: namely, the amount of time it takes the crawler to crawl
the entire graph and the fraction of honest users’ activity that is flagged. We have already
observed that to slow down crawlers effectively we need to replenish credits at a slow rate.
However, a limited rate of credit replenishment opens up the possibility of honest users’
views getting flagged. In this chapter, we explore the extent to which honest users’ activity
is flagged by Genie as it tries to limit crawlers.
We ran our Canal implementation for various different values of available credit per
refresh period. For each replenishment rate, we compute two metrics: (i) the time it would
take for a crawler to finish it’s crawl and (ii) the percentage of honest users’ activity that
is flagged. We compare these two metrics looking for a good tradeoff, where crawlers are
effectively slowed down, while good user activity is rarely flagged. We present the basic
tradeoff for our different social networks in Figure 4.14.
For each social network, we show the results for crawlers of different strengths. On
YouTube and Flickr graphs with more than 1 million users, we considered a crawler con-
trolling up to 1,000 user accounts, while for RR-PKU with only 30,000 user accounts,
we limited the crawler strength to 10 users. While the absolute number of compromised
accounts controlled by the crawler might seem small (< 0.1%), it is worth noting that the
percentage of compromised users in these networks is still substantial as discussed earlier in
Chapter 4.3.2.
The plots show that it is possible to slow-down crawls sufficiently to force a crawler
to spend several months to tens of months to complete a single crawl. At the same time,
the percentage of flagged user activity can be held to less than 5%. In many instances, the
flagged activity can be held lower than 1%. Thus, there are two important take-away from
these results: first, when Genie is employed a certain amount of honest users’ activity will
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Figure 4.14: Trade-off between fraction of user activity flagged and time taken to finish a com-
plete crawl in with crawlers of varying strengths over different social network
graphs. As shown in figure we measure crawler strength by the total number
as well as the percentage (shown in parenthesis) of compromised accounts in the
network under control of crawler. Further, we conservatively allowed crawlers
to exhaust the credits on links before allowing any honest users’ activity.
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unavoidably be flagged. Second, unless the crawler is quite powerful and possesses over
0.1% of the accounts the impact of the crawler on honest users is minimal.
4.5.4 Alternate strategies for flagged users
We observed in the previous chapter that a certain amount of blockage of honest users’
activity is unavoidable. In chapter 4.4.2, we discussed that the OSM operator can make
a choice based on some policy, once the profile view is flagged (or blocked) by Genie.
Normally, the OSM operator would deny or delay the view to slow down the crawler’s
activity.
We now pose a simple question: can users do anything to minimize the amount of their
flagged activity? To answer this question, we first investigate the flagged views in more
detail. We then propose some recourses available to users with flagged activity.
We analyze the set of flagged activities in our extensive RR-PKU simulation, where
we compute max-flow paths to verify if a profile view has to be allowed. We intentionally
focused on max-flow based simulations because of the certainty that profile views flagged
during such simulations are flagged due to lack of credit in the network.
For the analysis in this chapter, we focus on one particular simulation experiment with
credit value 12, where 2.6% (or 2,574 activities) of the user activities are flagged and the
crawler controlling 10 compromised accounts needs 8 months to complete the crawl.
A profile view can be flagged due to one of the three reasons: (i) the profile viewer runs
out of credit on all links connected to itself (i.e., source blocked), (ii) the credit on links
connecting the profile viewee is exhausted (i.e., destination blocked), or (iii) the view is
flagged due to credit exhaustion somewhere in the middle of the network. Strikingly, only
190 out of 2,574 (7%) flagged views (i.e., 0.18% of all views) are flagged due to lack of
credit on links in the middle of the network. The remaining 2,384 (out of which 1,961 views
were blocked at the source) views which includes 93% of the flagged activities is due to
credit exhaustion on links directly next to the viewers or the viewees. On examining the
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Figure 4.15: Comparison of the hop distance distribution of 3 users with too many views in
RR-PKU. Their profile view characteristics deviates considerably from the hon-
est user activities.
degrees of these viewers and viewees who are flagged, we find that 96% of them have degree
1 and 99% of them have degrees 5 or less. That is, most activities flagged near the source or
destination, is due to source or destination users having way too few number of friends and
lying on the fringes of the network graph. Our results support our observation in Chapter 4.4
that social network graphs are sufficiently well connected in their core that most flagged
activity (and credit exhaustion) occurs close to the fringes.
Next, we investigated the amount of flagged activities for individual users. We found
that a small number of users are bearing the brunt of the flagged activities. 1,808 of the
2,574 (or 70%) of the flagged profile views are made by 3 users in the network. These are
the same super-active users mentioned in chapter 4.3.1. Interestingly, all three users issue
two orders of magnitude more views than an average RR-PKU user and they are all flagged
near the source. Further investigation suggests that these top three users exhibit crawler-like
characteristics. Figure 4.15 shows that the three most blocked users issue considerably more
long distance views than normal users. In fact, network locality of their profile requests
resembles that of a crawler than that of a honest user with more than 60% viewed profiles
lying beyond their 2-hop neighborhood. Ignoring these three users, whose view trace bears
strong resemblance to crawlers, the percentage of total flagged activity falls to less than
third of its original value, which is already a low percentage (2.6%) of all activity.
For the remaining users who contribute to only 30% of flagged views, we have already
observed that most (99%) of the users have degree less than five. These are users who got
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flagged because their low number of friend links are insufficient to support the reasonable
number (on average 6 views) of views they issued. However, we argue that there is a simple
and natural recourse available to them: they can simply form more links in the online social
network.
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Figure 4.16: Cumulative distribution of how many extra links flagged RR-PKU users needed
for completing their activities. Evidently majority of them needed just a few more
links.
In order to test this hypothesis, we perform a simple experiment. We re-run the Genie
simulation where each flagged user which consists of 275 users (falling in the low degree
category), establishes a friend link to the destination of the flagged view (i.e requester sends
a link request and the receiver approves it). This immediately leads to the acceptance of that
view. At the end of the simulation, we look at the number of friend links established by each
flagged user so that all the earlier flagged views could now be accepted.
Figure 4.16 shows the distribution of number of friend links established versus the
ranked set of users. A significant majority (269 out of 275 or 97%) of the flagged users can
get their views accepted by only establishing very few links (less than 4). Thus, most of the
activity flagged by Genie would be accepted if the users of the flagged views spent a minimal
effort to establish a small number of friends. In fact, if Genie were to be deployed, it would
naturally incentivize users to form a few more friend links. Given that many OSMs already
explicitly encourage their users to form more friend links, we believe that the overhead from
Genie would be acceptable for a majority of users.
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4.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we address the problem of preventing large-scale crawls in online social
networks, and present Genie, a system that can be deployed by OSM operators to thwart
crawlers and proactively control the exposure of the user generated content. Based on
trace data from the RenRen OSM, we show that the browsing patterns of honest users and
crawlers are very different. While most honest users view the profiles of a modest number
of users who tend to be nearby in the social network, even a strong, strategic crawler must
view profiles of users who are further away. Genie exploits this fact by limiting the rate of
profile views based on the connectivity and social network distance between a profile viewer
and viewee. An experimental evaluation on multiple OSMs shows that Genie frustrates
large-scale crawling while rarely impacting browsing of honest users; the few honest users
who are affected can recover easily by adding a few additional friend links.
In the next two chapters we investigate our last scenario of exposure control: controlling
longitudinal exposure. In other words, we check how users are controlling exposure of their
old content today and what we can do to help them.
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CHAPTER 5
Understanding longitudinal exposure in
OSMs
In this chapter, we focus on understanding longitudinal exposure management of OSM
content—a dimension of user privacy that becomes more challenging to manage with the
passage of time. Users’ privacy preferences for sharing content are known to evolve over
time [21, 25]. There can be many reasons for such temporal changes in privacy preferences
– e.g., the sensitivity or relevance of shared content changes with time; the biographical
status of users and their friend relationships change over time. The challenge of managing
longitudinal privacy for a user refers to the difficulty in controlling the exposure of the
user’s socially shared data over time. This challenge becomes more complex over time
as the set of contents shared in the past grows larger and new technologies like archival
(timeline-based) searches make it easier to access historical content shared under outdated
privacy preferences.
Against this background, this chapter asks and investigates the following two founda-
tional questions related to understanding and controlling longitudinal exposure of user data
in social media sites, respectively:
1. In practice, is there evidence for users changing their privacy preferences for content
shared on social media sites 5 to 10 years in the past? If so, what is the extent of the
change in longitudinal exposure of user data?
2. In practice, how effective are the mechanisms provided by social media sites to enable
users to control the exposure of their shared data over time? Could we improve the
effectiveness of longitudinal exposure control mechanisms?
To address these questions, we have gathered extensive longitudinal data (over 6 years) from
the Twitter social media site. Compared to the Facebook social networking site, the privacy
preferences of users for messages (tweets) posted (tweeted) in Twitter are relatively simple
– each tweet is either publicly visible to everyone, or privately visible only to the user’s
followers, or deleted from the site by the user. However, the simplicity of privacy choices in
Twitter allows us to measure the temporal evolution of their users’ privacy preferences by
simply tracking the public visibility of users’ tweets over time.
Our analysis of Twitter messages1 reveals striking evidence of a significant fraction
(∼35%) of all Twitter users changing their privacy preferences over time. Only a minority
(∼8%) of all Twitter users selectively withdraw (i.e., delete or make them private) a small
(∼10%) fraction of all their public posts. On the other hand, a sizeable fraction (∼27%)
of all Twitter users withdraw all of their public posts older than a few (4-6) years. While
a few recent studies have attempted to understand how user’s privacy preferences might
change with time through user surveys [21, 25], to our knowledge, our work presents the
first large-scale measurement study of how users actually change their privacy preferences
in practice. Since our exploration is data-driven (as opposed to user surveys), we could not
investigate the user intentions behind the changes in privacy preferences. A limitation of our
work lies in the assumption that these changes are driven by users’ privacy concerns.
Our investigation of the effectiveness with which Twitter users control the public
exposure of their tweets reveals a fundamental problem. Even after a user withdraws her
public posts, the past interactions of her friends and other users with those posts (by the
way of comments and replies) leave a trail of residual posts that remain on the site (as the
1This study was conducted respecting the guidelines set by our institute’s ethics board and with their
explicit knowledge and permission.
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residual posts are not authored by the same user, they cannot be withdrawn by her). We
show that these residual activities are in many cases sufficient to recover significant amounts
of information about the withdrawn posts. Our analysis of residual activities highlights this
inherent flaw with the longitudinal exposure controls currently being provided to Twitter
users. To make users more aware of the flaws in the existing exposure control mechanisms,
we also design a Twitter app, deployed at http://twitter-app.mpi-sws.org/
footprint/, where any one can login with their Twitter account and check the residual
activities around their posts.
Having identified the limitations of existing longitudinal exposure controls, we discuss
why devising a perfect solution to control longitudinal exposure is extremely difficult. Then
we identify that, as a first step we need to understand the deletion ecosystem in OSMs in
general and need to understand the ownership on OSM content in particular.
5.1 Related work
In this chapter we explore the related work in this space along three axes.
Are users concerned about privacy of their old data? Understanding and improving
privacy control in online social media sites garnered quite a bit of attention in recent
times [48, 152, 92, 103, 85, 107, 29, 27, 112, 21, 25, 129, 180]. The focus of these studies
range from identifying regrettable / deletable content, to understanding the usage of privacy
management mechanisms for sharing data, to designing better privacy management tools.
However, there has been relatively little research on exploring the longitudinal privacy
management mechanisms. Two recent studies [21, 25] surveyed tens to hundreds of users
to explore how online social media users want to manage their longitudinal privacy for old
content uploaded in the recent past (last week, month, year). The study in [21] performed
a user survey and found that a user’s willingness to share content drops as the content
becomes old. Moreover, willingness of share further decreases with a life-change, e.g.,
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graduating from college or moving to a new town. The other study [25] performed two
surveys and discovered that users want some old posts to become more private over time
and their desired exposure set for the content remained relatively constant over the years.
Both of these studies indicate that users are, in general, concerned about the privacy of their
old content, possibly because these content do not reflect who they are at present (possibly
after a change in life). Hence, these studies provide a strong motivation for us to study at
large scale how users in the real-world behave to address their privacy concerns.
How do users control longitudinal exposure of their old data? One natural way for a
user to protect her longitudinal privacy is to delete her old content. Some recent studies have
focused on content deletion by users. For instance a PEW survey [106] on 802 teenagers
found that 59% of respondents edited or deleted their content in OSMs. Almuhimedi et
al. [11] reported the largest study so far on deleted tweets using real world data, however
they only collected data which are deleted at most one week after posting. Specifically, they
collected 67 million tweets from 292K users posted during a week, and found that 2.4% of
those tweets are deleted within that week. Out of their set of deleted tweets, 89.1% were
deleted on the same day on which they were posted. Moreover 17% of those deleted tweets
were removed by the user due to typos or to rephrase the same tweet. However, note that,
they primarily focused on content posted in the near past (no more than one week old) which
were selectively deleted by the user. We will report later in this study how the exposure
controls are quite different for the content posted in the near and far past, and show that the
study [11] missed a large part of deleted tweets posted in far past (e.g., 6 years back).
A few other studies [104, 90] explored the changing behavior of Twitter users over
time. Out of them, Liu et al. [104] analyzed the collective tweeting behavior over time
including deletion of content. They observed that social media users are either selectively
deleting their tweets or deleting their entire account. However, they did not check if there
are limitations of these mechanisms to control exposure. Neither did they explore the
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relative merits and drawbacks of different exposure control mechanisms. We explore these
unanswered questions in detail.
What are some proposed mechanisms to help users control longitudinal exposure?
Some recent studies mentioned possible mechanisms to improve the usability of longitudinal
privacy mechanisms in OSMs. Bauer et al. [25] observed that users are possibly becoming
more privacy-aware about their longitudinal data. This change in users’ privacy concerns is
further reflected by the advent and popularity of systems like Snapchat [145] which deletes
all users’ posts after a predefined expiry time. Aylan and Toch [21] proposed longitudinal
privacy management mechanisms like allowing users to set expiration dates on content or
having an archive feature for old content. We build upon these studies and explore smart
policies for content withdrawal.
5.2 Understanding longitudinal exposure
In this chapter, we aim to understand how users are presently withdrawing their socially
shared content to control longitudinal exposure. We start by answering the simple question
– what are the longitudinal exposure control mechanisms available today in Twitter, for
withdrawing shared content?
5.2.1 Exposure controls in Twitter
We found three distinct mechanisms of withdrawing socially shared content (tweets) in
Twitter today:
1. Withdrawing tweets via selective deletion: The reasons for such deletion ranges from
regrettable content in the tweets to simply correcting typographical errors or rephrasing [11].
2. Withdrawing tweets via deleting account: All tweets posted by a user can be withdrawn
by deleting her whole account.
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Twitter
error
codes
Corres
ponding
HTTP error
codes
Twitter error message Practical interpretation of
Twitter error codes
179 403 Sorry, you are not autho-
rized to see this status
User account made private
63 403 User has been suspended User account suspended by Twit-
ter
34 404 Sorry, that page does not
exist.
Tweet (or user account) with-
drawn
144 404 No status found with that
ID
Tweet (or user account) with-
drawn
Table 5.1: Error codes and error messages returned by the Twitter API when we try to access
a tweet that has become inaccessible. The last column presents a practical interpre-
tation of each error code.
3. Withdrawing tweets via making account private: In Twitter, user-accounts are either
‘public’ or ‘private’. Tweets posted by a public account are visible to anyone online, but
tweets posted by a private account are visible to only the followers of that account, who must
be approved by the private account owner before they can be a follower. Unlike Facebook,
Twitter does not have sophisticated access control mechanisms whereby a tweet can be made
visible to only a subset of one’s followers. In Twitter, a tweet is either public to all users, or
at least to all followers of the user who posted the tweet. Thus, if a user makes her account
‘private’, all tweets posted from this account are no longer available publicly.
Note that there is another factor that will result in tweets becoming inaccessible – if
Twitter suspends a user’s account for violating their terms of service, all tweets posted
by that account will became inaccessible. However, we do not consider this factor as a
mechanism for exposure control, since suspension is not carried out by the user herself.
To perform this study at scale, we needed to identify a large set of tweets that have
been withdrawn by Twitter users. Additionally, we also needed to ascertain why a tweet
has become inaccessible, so that we can ignore tweets that have become inaccessible due
to Twitter suspending the users, and focus only on tweets that have been withdrawn by the
users themselves. The rest of this chapter describes how we identified such tweets.
127
Methodology for identifying tweets withdrawn by users: Our methodology consisted of
taking a large set of tweets posted and archived in the past, and checking which ones have
become inaccessible at the time of this study (October 2015). We observed that if we query
the Twitter API with a tweet-id (a Twitter-generated unique identifier for a tweet) that was
archived in the past when the tweet was public, if the tweet is inaccessible at present, the
Twitter API sends back an error code and an error message as explanation. These error
codes are customized by Twitter and are different from the normal HTTP error codes 404
(resource not found) and 403 (access forbidden) that are also obtained during this querying
process. During our experiments consisting of querying for millions of tweet-ids (details
given later), we noticed four distinct error codes that are shown in Table 5.1, along with
the corresponding HTTP error codes, the corresponding error messages, and the practical
interpretation of the error codes. These practical interpretations are based on the Twitter
error messages and experiments performed using one of the author’s Twitter account (as
described below).
As shown in Table 5.1, the error messages accompanying codes 179 and 63 respectively
identify the cases where the tweet has become inaccessible because the user made her
account private, and where Twitter suspended the account. In this study, we will henceforth
ignore the tweets that returned error code 63, since these tweets became inaccessible not
due to user controlling their exposure, but rather due to Twitter suspending the users.
However, neither the Twitter official documentation2 nor the error messages help to
practically interpret the difference between the error codes 34 and 144. We experimented
using the Twitter account of one of the authors of this work, and observed that, both these
error codes practically correspond to the case where the tweet has been withdrawn. However,
these two error codes do not distinguish between the cases where the user selectively deleted
a tweet and where the user deleted her account as a whole. To distinguish between these
two scenarios, we further queried the Twitter API to check the status of the user account
2https://dev.twitter.com/overview/api/response-codes
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Figure 5.1: Percentage of tweets in our sample of archived tweets that have been withdrawn
as of October 2015. The age of a tweet is the difference between the time when
the tweet was posted and the time of querying the Twitter API with the tweet-ids
(October 2015). The amount of withdrawn tweets is increasing considerably over
time – more than 28% of tweets posted 6 years back have been withdrawn today.
The dotted vertical lines in the figure demarcate the points on the x-axis where the
scale changes (days vs. months vs. years).
that had posted the tweet. The interpretation of codes is much simpler for user accounts (as
compared to those for tweets) – the Twitter API returns HTTP code 200 OK for existing
accounts, and error code 404 for deleted accounts.
Thus, by querying the Twitter API with archived tweet IDs (and the userids of users
who posted the tweets), and observing the error codes returned, we can determine whether a
previously public tweet has been withdrawn.
Limitations of our methodology: We do not know exactly when a tweet became inaccessi-
ble, i.e., how long after posting was it withdrawn. However, this limitation does not have
much effect on the analyses we intend to conduct in the later chapters. As we mentioned in
the introduction, we also do not capture the user intention behind the withdrawal, i.e., we do
not know exactly why a user withdrew her tweet or account. That said, we do view historical
tweet withdrawal as being implicitly motivated by the desire for controlling longitudinal
exposure of prior posts.
5.2.2 Longitudinal exposure of user data
To measure the longitudinal exposure of user data over the last six years from the time of the
experiment (October 2015), we used two sets of archived data – (i) a near-complete crawl of
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Twitter done in September 2009 [37], consisting of 1.7 billion tweets posted by 54.9 million
users, and (ii) a 10% random sample provided by Twitter (Gardenhose sample) collected
from 2011 till the time of this study. Note that all of these archived tweets were publicly
shared when the data was originally collected.3
We fixed twenty-two time periods over the last six years, ranging from 1 day ago (from
the date of our experiment in October 2015) to 6 years ago (see the x-axis in Figure 5.1).
Then we randomly sampled 5,000 tweets from each of those time periods from our archived
data.4 We used the method described in the previous chapter on these tweet samples to
check how many of the tweets from each time period have been withdrawn today due to
exposure control of user data. We repeated the experiment over multiple consecutive days
to make sure that the particular day examined was not an outlier (e.g., a holiday, the day
a privacy news story broke, etc.). Specifically, for each of the time periods earlier than 2
months ago, we sampled 5,000 random tweets per day for a week around that time period
and repeated our experiment.
1. How much of the archived data has been withdrawn? Figure 5.1 shows the variation
in the percentage of tweets that have been withdrawn for each time-period. We show box
and whiskers for time periods that are greater than or equal to 2 months, representing results
from multiple days around those timestamps. We observe that there is little variation among
results from the repeated experiments over multiple consecutive days. Unless otherwise
stated, we will report the median from the values obtained through the repeated experiments.
We discover that a substantial amount of past data has been withdrawn today. As shown
by the solid red curve in Figure 5.1, the percentage of withdrawn tweets increases from 4.3%
of the tweets archived 1 day ago to 28.3% of the tweets archived in 2009. Our observation
suggests that users control the exposure for a significant amount of their past data. Hence
3We observed that Twitter provides a tweet in their random sample nearly instantaneously (within seconds)
after a user posts the tweet. Consequently, there is at most a minimal chance that a user deleted a tweet even
before it could appear in our random sample.
4We only considered original tweets (and not retweets) during sampling since our goal is to understand
how much of the tweets originally posted by users are withdrawn today.
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the natural next question is: how do the different exposure control mechanisms account for
this inaccessibility?
2. What is the relative usage of different control mechanisms for longitudinal expo-
sure? Figure 5.1 further shows the variation of the percentage of tweets withdrawn via the
three longitudinal exposure controls – (i) users selectively deleting tweets (green dashed
curve), (ii) users deleting their account (blue curve), and (iii) users making their account
private (pink curve). Surprisingly, we find that tweets posted from the near to far past have
been withdrawn via very different exposure controls. Tweets posted in the near past (e.g., 1
month ago) have mostly been withdrawn via users selectively deleting some of their tweets.
However the percentage of tweets withdrawn via selective deletion quickly stabilizes over
time. On the other hand, the percentage of tweets withdrawn due to users deleting their
accounts or making their accounts private, ramp up as we go further back in the past. In fact,
these tweets account for the bulk of the older withdrawn tweets (e.g., 6 years back).
Specifically, out of 8.9% withdrawn tweets from September 2015 (1 month back), 5.9%
consists of tweets selectively deleted by users and only 3% is contributed by users who
deleted their account or made it private. Whereas, out of 28.3% withdrawn tweets posted in
2009, as much as 16.2% is contributed by users who deleted their account and only 3.2% by
users who selectively deleted tweets.
It is important to note that prior studies on deleted tweets, e.g., by Almuhimedi et
al. [11] exclusively focused on data from the near past (e.g., 1 week in the past), most of
which are deleted shortly (within a few days) after they are posted. Hence, they ended up
analyzing only the selectively deleted tweets, and missed the significant fraction of tweets
posted in the far past that have been withdrawn due to users deleting their accounts or
making the accounts private.
Summary: We analyzed the longitudinal exposure of socially shared data by measuring the
percentage of tweets posted at different time periods in the past, that have been withdrawn as
of today. We discovered that a surprisingly large fraction of old tweets has been withdrawn.
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Moreover, the exposure controls responsible for this withdrawal are very different for the near
and far past. This global view motivates us to better understand privacy related behaviors
at a user-level, i.e., how are individual users controlling their longitudinal exposure? We
address this question next.
5.2.3 Understanding user behaviors
In this chapter, we assess individual users’ behavior for controlling longitudinal exposure
in the long-term. From the near-complete snapshot of Twitter data collected in September
2009 [37], we randomly selected 100,000 users who posted at least 100 tweets. For each
selected user, we randomly sampled 100 tweets out of all the tweets posted by her (as
obtained from the dataset). To simplify further analysis, we selected only the tweets that are
in English, i.e., tweets in which at least 50% of the words appear in an English dictionary.
Further, we ignored users who were later suspended, and the tweets posted by these users.
We were left with 8,950,942 tweets (more than 89% of all tweets), posted by 97,998 users
(97.9% of the users).
Using the methodology described earlier, we found that 29.1% of all the tweets that we
checked have been withdrawn in the last six years, and these tweets were posted by 34.6%
of our selected users.
5.2.3.1 Longitudinal privacy preferences of users
We start with categorizing our users into 3 distinct categories based on their usage of
longitudinal exposure controls for withdrawing their tweets.
1. Non-withdrawers: users who did not withdraw any of their tweets. 65.4% of the
users in our random sample fall in this class.
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2. Partial withdrawers: users who only selectively withdrew some of their tweets.
8.3% of users in our sample are in this class. They have contributed 9.7% of the tweets that
have been withdrawn.
3. Complete withdrawers: These are the users who have withdrawn all of their old
tweets by either deleting their account or making their account private. As many as 26.3%
of our selected users (25,751 in total) are in this class. Out of these users, 60.4% users have
controlled exposure of their data by deleting their account, while 39.6% have made their
account private. Out of all the withdrawn tweets in our sample, these users have contributed
the bulk – 90.3% of all withdrawn tweets.
Table 5.2 shows the relative presence of each category of users in our dataset. We
also show the breakdown of these users across different countries where only the top few
countries (according to number of users) are shown.5 The percentage of users with the
different privacy preferences remains relatively constant across locations. This observation
gives us some confidence that these privacy preferences are not location-specific, rather they
are more universal.
Country Total Non Partial Complete
users withdrawer withdrawer withdrawer
All 97,998 65.4% 8.3% 26.3%
US 43,412 65.4% 8.6% 26.0%
UK 4,870 69.7% 8.7% 21.6%
Brazil 4,576 60.8% 8.5% 30.7%
Canada 2,818 67.9% 10.7% 21.4%
Japan 1,740 73.2% 3.6% 23.2%
Australia 1,602 67.6% 7.9% 24.5%
Germany 1,439 67.7% 8.6% 23.7%
Table 5.2: A breakdown of all users by their privacy preferences as well as by their coun-
tries. Note that the breakdown of users by privacy preferences remains relatively
consistent across countries.
5We obtained the country of our users by leveraging location data of Twitter users gathered by Kulshrestha
et al. [99]. They used the location and timezone field of the Twitter profile for inferring location of users.
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One concern with our methodology is that, since we randomly sampled 100 tweets per
user, we might potentially undercount the fraction of partial withdrawers. To check how
serious this concern is, we repeated our experiments using all tweets posted by a set of users.
However, due to the presence of some very active users, our sampled users posted more that
60 million tweets in total, and given the rate limitations imposed by the Twitter API, it is
very difficult to obtain the present status of all these tweets. Hence, we analyzed a slightly
less active set of ∼ 97k random Twitter users from 2009, who posted between 10 to 100
tweets each. We repeated the same analysis as above considering all of their 2,622,808
English tweets. We found out that 13.6% of the users in this new random sample are partial
withdrawers, which is only slightly higher than the fraction of partial withdrawers in our
original sample of active Twitter users (8.3%).
We also found that, for a large majority of the users who posted between 10 to 100
tweets, the amount of information available is not sufficient for most of the analyses that we
performed further (as described in the subsequent chapters) due to lesser activity of these
users. Hence, in the rest of our study, we will report results for our original set of 97,998
active users who posted 100 or more tweets each.
5.2.3.2 Correlating privacy preferences with demographics
Having identified users with different privacy preferences, we now check who these users
are, by correlating the longitudinal privacy preferences of the users with their demographics.
Twitter maintains only minimal demographic information for users, which includes only a
profile bio and location. In spite of the absence of user-reported fine grained demographics
information, there has been lot of prior work to infer different demographics characteristics
for Twitter users [122, 144, 99]. We leverage this prior work to infer one important demo-
graphic for users from the available profile information – gender of these users. We focus
on the gender since Tufekci et al. [158] noted a correlation between gender and privacy
preferences of users in online social media.
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category Total #users # users with
inferred
gender
% female
users
Random population 97,998 65,438 50.3
Non-withdrawers 64,073 41,054 44.5
Partial withdrawers 8,174 5,667 55.7
Complete withdrawers 25,751 18,717 61.5
Table 5.3: Percentage of female users among different categories of Twitter users whose gen-
der is inferred. The percentage of female users is higher among the partial and
complete withdrawers than in a random Twitter population.
We infer the gender from the self-reported first names specified in the user profiles
using the methodology developed in [122]. Table 5.3 shows the percentage of female users
among the users with different longitudinal privacy preferences. Interestingly, a majority
of the partial and complete withdrawers are female, whereas the exact opposite is true for
non-withdrawers. As a baseline, we checked that in a random sample of Twitter users, the
percentage of males and females is similar. These results suggest that female users are
controlling exposure of their old data more than male users. This finding is also supported
by an earlier study on Facebook [158] which reported that women are more likely than men
to delete social media content.
Summary: We identify three distinct categories of users based on their individual
use of longitudinal exposure control mechanisms. These privacy preferences of individual
users do not vary significantly across countries. We also find that a majority of the content
withdrawers are female.
After understanding the privacy preferences of different users, and observing the signifi-
cant use of longitudinal exposure controls among them, we investigate our next question –
are there any limitations of the current exposure controls?
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5.3 Limitations of existing longitudinal exposure controls
Across online social media sites, the existing longitudinal exposure control mechanisms
have an inherent limitation in the form of retained residual activities associated with a
withdrawn post (e.g., a deleted tweet) or a withdrawn (deleted or private) account.
In these sites users frequently engage in conversations with other users, spurring inter-
actions linked to their posts or to their accounts themselves (e.g., by mentioning a user in
a tweet or by tagging a user in a Facebook post). Such interactions also include someone
publicly replying to a specific post. When a user selectively deletes her post or withdraws
her whole account, those old interactions (from others) associated with her withdrawn post
or account become residual activities which still points to the withdrawn tweet or account.
We show later in this chapter that, anyone today can collect a number of residual activities
(e.g., residual tweets on Twitter) around both withdrawn tweets and accounts posted as far
as six years back from the time of this study.
We acknowledge that such residual activities might exist even when a user deletes her
recent post or withdraws her account created in recent past. However, intuitively, the amount
of residual activities grows over time as an account stays longer in an online social media
site, and consequently the associated privacy concerns become higher. Thus, we focus our
analysis on the residual tweets around withdrawn tweets and accounts posted long back in
the past (in 2009).
The presence of residual activities raises an immediate privacy concern – do the residual
activities actually breach the longitudinal exposure control mechanisms? In other words,
in the context of Twitter, can one recover information about selectively deleted tweets and
deleted/protected accounts by simply collecting and analyzing the residual tweets associated
with them?
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5.3.1 Recovering information about selectively withdrawn tweets
We first focus on the selectively withdrawn tweets, which are deleted by their account holder
while retaining some other tweets posted from their accounts. Specifically, we ask: what is
the amount of the retained residual activities associated with these withdrawn tweets today,
and what can we learn from them about withdrawn tweets?
5.3.1.1 Residual activities around withdrawn tweets
Data collection: We analyzed all the users who selectively withdrew one or more of their
tweets from our random sample of 97,998 active users from 2009 (the same dataset as
employed in Chapter 5.2.3). We then used Twitter search to collect conversations that
mention any of those user accounts. Among these conversations, replies to a tweet still
contain the tweet id of the tweet. Thus, we also identified the reply posts i.e., residual tweets
involving those selectively withdrawn tweets from our dataset.
Limitation of our data: Modified residual tweets like RT@XTZ:<copiedPartialTweetText>
are easy to (programmatically) assign to withdrawn accounts (@XYZ) but not to particular
withdrawn tweets. Therefore we included such residual tweets in the analysis of withdrawn
accounts in Chapter 5.3.2 but not for the analysis of withdrawn tweets in this chapter. Thus,
the data used in this chapter is effectively a lower bound on the residual activity around
tweets. However, even so, we will show that one can still infer significant information about
withdrawn tweets using this data.
How many residual tweets remain around the selectively withdrawn tweets?: In our
dataset, a total of 8,174 users selectively withdrew their 253,853 tweets. We were able
to collect 12,415 residual tweets posted in response to 9,738 of the withdrawn tweets.
Although only 3.8% of all selectively withdrawn tweets have at least one residual tweet,
these withdrawn tweets with residual activities were selectively withdrawn by a significant
fraction of the users – 29.2% of 8,174 users who controlled longitudinal exposure by
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selective withdrawal. We further analyze the number of residual activities per withdrawn
tweet. Figure 5.2 shows that, although a majority (89.2%) of these 9,738 selectively
withdrawn tweets (with residual activities around them) have only one residual tweet, 3.8%
of those tweets have more than two residual tweets. There is a maximum of 59 residual
tweets around a single selectively withdrawn tweet in our data.
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Figure 5.2: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) for number of residual activities per se-
lectively withdrawn tweet. Each of the withdrawn tweets have non-zero residual
activity around it.
5.3.1.2 Recovering keywords from withdrawn tweets
We start by asking – can we recover meaningful words from the original withdrawn tweets
just from the residual replies? To answer this question, we first removed all stopwords
6(no hashtags were removed in the process) from selectively withdrawn tweets and their
associated residual activities, then stemmed the remaining words. We call the resulting set of
words for a tweet keywords. We then checked what fraction of keywords from a withdrawn
tweet also appears in the keywords from the set of residual tweets around it.
How many keywords can we recover from the withdrawn tweets?: Figure 5.3 shows
the fraction of keywords shared by the withdrawn tweets and the residual tweets, as the
number of residual tweets increases. We report the median values (unless otherwise stated)
in this chapter, and the boxes in Figure 5.3 indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles. Note that
we could recover 16.7% of the keywords when the withdrawn tweets received two or more
6We use a list of English stopwords and a list of Twitter-specific stopwords from [179].
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Figure 5.3: Fraction of keywords that could be extracted for each of the withdrawn tweets
(with at least one residual tweet) with varying number of residual tweets. The
boxes indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles in the fraction, and the whiskers in-
dicate the minimum and maximum values. The recovered keywords from with-
drawn tweets increase with the number of residual tweets.
Original withdrawn tweet #Res-
idual
tweets
Example keywords from
residual tweets
Example residual tweets
Saw The Cove last night. Made
me think about how much ALL
animals need our respect – dol-
phins, cats, pigs, dogs, cows,
chickens...
1 cove, respect, animals,
extend, yeah, sea, recom-
mending, veganfail, eat
“@[username] Yeah,
but too bad "The Cove"
doesn’t extend that respect
by recommending to not
eat any animal from the
sea”
[url] - Is it bad for you to eat un-
baked cookie ? Hope not
3 cookie, eat, dough, batter,
yummy, eveyone
“@[username] Cookie
dough is awesome! Eat
it up.”, “@[username] i
don’t think so. isn’t it like
eating cookie dough? i do
it with cake batter all the
time. it’s yummy”
What happened with Palin? 7 palin, resigining, alaska,
safe, dearly, white, house,
fantastic, definitely
“@[username] she’s
resigning. awww...”,
“@[username] she’s
going to act now....Nat’l
Lampoon: Palin goes to
Hollywood.”
Table 5.4: Examples of withdrawn tweets, example keywords from the residual tweets, and
actual examples of residual tweets. The keywords common in withdrawn tweets is
shown in the bold font. As the number of residual tweets increases, their keywords
give out more context about the withdrawn tweet.
replies. Moreover, as expected, more residual tweets allow recovery of more information –
the fraction of common keywords increases as the number of residual tweets increases.
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Keywords revealed from the residual tweets: Table 5.4 shows some sample withdrawn
tweets along with their residual tweets and the keywords gathered from the residual tweets.
The keywords that also appear in the withdrawn tweets are highlighted using a bold font.
Note that even if all the keywords from residual tweets do not match the ones in the
withdrawn tweet, they offer significant contextual information regarding the withdrawn
tweet. This becomes more evident as the number of residual tweets increases. This
observation motivated us to consider another ambitious idea: to what extent is it possible
for a human observer to guess the meaning of a withdrawn tweet from the residual tweets?
Specifically, we asked human observers to guess a withdrawn tweet from its residual tweets,
and then informally checked whether the meaning of the guessed tweets is qualitatively
similar to the meaning of the original withdrawn tweet.
5.3.1.3 Recovering meaning of withdrawn tweets
Since guessing the meaning of a tweet automatically is a hard problem, we instead took help
of human annotators from Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) for a preliminary demonstration.
We used three AMT master workers from the USA for this survey. Each worker was first
shown 5 example tweets and their replies. We first binned all of our selectively withdrawn
tweets into five bins by the number of their residual tweets (i.e., tweets with 1, 2, . . . , 5 or
more residual tweets) and selected ten withdrawn tweets from each bin. For our randomly
sampled 50 withdrawn tweets, all the AMT workers were then shown the residual tweets of
each withdrawn tweet and were simply asked to “Guess the original tweet”. Finally we read
through the guessed tweets and informally checked the (qualitative) resemblance between
the meaning of the original withdrawn tweet and that of the guessed tweets.
Table 5.5 shows a part of the result from our AMT experiment.7 As expected, when
the number of residual tweets is small, the AMT workers were sometimes unsure about the
7For an interested reader to check the resemblance in meaning between the guessed and original tweets,
we put our complete AMT evaluation result at http://twitter-app.mpi-sws.org/soups2016/
amt_guess.html.
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Original withdrawn
tweet
#Resi-
dual
tweets
Guessed tweet from AMT workers
Guess 1 Guess 2 Guess 3
Saw The Cove last night.
Made me think about how
much ALL animals need
our respect – dolphins,
cats, pigs, dogs, cows,
chickens...
1 The Cove has
vowed to not
eat any animals,
good start!
Loved The Cove! I think it’s cool
that the cove
doesn’t eat
animal meat.
[url] - Is it bad for you
to eat unbaked cookies?
Hope not
3 Cook cookies? no
thanks, I’ll just
eat them raw.
Are you sure I
can eat this stuff?
It’s got raw food
in it
I made cookie
dough, but I can’t
seem to actually
bake the cookies
because I can’t
stop eating the
dough!
What happened with
Palin?
7 Sarah Palin
finally stepping
down, good day!
Read Sarah
Palin’s governor-
ship resignation
speech here:
<link>
I wonder why
Palin is resign-
ing??
Table 5.5: Examples of selectively withdrawn tweets and the corresponding tweets guessed by
AMT workers who were shown only the residual tweets for a withdrawn tweets. As
the number of residual tweets increases, the AMT workers guessed the meaning of
the original withdrawn tweet more closely.
meaning of the withdrawn tweet. Nevertheless, as the number of residual tweets increased,
all the human observers guessed the meaning of the withdrawn tweets reasonably well
(as reflected in their guessed tweets). This observation indicates that residual tweets often
give out sufficient information for a human observer to guess the meaning of selectively
withdrawn tweets.
Summary: We demonstrate that it is possible to recover both keywords and meaning from
the withdrawn tweets by collecting and analyzing the available residual tweets associated
with them. This is definitely a bad news for the users who wish to control exposure of their
old post through selective withdrawal.
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5.3.2 Recovering information about withdrawn accounts
Twitter users widely employ two mechanisms towards controlling longitudinal exposure of
their accounts – some prefer to delete their accounts, while others prefer to make accounts
private making their content inaccessible to a public observer. We collectively call these
deleted or protected accounts withdrawn accounts. Here, we study two questions: what
amount of residual activity around a withdrawn account is available, and what information
does this residual activity reveal about the withdrawn accounts?
5.3.2.1 Residual activities around withdrawn accounts
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Figure 5.4: CDF of number of residual activities per withdrawn account. More than 55% of
withdrawn accounts have more than 10 residual tweets.
We collected residual tweets around withdrawn accounts using a similar methodology as
described in Chapter 5.3.1.1. We considered the withdrawn accounts from our random
sample of 97,998 users from 2009 (same dataset from Chapter 5.2.3), and then used Twitter
search to collect posts that mentions any of those user accounts. We limited our search to
the period when the withdrawn accounts were active in our dataset, i.e., from the account
creation date to the date of the last tweet appearing in our data.
How many residual activities remain around withdrawn accounts?: We collected a
total of 1,403,716 residual tweets that mentioned 23,526 withdrawn accounts. In other
words, a substantial fraction (91.4%) of the 25,751 withdrawn accounts have some residual
tweets around them. We analyzed the number of residual activities around each account.
Figure 5.4 shows that a significant amount of residual activities remain even at an individual
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account level – 55.9% of all withdrawn accounts have 10 or more residual tweets. Next,
we ask what information can we recover about these withdrawn accounts, using both the
residual tweets and the existing accounts that posted those residual tweets?
5.3.2.2 Recovering social connections
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Figure 5.5: The accuracy of our social connection inference with the percentage of withdrawn
accounts for which we get this accuracy. For more than 30% of withdrawn ac-
counts, all of their residual tweets came from their social connections.
We expect that two users converse mostly when they are socially connected. Thus, as a
first test, we check if the users who mentioned a withdrawn account were connected to the
withdrawn account by the follower-following relation. Cha et al. [37] had collected all the
followers and followings of all Twitter users in 2009 and our withdrawn accounts are part
of their dataset. Leveraging their collected data, we took all the social connections (both
followers and followings) for each withdrawn account as our ground truth. Then we did a
simple prediction: we predicted that each of the accounts mentioning a withdrawn account
are either followers or followings of the withdrawn account. The accuracy of our inference
for each user was: for what percentage of cases was our prediction correct?
Figure 5.5 shows the accuracy of our inference and for what percent of users we have a
specific accuracy. Significantly, for 33.3% of the withdrawn accounts, the accuracy is 100%,
i.e., all residual activities around these withdrawn accounts were posted by their social
connections. For 48.3% of the withdrawn accounts, accuracy is more than 80%. Therefore,
simply by checking who posted the residual tweets associated with a withdrawn account,
we can recover some social connections for a significant number of withdrawn accounts.
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Figure 5.6: 5.6(a) Accuracy of our location inference leveraging residual activities. We can
infer location with high accuracy and the inference is consistently better than
baseline. 5.6(b) the accuracy for withdrawn accounts from different countries.
First bar for each country is accuracy of our method and second bar is percentage
chance that a random user will belong to that country.
A large number of existing studies pointed out that connected users in online platforms
show homophily, i.e., have similar characteristics [155, 10]. So we next check if we can
recover some of the demographic attributes, like location, for the withdrawn accounts by
leveraging the demographics of the accounts who contributed to the residual posts.
5.3.2.3 Recovering demographics
We here focus on whether we can infer the location of an withdrawn account from the
location of the accounts who contribute to the residual activity around the withdrawn
account. As stated earlier, we obtained the ground truth country-level location for user-
accounts from the study [99]. We then picked the most frequent location among the accounts
which posted the residual tweets, as our predicted location for the corresponding withdrawn
account. Our accuracy was decided by the number of withdrawn accounts for which our
prediction was correct. As a baseline for comparison, we take the accuracy of a trivial
predictor that selects USA as location every time (the most popular country in Twitter
population).
Demographics prediction accuracy: Figure 5.6(a) shows the accuracy of our prediction
with increasing number of user accounts associated with residual tweets. Significantly, when
144
a withdrawn account has three or more accounts posting residual tweets around it, just by
leveraging the residual activities we can infer the withdrawn account’s location in 85.8%
cases. This is consistently better than the baseline.
We also analyzed accuracy of our location inference for top five countries for the
withdrawn accounts with some residual activities. The baseline accuracy for each country in
this analysis was the accuracy of a predictor that outputs location based on the chance that a
random Twitter user will belong to that country (computed using the full random sample of
∼98K users from Chapter 5.2.3). Figure 5.6(b) shows the comparison of accuracy for top
five countries. We note that even for countries like Japan, where the chance of a random
user coming from the country is as low as 2.25%, our inference is accurate for more than
87% withdrawn accounts.
5.3.2.4 Recovering topics of interest
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Figure 5.7: The percentage of hashtags revealed by residual tweets that were originally also
used by a withdrawn account. 25% of the withdrawn accounts, who ever used
any hashtag in their tweets, used all of the hashtags revealed from their residual
activities.
To recover potential topics the withdrawn accounts could have been interested in, we
leveraged a special type of keyword – hashtags. Hashtags are words in tweets that starts
with a ’#’ symbol and are included to provide the tweet a specific context. Practically
hashtags are used to group together multiple tweets on the same topic. For example, there
were multiple tweets posted with “#iranelection” in 2009 to identify the topic of the tweet
related to Iran election 2009.
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Using data from [37], we determined that 3,855 accounts in our set of withdrawn
accounts posted at least one tweet with a hashtag. Out of those, for 58.7% accounts (2,263
in total), the residual tweets revealed at least one of their hashtags, and in total 3,625 unique
hashtags were revealed for these withdrawn accounts. This correlation encouraged us to
further check what percentage of the hashtags revealed by the residual tweets were also used
by the withdrawn accounts. Figure 5.7 shows our results: interestingly, in 25% of the cases,
all the hashtags revealed by the residual tweets were also used by the withdrawn account.
User
serial
Topics Hashtags used by withdrawn accounts, that are re-
vealed by residual tweets
1 Politics, Sports, Technology #iranelection, #prisoners, #strike, #frenchopen, #tech
2 Politics #conservativebabesarehot, #teaparty, #tcot, #oba-
macare
3 Sports, LGBTQ issues #daviscup, #samesexsunday, #india, #lgbt, #followfri-
day
4 Sexuality, Entertainment #furgasm, #nsfw, #gay, #shazam, #music
5 LGBTQ issues #housing, #dcmetro, #protest, #gaymarriage
6 Politics #immigrationreform, #iranelection, #peace #lgbt
7 Religion #jesus, #truth, #idol
8 Sports #grandrapids, #nascar
9 Sexuality #hugeboner, #carchat
10 Sports, Entertainment #collegefootball, #seinfeld
Table 5.6: Hashtags revealed by residual tweets for 10 withdrawn accounts. These users them-
selves used each of these hashtags. Also shown are some manually annotated topical
categories these hashtags fall into. These hashtags give us an idea of what might be
the topics of interest of the withdrawn accounts.
We further analyzed the hashtags revealed from residual tweets for some individual
withdrawn accounts, and manually annotated the hashtag topics. Table 5.6 presents some
example hashtags from the residual tweets of 10 users, who had used all of these hashtags in
their now withdrawn tweets. As shown by our manual topical annotation of these hashtags,
these hashtags shed light on the user’s interests partially if not fully. Interestingly, some
of these hashtags like “#iranelection”, “#nsfw” might even be considered sensitive, while
other hashtags such as “#daviscup”, “#tech” or “#nascar” give away specific interests of
the withdrawn accounts. This observation provides evidence that the residual tweets still
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reveal information about what a withdrawn account was interested in, even when the account
become inaccessible.
Twitter app to raise awareness about residual activities: To increase user awareness
about their residual activities, we designed a Twitter app, using which any Twitter user can
check what information about her account and individual tweets can be inferred by simply
analyzing her residual activities on Twitter. We invite readers to use the app by visiting
http://twitter-app.mpi-sws.org/footprint/.
Summary: We found significant evidence that the residual tweets and their associated user-
accounts can be leveraged to at least partially recover the social connections, demographics
(location) and even topical interests of the withdrawn accounts. Hence, the goal of the
withdrawn tweet / account owners to control exposure of their (past) data cannot be achieved
by the existing exposure control mechanisms in Twitter.
5.4 Research challenge: How to better control longitudi-
nal exposure?
Naturally, our findings call for improvements of longitudinal exposure control mechanisms,
which will directly increase the usability of such systems from a privacy perspective. We
note that improving longitudinal exposure control mechanisms is a complex problem, as
this has to take into consideration multiple (and sometimes contradictory) factors, such as
the desire to retain some old content while allowing other content to be completely removed
without a trace. Thus there is little chance of having a silver bullet to solve the problem
to controlling longitudinal exposure. Furthermore, we observe that the complexity arises
partially due to the complex issue of the “ownership of content” in the context of OSM
content deletion. This issue is complicated since, in OSMs, multiple users interact with
the same content (while uploading, sharing, commenting etc.); thus, good longitudinal
exposure control mechanisms should be acceptable to majority of these users. To that end,
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the concrete research challenge in this space is: we need to better understand and improve
the deletion ecosystem in OSMs today. We take a first step to address this question in the
next chapter of this thesis. Particularly, we take a deeper look into the longitudinal exposure
control mechanisms today; We point out the key challenges in this space and discuss the
relative merits and demerits of a few exposure control mechanisms in the next chapter.
5.5 Discussion
In this work, we explored longitudinal exposure control, i.e., controlling exposure of past
content. Specifically, using extensive data from the Twitter social media site, we studied
whether online users employ longitudinal exposure control mechanisms in real world to
limit exposure of their old data. We find that a surprisingly large fraction (28%) of tweets
posted in the far past are withdrawn by users today. After exploring the usage of existing
privacy mechanisms by individual users, we find a significant problem with mechanisms to
control data exposure today – social media sites retain residual activities around withdrawn
content, which can be used to recover various important information ranging from social
connections to user interests and even parts of the withdrawn content (and might result
in privacy violation). We identify the need to better understand the deletion ecosystem in
OSMs in order to improve longitudinal exposure control mechanisms. To that end, as a first
step, in the next chapter, we survey the longitudinal exposure control mechanisms that are
being deployed in different online social sites today and present a structured analysis of the
deletion ecosystem, which involves actors other than just the content creator.
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CHAPTER 6
Towards better longitudinal exposure con-
trol mechanisms
Our analyses in the earlier chapter show that a large number of users withdraw their past
social content, but nonetheless often a significant amount of residual information is left
behind, possibly leading to significant information leakage about withdrawn social content.
To prevent such privacy violations, we must design improved longitudinal exposure-control
mechanisms.
As we noted before, improving longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms is a complex
problem, which requires consideration of multiple (and sometimes conflicting) factors, such
as the desire to retain some old content while allowing other content to be completely
removed without a trace [25]. In fact, analyzing the effectiveness of such a mechanism
might require a far richer understanding of many dimensions like incorrectly (not) limiting
the exposure of (non-)desirable content, the potential privacy impact of such false flags, the
ownership of residual activities, and the ease of use and in general understanding the intent
of all the actors involved. Hence, it is very unlikely that there is a silver bullet to solve all
the problems with longitudinal exposure control.
Any longitudinal exposure control method involves modifying the past—via deleting
or editing old uploaded content. However, in the online world and specially in OSMs, the
modification of historical content comes with ethical concerns. These concerns are complex
and often very contextual. On one hand, if an OSM user removes her historical content
containing hate speech, then she is evading any type of accountability for her hate speech.
On the other hand, if an OSM user wants to correct grammatical errors in her earlier post,
she is simply aiming to better express her thoughts. The complexity of ethical concerns
with longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms arises from the multiple ownership of OSM
content—users other than the uploader also interact with OSM content (via replies, shares
or likes) and ethical concerns become more complicated since removing or editing past
content concern multiple parties. For example, people who commented on an opinionated
post might not want the content to be removed, since removing it will affect the context of
their comments. In other words, modifying or deleting past content might cause a boundary
turbulence among the boundaries set by owners (i.e., content creators) and co-owners (i.e,
other users) of the content. Since general boundary turbulence has already been investigated
in past privacy theories, we start with a brief review of the relevant theories.
6.1 Related work
The ownership of OSM content may appear to be a trivial or even inconsequential question,
since whoever uploads OSM content should intuitively be the owner of the content. However,
in OSMs or in general in online platforms the ownership of a piece of content has multiple
dimensions—any user (other than the owner) that interacts with a piece of content (replying
to the content, re-sharing the content etc.) should also have some control over how the
longitudinal exposure of the content is to be handled. In fact, online forums like Reddit
enable moderators to delete content contributed by other users. The dilemma with ownership
is true even for other online platforms as well: For example, on a platform like ArXiv [1]
if a research study is uploaded, cited in subsequent studies, and then at some point in the
future removed for some reason, that might have tremendous negative impact on the studies
that used findings of that paper. To that end, the communication privacy management (CPM)
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theory by Petronio [128] and the theory of privacy in the networked world by Palen and
Dourish [127] generally touched upon the idea of ownership for online content.
Petronio’s CPM theory: Petronio pointed out in her CPM theory (mentioned in detail in
Chapter 2.1.4) that, any user who uploaded the OSM content is the owner of the content.
Furthermore, according to her theory, any other entities who have access to the content after
uploading are the co-owners of the content. Both the owners and co-owners use rule–based
privacy management to control the privacy of the content. CPM theory suggests that when
the rules set by owners do not match with those set by co-owners, there are chances for
privacy violations. However, in the context of longitudinal privacy management in OSMs,
CPM theory neither points out the specific actors (exact owners and co-owners) nor the
expectation of these actors from longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms.
Palen and Dourish’s theory: Similar to CPM theory, Palen and Dourish (mentioned in
detail in Chapter 2.1.5) argued that one of the key privacy boundaries in the online world
is the “identity boundary”, i.e. “self vs. other”. In short, the privacy expectations of the
original owner of content might not match with the privacy expectations of other users who
can access the content. This mismatch creates tension at the identity boundary. Palen and
Dourish further pointed out that the identity boundary is also affected by the content sharing
platform which mediates between the content creator and the content recipients. However,
they did not clearly mention who the “other” is—for example, if a user uploads a public
Facebook profile picture, should the whole population of the internet be counted as “other”?
Thus, we need to investigate the general notion of “others” or “co-owners” in the specific
context of understanding the deletion ecosystem in OSMs. Specifically, in our investigation
we need to (i) identify the roles of specific actors, i.e. co-owners and (ii) identify the
key longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms in OSMs today. We will investigate these
two questions in this chapter. We will further point out the concrete research questions
that needs to be answered for a comparative assessment of longitudinal exposure-control
mechanisms. Finally we will conclude this chapter by presenting three improved exposure
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control mechanisms in the context of Twitter and evaluating the merits and drawbacks of
each of these mechanisms.
6.2 Identifying key actors in the deletion ecosystem
Currently, OSM sites like Twitter enable users to control the exposure of their own content.
However, due to the social nature of OSMs, content from multiple people are often effectively
intertwined. The social nature of OSM content and the resultant effect on longitudinal
exposure control is embodied by “residual activities”, which we investigated in Chapter 5.3.
One easy way to deal with such residual activities is to consider OSM content and residual
activities around them (i.e. replies, likes etc.) as a group and apply longitudinal exposure
control to the group of content as a whole. However, the issue is that each group (a piece
of content and all of its residual activities) are contributed by multiple entities and can be
edited/deleted by multiple parties (e.g., a moderator in Reddit can delete content), including
the original uploader and other OSM users/moderators who interacted with the content.
Note that, in this thesis we try to provide users better privacy management tools for their
own uploaded content. Specifically, in the scope of this thesis, we simply assume that if an
OSM user uploads some content, she owns that content. Below we systematically explore
different actors in the deletion ecosystem and their roles in this content.
Owner: The uploader of the OSM content is the “owner” of a piece of content. The
uploader owns the OSM content and consequently has the direct right to control longitudinal
exposure. Today, in OSMs this right is acknowledged by enabling the uploader to control
the longitudinal exposure of their content (e.g., via deletion).
Direct exposure set: The users who interact with the content are the “co-owners” of the
content. We note that, in a very liberal sense, all the people who are in the access control
list can be considered as co-owning the content. However, as we explained in our exposure
control model, in the context of privacy, the relevant set of users are those who actually
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viewed the content, not all of those who are simply in the access control list. Thus, the
users who actually viewed the content (i.e., the users in the exposure set of the content)
or, more specifically, interacted with the content (via commenting, sharing etc.) should be
the “co-owners”. To that end, we take the human users1 in the exposure set of a content as
co-owners. Collectively we call these users as the “exposure set”. Specifically we denote
the users whom the owner explicitly points out as co-owners (e.g., via tagging them in the
post) are part of direct exposure set. Note that this notation does not apply transitively. For
example, even if a user in the direct exposure set tags another user in the same content, then
the tagged user is still not in the direct exposure set as the owner herself did not tag him.
Indirect exposure set: We denote the users who were not assigned co-ownership by the
owner, but rather gained co-ownership by interacting with the content (e.g., via commenting
on, replying to or liking the post) as the members of the indirect exposure set. Note that, in
the aforementioned case, where user A in the direct exposure set tagged user B, user B will
be in the indirect exposure set. Intuitively, the members of the direct exposure set should
have more knowledge about any longitudinal exposure mechanism applied to a piece of
content compared to the members of the indirect exposure set. In this thesis, by the generic
term “exposure set” we mean the union of users in the direct and the indirect exposure set.
Redactor: We denote the user who controls the longitudinal exposure of a content (via
deletion or edit) as the “Redactor”. The redactor might be the owner of the content. However,
in certain cases, other users (e.g., a moderator or system administrator) can delete or edit a
particular piece of previously posted content.
Suggester: Someone who flags content due to violation of some standards, potentially
causing a redactor to delete it. A suggester might also act passively, e.g., by writing "You
shouldn’t have said that" in response to a post.
1OSM can discount bots or crawlers who viewed the content, as ideally only human users should not have
ownership.
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Key actors in the deletion ecosystem Description
Owner The user who uploads the content.
Direct Exposure set Users whom the owner explicitly ask to view and
co-own the content, e.g., by tagging.
Indirect Exposure set Users who proactively co-own the content, by lik-
ing, commenting or sharing.
Redactor Users who can edit or delete a content, for example
the owner or a moderator of the OSM or even the
OSM operator.
Suggester Users who suggest editing or deleting a content,
e.g., by flagging the content or by posting a nega-
tive comment about the content.
Impact set Users who can detect an edited or deleted content.
Mediator The OSM operator.
Table 6.1: The key actors in the deletion ecosystem of OSMs.
Impact set: The impact set is the set of users who have the ability to view any longitudinal
mechanism applied to a content. Intuitively, if a site like Facebook maintains a public
“edit history” (i.e., a historical edit log made by an owner) alongside any publicly uploaded
content, then the whole population of Facebook is in the impact set of that content. However,
intuitively, the impact set normally should only include the members in the exposure set of
original content.
Mediator: In the online world, the mediator (i.e., in our case the OSM operator) hosts the
content and delivers the content from the owner to the recipients. Note that mediator is
not in the exposure set, since ideally the content delivery in OSM platform is automatic.
However, the mediators are also in charge of providing users longitudinal exposure-control
mechanisms as well as preserving accountability in OSMs (e.g., by detecting and stopping
hate mongers, cyber bullies etc.). Thus the longitudinal exposure control used in the OSMs
should also concern the mediators as they partially own the content by virtue of hosting it.
We will address these above mentioned entities as actors in this chapter. We point
out the actors and their brief descriptions in Table 6.1. Observe that a single user can take
multiple roles. For example, a moderator in Reddit can be both redactor and be in the
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exposure set. Naturally, in order to avoid ethical concerns, longitudinal exposure-control
mechanisms or in general past content modification mechanisms should respect the intent of
as many actors as possible. Currently, different OSM platforms provide the owner a number
of different content modification mechanisms to control the longitudinal exposure of their
old content which has various side effects on the actors. Next, we review the available
modification mechanisms in current OSMs.
6.3 Taxonomy of historical content modification mecha-
nisms in OSMs
In this section we present a taxonomy of content modification methods in OSMs. We divide
the historical content modification methods from the point of longitudinal exposure into two
broad dimensions—1) the removal of content; and 2) the editing of content. We choose the
top ten OSMs by the number of active users (as of April 2017) whose primary language
is English [119]. These sites are Facebook, Whatsapp, YouTube, Facebook Messenger,
Instagram, Tumblr, Twitter, Snapchat, Skype and Viber. Note that, five of these sites,
Whatsapp, Facebook Messenger, Snapchat, Skype and Viber are primarily instant messaging
services. However, they come under the broad definition of OSM [95]—systems that
leverage Web 2.0 technologies to allow the creation and the exchange of user generated
content (both from one user to another and in groups).
In addition to these ten most popular OSMs, we also choose three other popular OSMs
that exemplify other important retrospective content-management mechanisms: Reddit,
4chan and Whisper. Reddit is a popular forum to post and discuss social content. It had
243 million monthly active users as of April 2016 [149]; interestingly Reddit employs
two interesting longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms (i) not letting users delete their
account (ii) anonymizing posts. 4chan [28] and Whisper [41] are two popular anonymous
OSMs—4chan is an anonymous image board with multiple topic based discussion forums
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OSMs # active users
Facebook [53] 1,968 million
Whatsapp [170] 1,200 million
YouTube [175] 1,000 million
Facebook Messenger [56] 1,000 million
Instagram [89] 600 million
Tumblr [159] 550 million
Twitter [160] 319 million
Snapchat [145] 300 million
Skype [143] 300 million
Viber [163] 260 million
Reddit [137] 243 million
Whisper [171] 30 million
4chan [5] 22 million
Table 6.2: List of most popular OSMs that we surveyed for identifying key longitudinal
exposure-control mechanisms.
(e.g, for politics, music etc.) and Whisper is an anonymous micro blogging service, where
users anonymously post short texts. Both 4chan and Whisper are quite popular; 4chan
had 22 million monthly visitors [3] (as of December 2016) and Whisper had 30 million
monthly active users [18] (as of September 2016). We choose them in order to examine how
longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms work in anonymous OSMs. We present the list
of the OSMs with their monthly active users in Table 6.2.
We surveyed these 13 OSMs and identify the key longitudinal exposure-control mecha-
nisms deployed in these systems. Next, we will investigate the content removal and editing
mechanisms separately.
6.3.1 Historical content removal mechanisms
In this thesis, we consider mechanisms that deal with the removal of historical content
directly (e.g., by choosing a single option in the interface). This conservative definition
of removal allows us to differentiate removal mechanisms from editing mechanisms. For
example, in a hypothetical scenario, if an OSM allows a user to overwrite her historical
content without leaving any edit history, even then overwriting historical content completely
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(a) Deleting individual post (no trace) in Face-
book.
(b) Deleting individual post (with marker)
in Skype.
(c) Deleting only owner’s
copy of content in Viber.
(d) Deleting content from the indirect ex-
posure set in Facebook.
(e) Age-based deletion in
Snapchat.
(f) Inactivity-based deletion in 4chan.
Figure 6.1: Screenshots of different historical content removal mechanisms in different OSMs.
Red boxes in some of the figures highlight the relevant feature in OSM interfaces.
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will be considered by us as an editing mechanism, not as a deletion mechanism. To that
end, we observe a wide spectrum of deletion mechanisms in these OSMs, ranging from
completely deleting individual posts to not letting users delete posts. We summarize the
removal strategies in Table 6.3.
• Deleting individual post: Many OSMs allow the owners to delete their individual
posts from the system without any trace. In our survey we observed that Facebook,
YouTube, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, some forums of 4chan and Whisper allow
this type of deletion. In the case of 4chan if the post is not made by moderators then
the post can be deleted. Figure 6.1(a) provides an example of such individual post
deletion in Facebook.
• Deleting individual post from the system (with a marker): OSMs like Skype and
Viber allow the owners to delete their individual post from the system (i.e., delete
their posts from the senders as well as the receivers). However, they keep a “marker”,
i.e., a symbol or a piece of text to indicate that the post is removed. For example,
Figure 6.1(b) shows that in Skype, the system replaces deleted content with a “this
message has been removed” marker.
• Deleting only the owner’s copy: Unlike Skype and Viber, some other OSMs only
allow to delete the copy of the owners. This mechanism is similar to the deletion of
emails. If Alice sends an email to Bob, then even if Alice deletes the email from her
inbox, Bob still retains his copy of the received email. For example Figure 6.1(c)
points out the delete options provided by Viber; The highlighted option (marked
with a red box) clearly mentions that this option will only delete the content for the
owner. Interestingly Viber also provides option for deleting an individual post from
the system with a marker. However, OSMs like Whatsapp, Facebook Messanger or
Tumblr only provide the option of deleting the owner’s copy, and not the recipients’
copies.
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• Deleting whole account: All OSMs we surveyed other than Reddit provide users an
option to delete their entire account and remove any content posted by that account.
We note that out of the OSMs we checked only Reddit does not offer deletion of post
or account out of the box. In Reddit, when a user attempts to remove her content,
Reddit simply removes the user’s identity from the content, but the content itself is
not deleted.
• Deleting activities around content: Some OSMs like Facebook, YouTube, Insta-
gram, Tumblr, Snapchat, and 4chan allow the owners to delete activities around their
content (e.g., comments by others), i.e., content from the indirect exposure set. For
example Figure 6.1(d) shows how Facebook allow an owner to delete the comments
on their posts.
• Age-based deletion: Ephemeral OSMs like Snapchat allow the users to set a timer
on their posts and remove the posts after the time is over. In Figure 6.1(e) we show
an example of a Snapchat post; the timer (bottom left corner) allows the owners to
auto-delete their posts after the preset time.
• Inactivity-based deletion: 4chan employs a type of inactivity-based deletion, where
a discussion thread which does not have any new replies will be eventually deleted.
Figure 6.1(f) shows the 4chan faq which explains this feature. Essentially, at any
given time, 4chan shows only the most active threads, discarding the rest. Thus, a
thread that is inactive for an extended period of time (hours or days as indicated by
4chan administrators in Figure) gets deleted.
• Complete removal of post by redactors other than owners: Many OSMs like
Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Tumblr, Twitter, Snapchat, Reddit, Whisper, 4chan
allow moderators or system administrators to delete content which violates some
community standards (e.g., hate speeches or spam). An example of this feature is
suspension of user accounts and all of their posts by Twitter.
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• No deletion: We observe that in some cases OSMs do not allow the users to at all
remove any of their historical content. For example, in 4chan, sticky threads (the
threads which are shown at the most prominent places irrespective of activity) which
are made by OSM administrators or moderators cannot be deleted.
Having reviewed content-removal mechanisms, we next investigate content-editing
mechanisms.
6.3.2 Historical content editing mechanisms
In addition to allowing users to delete content, OSMs also allow their users to edit their
historical content, i.e. owners can go back to their content and overwrite their post or modify
data surrounding a post (e.g., picture captions or tags). However, the specific editing options
are specific to different OSMs. We summarize the editing options in Table 6.3.
• Editing post (no trace): OSMs like Tumblr and Snapchat allow the owners to com-
pletely overwrite their old content without an editing log; i.e., in OSMs like Snapchat,
others cannot potentially tell if the content is edited after upload. Figure 6.2(a) shows
an example of such an edit feature for a Tumblr post.
• Editing post (with edit history): OSMs like Facebook store a full edit history of
edited past content, which can be viewed by anybody who has access to the original
content. Figure 6.2(b) shows the example of the Facebook interface for showing the
edit history of a particular post.
• Editing post (with marker): OSMs like Skype or Reddit (specifically for comments
to Reddit posts) do not show the edit history of an edited content. However, they
display a marker (i.e, a symbol) to point out that a particular content is edited. For
example Figure 6.2(c) shows that an edited Skype message has a small pencil icon
next to it as marker.
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(a) Edit post (no trace) in Tumblr. (b) Edited post (with edit history) in Face-
book.
(c) Edited post (with the
small pencil icon as marker)
in Skype.
(d) Editing only captions/tags in Insta-
gram.
(e) Archive in Instagram. (f) Anonymize in Reddit.
Figure 6.2: Screenshots of different historical content edit mechanisms in different OSMs.
Red boxes in some of the figures highlight the relevant feature in OSM interfaces.
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content (photos for Instagram, videos for YouTube). Figure 6.2(d) shows this feature
in the case of Instagram.
• Archive: OSM platforms like Instagram also allow the owner to “archive” their post.
Once a post is archived, only the owner can view the post. They can revive the post at
a later point of time if they wish. Figure 6.2(e) shows Instagram’s archive feature by
showing an archived post.
• Anonymize: Reddit also allows another editing mechanism—anonymizing the post.
Reddit allows uploaders to remove their identity from the post, or in other words
edit the post to detach the content owner’s identity from their posts. Figure 6.2(f)
shows an anonymized post, where the user identity is replaced by the string “deleted”.
We note that there are other possible anonymization mechanisms that OSMs can
employ, e.g., deleting personally identifiable information (PII) from the historical post
or just including a short summary of the user’s bio (but not the precise user identity)
automatically in order to preserve the context of the anonymized post.
• No editing permitted: Finally, we note that multiple OSMs, including Whatsapp,
Facebook Messenger, Twitter, Viber, 4chan, Whisper do not allow any editing of past
posts. An owner can remove their past post, but they cannot edit it. On Reddit, too,
original posts cannot be edited once posted. However, comments on these posts can
be edited as mentioned before.
6.4 Research challenge: Exploring usability of longitudi-
nal exposure-control mechanisms
So far our investigation provides the foundation we need to explore the usability of differ-
ent longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms. Our idea is simple: A good longitudinal
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Historical content removal mechanisms
Mechanism Description Example OSMs that support
this mechanism
Deleting individual post Completely deleting individual post from the
system without a trace
Facebook, YouTube, Insta-
gram, Twitter, Snapchat, some
forums of 4chan, Whisper.
Deleting individual post
from the system (with a
marker)
Remove individual post from the system but
keep a marker (e.g, “the message is deleted”)
Skype, Viber
Deleting only the owner’s
copy
Remove content only from the owner’s (e.g,
in Whatspp a sender cannot delete receiver’s
copy of message)
Whatsapp, Facebook Mes-
sanger, Tumblr, Viber
Deleting whole account Complete removal of individual user account
information as well as all the associated post
Facebook, Whatsapp,
YouTube, Instagram, Tumblr,
Twitter, Snapchat, Skype,
Viber, Whisper
Deleting activities around
content
Removal of activities (e.g., comments by oth-
ers) by owner
Facebook, YouTube, Insta-
gram, Tumblr, Snapchat, 4chan
Age-based deletion Automatic deletion of post (e.g., after preset
time).
Snapchat
Inactivity-based deletion Remove posts after a period of inactivity (e.g.,
no replies in 4chan)
4chan
Complete removal of post
by redactors (other than
owner)
A moderator or the OSM operator removing
a particular content (e.g, spam)
Facebook, YouTube, In-
stagram, Tumblr, Twitter,
Snapchat, Reddit, Whisper,
4chan
No deletion The owner is not allowed to remove a post Some forums of 4chan
Historical content editing mechanisms
Mechanism Description Example OSMs that support
this mechanism
Editing post (no trace) Completely overwrite the old post Tumblr, Snapchat
Editing post (with edit his-
tory)
Overwrite the old post, but all previous ver-
sions of the post are available on demand.
Facebook
Editing post (with marker) Overwrite the old post but a marker (e.g., a
pencil icon) is added to the post
Skype, comments on Reddit
posts
Editing only captions/tags Cannot edit the main content, but can only
edit some surrounding data, e.g, caption of a
picture or video
YouTube, Instagram
Archive Deny access to the post for everybody except
owner
Instagram
Anonymize Anonymize a post (e.g., by removing user
identity)
Reddit
No editing permitted Neither owner nor any other redactors are
allowed to edit a historical post
Whatsapp, Facebook Messen-
ger, Twitter, Viber, 4chan,
Whisper, Reddit
Table 6.3: Summary of the historical content modification techniques in OSMs.
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exposure-control mechanisms should respect the intent of as many actors as possible in a
given context. The intent of an actor is how she thinks a removal/editing operation should
be carried out. We leave the investigation of user intent in different contexts to future work.
However, in this section we provide concrete research questions for our future investigation.
Identifying intent of actors in different context: Different OSMs are created to share
different types of content. For example, in the personal-content-sharing OSMs (like Face-
book and Instagram) the owner’s intent might be considered most important. However, in
other platforms the OSM designer might also decide to put more emphasis on the intent of
mediators and might forbid content removal in order to enforce accountability of owners. A
bulletin-board social-news-sharing system like Reddit might want to emphasize community
discussion on social news (i.e., interaction from users in the exposure set). In practice, Red-
dit indeed puts more emphasis on the intent of the users in the exposure set, consequently
choosing not to allow the owner to remove content.
Investigating if different longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms respect the intent
of different actors: Another important research challenge is to compare existing longi-
tudinal exposure-control mechanisms in light of the actors’ intent. We need to identify
in which context a longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms respects the intent of the
majority of actors and where these mechanisms fail to satisfy the intent of most of the actors.
Furthermore, for a given longitudinal access-control mechanism, we need to determine why
the mechanism fails to satisfy certain actor’s intent.
Designing novel mechanisms like “notifications” to augment current mechanisms: Mech-
anisms like “archiving” might respect the intent of both the owners and the OSM operator.
Nonetheless, archiving still affects all the interactions (from others) around the post. To that
end, proactively sending deletion/edit notifications to the users in the exposure set might
improve such mechanisms to respect the intent of some of the actors (e.g., users in the
exposure set). In fact, notifications about removal/deletion can be proactively pushed to
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the actors in some scenarios and in other scenarios it might be more rational to let actors
pull the notifications (so that an actor will know about the removal/editing only the actor is
curious). For example, in the case of archiving, the users who interacted with the post might
receive a push notification that the post is archived and from then onwards, the actors can
only access a read-only, archived version of the post.
Systematically exploring these research questions is part of our concrete future work.
However, next we propose three exposure control mechanisms to show that we can indeed
respect multiple actor’s intents in specific contexts with different proposals. We take Twitter
as our experimental platform and explore some improved longitudinal exposure control
methods for Twitter from the deletion ecosystem in general.
6.5 Proposal for better longitudinal exposure-control mech-
anisms in Twitter
Twitter primarily provides a simple deletion mechanism to the owners for controlling
longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms for old content and does not allow users to
edit their past content. We start with exploring the existing longitudinal exposure-control
mechanisms in Twitter.
Putting users in charge of controlling their longitudinal exposure: This mechanism is
used in most of the popular online OSMs, including Twitter and Facebook, where the content
owners are expected to control their own longitudinal exposure by withdrawing individual
posts / accounts. On the positive side, this mechanism perfectly captures the user intent of
retainment or withdrawal of specific content.
However, as Chapter 5 demonstrated, even when owners withdraw their posts or ac-
counts, the residual activity surrounding the withdrawn posts (authored by other users)
could leak significant information about the withdrawn content. Thus, simply deleting old
posts still might not satisfy the intent of an owner due to the residual activities in Twitter
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(mentioned in Chapter 5). To that end, we propose several possible improvements and
evaluate those proposals.
6.5.1 Proposal 1: Age-based withdrawal
Ephemeral OSMs such as Snapchat [145] and Cyber Dust [2] offer a potential way out of
the residual activity problem which we can apply in OSMs like Twitter. On ephemeral
OSMs, every message is associated with an expiry time after which the post is automatically
withdrawn and becomes inaccessible to the users. Ayalon et al. [21] have suggested that the
system operators of non-ephemeral OSMs (like Twitter) can offer their users similar timed
expiry option such that the posts will become inaccessible to the public after the expiry time.
Though this mechanism solves the problem of residual activities (since even the residual
activities will be inaccessible over time), it has two limitations.
1. First, the default expiry time used in such mechanisms is generally too small (e.g.,
a few seconds or few minutes), which prevents any meaningful discussion around
any post. Since the most interesting posts also get deleted after the expiry time, such
mechanisms might not be preferred by mediators in sites like Twitter which promote
social discussions. One might argue that this limitation can be overcome by simply
setting the expiry time according to user’s preference. Unfortunately, as noted by
Bauer et al. in [25], users are generally bad at anticipating when a post should be
deleted and thus there is little chance that this simple solution would work.
2. Second, age-based withdrawal or any related longitudinal exposure control methods
have a common shortcoming. They solve the problem of residual activities by deleting
all posts, effectively removing the history of any social activities and destroying the
archive of historical social media posts. However, there is a big problem with such
removal of old posts—no archive of historical social media posts. In other words
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age-based withdrawal completely ignore the intent of actors like users in the exposure
set or the mediators.
Some OSMs enable researchers, as well as social media analytics companies (part of
the indirect exposure set of content), to study a huge volume of user generated data. A
prime example of such an OSM is Twitter. Twitter makes a portion of user-generated
data (i.e. tweets) available to researchers and businesses via their streaming or search
API [162]. Research studies use this Twitter data to solve problems ranging from
understanding human behavior to detecting spam. Many of these studies use historical
Twitter data, i.e., data posted recently or in the past (weeks, months or even earlier)
in their research (e.g., while investigating user sentiment for last five US elections).
Unfortunately, age-based withdrawal (at least the current implementation in platforms
like Snapchat) or similar mechanisms makes any such research efforts impossible.
To that end, next we present two more proposals to improve the longitudinal exposure-
control mechanisms.
6.5.2 Proposal 2: Inactivity-based withdrawal
Our proposal is based on a simple intuition—when a post becomes inactive, i.e., it does not
generate any more interaction or receive any more exposure, the post can be safely withdrawn
(deleted/archived/hidden) from the public domain. 4chan offers similar ephemerality by
deleting inactive discussion threads over time.
Note that ‘interaction’ is a general term that can involve several tasks based on the OSM;
e.g., it can mean sharing the post (e.g., retweeting in Twitter), replying to the post or even
viewing the post by the original posting account or other users. Large social media operators
today log all of these interactions.2 Hence, they can easily check if a post is inactive for
more than T days (for any given definition of inactivity), and then the post can be withdrawn
2https://support.twitter.com/articles/20171990#
https://www.facebook.com/help/437430672945092
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from the public domain. Also note that a user can be given various options for withdrawing
her posts which become inactive; for instance, instead of fully deleting the post, she may
instead decide to limit access to the post to only select friends or may even anonymize the
post by removing any identifiable information. Here we generally consider the withdrawal
of posts from the public domain, and leave the details of the exact access control decisions
to the social media operators. Compared to age-based withdrawal, this mechanism has the
following advantages. First, the users need not be burdened with deciding the expiry times
of their posts. Second, this mechanism allows meaningful discussions around interesting
posts, since the posts are withdrawn only after the discussion around them has died down.
Limitations of inactivity-based withdrawal: However, inactivity-based withdrawal is a
simple improvement over age-based withdrawal. Specifically, even in the case of inactivity-
based withdrawal, all the past posts are eventually deleted. Thus, even in this case there is
no preservation of part of historical content. Moreover this mechanism does not capture
a user’s intent to retain some old content even after it becomes inactive (e.g., because it
had acquired large popularity, or because of some user sentiment around a particular post).
Another limitation of this mechanism is that, if a post is continuing to get interactions
because it is controversial in nature, this mechanism would lead to the post remaining in
the public domain. To address such issues, this mechanism should be coupled with other
exposure control mechanisms such as a user being able to specifically withdraw some posts,
or indicating her desire to retain a post even after it becomes inactive.
Even if a user wishes to adopt our proposed mechanism, a technical question needs to
be addressed—how to select a value for T , the number of days after which a post will be
withdrawn? With a very small value of T (say, 1 day), we may end up losing some valuable
interactions; on the other hand, if T is too high (e.g., six years) users run a significant risk
of someone digging up information about their past lives. Next, we demonstrate how the
system operators can leverage the past interaction history to select an appropriate value of
T .
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Figure 6.3: Percentage of lost retweets if tweets were withdrawn after T days of inactivity, for
different values of T . When T is set to 180 days only 0.4% of the future retweets
will be lost.
Deciding an inactivity threshold: We ask a simple question in this direction: if we set a
threshold of T days of inactivity before withdrawing a post, how much of the interaction
generated by a post is likely to be lost? To that end we perform the following experiment.
We randomly sample 700,000 tweets posted in the first week of November 2011, i.e., more
than four years back. Note that all of these tweets are accessible today. In our experiment
we take “retweets” as a proxy for generated interactions by a tweet. For a given tweet, we
can obtain this interaction information directly from the Twitter API (unlike interactions
like residual activities).
In our dataset, 30,014 tweets received at least one retweet and they received 74,705
retweets in total. We collect information about when each tweet received their retweets
using the Twitter API, and simulate setting our inactivity threshold at T days, i.e. each of
these tweets will become inaccessible after T days of not getting any retweets. We analyze
the number of future retweets we would lose for different values of T .
Figure 6.3 shows that if we set our threshold to be too low, say 1 day, we will lose a
significant 5.5% of all the retweets. However, if we set our threshold at only 180 days (i.e.,
decide that after six months of inactivity a tweet might be withdrawn from the public eye)
then only 0.4% of the future retweets will be lost. Note that the parameter T need not to be
global, and every user may choose her own value. In fact, the system operator can show a
range of values of the threshold and point out the associated percent of stopped activities
based on a user’s past history, and allow the user to make an informed decision.
169
Threshold
in days
Inactivity based withdrawal Age based withdrawal
#Retweets
stopped
#Tweets these
retweets came
from
#Retweets
stopped
#Tweets these
retweets came
from
1 4,117 1,584 7,798 1,681
7 1,342 556 2,678 587
30 842 317 947 339
90 609 235 744 243
180 300 181 579 193
Table 6.4: Comparison of age and inactivity-based threshold when both have the same thresh-
old. Retweets of more active tweets are stopped by age-based threshold.
A comparison between the inactivity-based withdrawal and the age-based withdrawal:
To demonstrate advantages of inactivity-based withdrawal over the age-based withdrawal,
we also simulated the age-based withdrawal policy with different thresholds over the same
dataset of 700,000 random tweets and their retweets. Our age-based withdrawal policy
is simple: after T days the tweet is withdrawn and all future retweeting is stopped. We
closely investigated how many retweets would be affected by each of these policies if we
set the same threshold. Table 6.4 shows the absolute number of retweets stopped and the
number of tweets these retweets come from. It demonstrates that for the same threshold T ,
inactivity-based withdrawal stops comparatively fewer retweets than age-based withdrawal.
From our experiments, we make a more interesting observation: age-based withdrawal
also affects tweets which generates a lot of interaction (i.e., retweets) over a longer period of
time, e.g, a tweet from the president of the United States. Let us take an example: Table 6.4
shows that when the threshold is set to 180 days, inactivity-based withdrawal stops 300
retweets from our dataset as it makes 181 tweets inaccessible. For the same threshold,
age-based withdrawal makes 12 more tweets inaccessible (total 193), but stops 279 retweets
from those additional 12 tweets, (i.e., on average 23 retweets per tweet). Notice that, by
generating a lot of activity, popular tweets increase the usefulness of social content sharing
systems, respecting the intent of mediators and users in exposure set. Thus, since age-based
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withdrawal might affect popular tweets, even with a high threshold it might not be suitable
in the real-world adaptation. To demonstrate the effect of this issue, we measured actual
time when a tweet will be withdrawn when we set an inactivity-based threshold of T days
for different values of T .
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Figure 6.4: Actual time when a tweet will be deleted when we set an inactivity-based threshold
of T days.
In Figure 6.4, we plot the withdrawal age of the (inactivity-based) withdrawn tweets,
and rank them in a sorted order based on their age. From the slope of these plots for different
values of T , it is clear that the actual age of most tweets is significantly higher than their
inactive age (or period).
Summary: We consider our inactivity-based withdrawal method to be an improvement
over the age-based withdrawal, as it removes the need for a user to guess when her content
should be withdrawn. Instead, the social site operator can present suggestions to users when
a post becomes inactive, and facilitate the withdrawal. However, the intent of the users in
the exposure set might still not be met by inactivity-based withdrawal, since this mechanism
too deletes all post over time.
Next, we propose anonymization as another effective method of longitudinal exposure
control which preserves part of historical content and better honor the intent of users in the
exposure set (e.g., researchers or users who replied to the content) as well as mediators.
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6.5.3 Proposal 3: Anonymize withdrawn tweets
When an owner withdraws her posts, she explicitly expresses desire for not to be associated
with that content any more. Thus a simple trade-off between respecting the owner’s desire
of withdrawal and still keeping a part of the data would be an anonymizing scheme that
anonymize and unlink a post from the identity of its owner or uploader (the user who
originally uploaded the withdrawn content).
In fact, as we briefly mentioned before, there are multiple systems today that decouple
owner identities from content. Examples include fully anonymous social media systems
like Whisper (http://whisper.sh/) or YikYak (https://www.yikyak.com/
home), which omits the concept of associating user identities with posts altogether. More-
over, another OSM operator, Reddit, already employs a version of anonymization for their
withdrawn content (https://www.reddit.com/wiki/privacypolicy). Reddit
simply removes the user identity in a withdrawn reddit comment and replace it by a “deleted”
string.
Based on these observations, we propose the following idea: OSMs should anonymize
the withdrawn historical content to by unlinking the identities of owners from the content
for withdrawn content, rather than removing both the identity and the content. This strategy
provides a trade-off between the owner’s intent of withdrawal and keeping the archive of
historical content—anonymization removes user identity from posts, detaching an owner
from her withdrawn content and the existence of anonymized version of posts (as opposed to
complete removal) preserved a part of the historical data archive. Again we will use Twitter
as a platform to instantiate our proposal of anonymizing withdrawal social content (tweets
in this case).
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6.5.3.1 Anonymization scheme
We propose a simple anonymization scheme for tweets withdrawn by owners; Twitter can
recommend to just replace the owner identities (e.g., owner id, owner’s user-name) in the
withdrawn tweet with a random string.3 In this way the studies that leverage the tweet
content can still analyze the tweet text including URLs and hashtags. Note that here we
consider tweets withdrawn by their owners. Twitter can choose to keep the tweets that
redactors withdraw (e.g., by suspending accounts) as-is (perhaps with a flag that the user
account who posted this tweet is suspended). After the withdrawn historical tweets are
anonymized, users in the exposure set (e.g., researchers) can still view historical tweet data,
and can obtain the URLs, hashtags and words to continue their analysis. Thus, the impact
on the data quality for content analysis will decrease.
Limitations of anonymization: We acknowledge that our proposal is not a silver bullet.
Specifically our particular scheme does not address two issues: First, since all owner
identities are detached from their tweets, researchers focusing on specific parts from the
population might not be able to collect data from those parts (e.g., collecting data from
all female Twitter users posting about Brexit). However, we believe that this is a trade-off
that a researcher have to make while respecting owner intent of data withdrawal. Second,
personally identifiable information (PII) might still remain in the tweets (e.g. as proper
nouns or even writing styles) and our simple anonymization scheme will not remove them.
Twitter might provide users the option to remove this PII by automatically identifying them.
However, finding the PII is highly context dependent and we leave it to future work for
improving this aspect.
Aside from these two issues with our particular scheme, in general any anonymization
scheme raises a general issue—the loss of context. In general when owners are allowed to
delete posts that users in the direct/indirect exposure set have subsequently referred to the
3We address the question of whether the random strings are unique per post or just unique per user (and the
same across all posts from that user) in Section 6.5.3.2.
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deletion does not respect the intent of users in the exposure set. Even for anonymization
schemes (when the content is partially retained) removing the author’s identify from a post,
can change the appearance of a response to the post and disrespect the intent of the users in
exposure set. For example, take the case where the content owner is a staunch supporter of
ruling party and still vehemently opposes government policies in an OSM post. In this case,
anonymization omits the significance of the post considerably by omitting the context of
owner’s political leaning.
6.5.3.2 Likelihood of de-anonymizing an owner using network structure
There is another technical concern that our scheme needs to address. Twitter is a social
network and people converse about published content (e.g., in the form of replies to tweets).
However, while anonymizing a withdrawn tweet, Twitter cannot simply anonymize these
conversations, too; that will raise a complicated ethical concern — these conversations are
posted by users in the exposure set and not the owner of the withdrawn tweet, so, ideally,
anonymizing the conversations would require the explicit consent of all users participating
in the conversation (i.e., all users in the exposure set). Still, these conversing users are highly
likely to be connected to the original owner in Twitter (by follower/following relations) and
might reveal owner identity thorough the network structure of the social graph. An obvious
question is how likely is it for an analyst to identify the owner of an anonymized tweet by
simply looking at the social connections of the users conversing (e.g., replying) with the
anonymized tweet. Next, we will thoroughly investigate this question using data from the
real world.
We will first describe our dataset of Twitter conversations around withdrawn content.
Then we will consider two possible implementations of our anonymization scheme: (i)
anonymization per withdrawn tweet – each withdrawn tweet is anonymized independently,
i.e., owner identities in each withdrawn tweet is replaced by a unique random string and
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(ii) anonymization per owner – where all withdrawn tweets from the same owner, owner
identity is replaced by same random string.
Note that although anonymization per user better honors the intent of users in the
exposure set and mediators (since all withdrawn tweets from same owner and conversations
around them can be grouped), it also leaks more information about owner’s identity (through
information about multiple people conversing with tweets from same owner).4 We will
investigate the likelihood of deanonymizing owner using network structure in both of these
cases.
Dataset to evaluate anonymization scheme: For our analysis in this part we require a
dataset of withdrawn tweets from a large sample of Twitter users and the conversations
around these tweets. We leverage the same dataset mentioned in Chapter 5.2.3 and Chap-
ter 5.3.1.1. Recall that our dataset contains 8,950,942 historical tweets, posted by 97,998
users. Furthermore 33,925 (34.6%) users withdrawn 2,605,317 (29.1%) tweets from this
collection. Aside from historical tweets, there are 41,618 conversations (tweets posted
as replies) around 36,796 of these withdrawn tweets from 7,964 owners (23.5% of the
owners who withdrew their tweets). Our data also contains the social connections of these
conversing users as well as the tweet owners.
Using this dataset we seek to answer the question: How likely is it that the original
owner of a withdrawn tweet is revealed by simply looking at the social connections of the
conversing users? Or in other words, how likely is it that the original owner of a withdrawn
tweet is the only common neighbor of the conversing users in the Twitter social graph?
Deanonymizing an owner when anonymization is done per withdrawn tweet: Recall
that when each withdrawn tweet is independently anonymized, the user identity in each
withdrawn tweet is replaced by a unique random string. So an analyst can only identify
that conversations around each withdrawn tweet are addressed to a particular owner. In that
scenario, we take each withdrawn tweet and collect the social connections (both followers
4Aside from the case when any single tweet by the owner makes the owner identity obvious.
175
and followings) of the users who conversed with that tweet. Then for each withdrawn tweet
we check the number of common social connections for the conversing users.
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Figure 6.5: The number of common social connections between conversing users for with-
drawn tweets with one or more conversations. Only 0.9% of the tweets have
one common neighbor within conversing users. Also 98.6% of the 2,605,317 with-
drawn tweets did not spur any conversation (not included in the figure).
The result is shown in Figure 6.5. We note that only for 0.9% of the withdrawn
tweets with one or more conversation, there is exactly one common connection between the
conversing users, and 96.9% of withdrawn tweets have more than 10. We concentrate on
the withdrawn tweets, where there is only one common connection between the conversing
users. We found that, only for 319 withdrawn tweets, the identities of 168 original owners
are revealed, i.e., those owners are the only common social connection of the conversing
users around those tweets. In other words, 99.5% of the 33,925 tweet owners who withdraw
their tweet cannot be de-anonymized using the social connections of conversing users if
Twitter leverage a simple per withdrawn tweet anonymization scheme.
We investigate further and find the main reason for this low likelihood of deanonymiza-
tion: 98.6% of the 2,605,317 withdrawn tweets did not spur any conversation around them
and 1.3% received only 1 conversation (i.e., only one reply). Thus, for most of the owners,
an analyst does not have enough information from the social connections of the conversing
users for revealing owner identity.
Now we investigate the likelihood of de-anonymization if we replace user identities of
all withdrawn tweets belonging to a particular owner with a random string, i.e., the random
string is not unique for each withdrawn tweet, but for each owner.
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Deanonymizing an owner when anonymization is done per owner: In this case an
analyst can identify and group multiple withdrawn anonymized tweets belonging to a
particular anonymized owner. Moreover, she can also identify that all the conversations
around those withdrawn tweets are addressed towards a particular user. Thus, intuitively, an
analyst has more information available for deanonymizing an owner. We implemented this
scheme and check in how many cases the owner is the common social connection of all the
conversing users around all of the owner’s withdrawn tweets.
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Figure 6.6: The number of common social connections between conversing users for with-
drawing owners with one or more conversations. 23.5% of these owners have
exactly one common connection between conversing users. Note that, 76.5% of
the 33,925 owners with withdrawn tweets did not have any conversation (not in-
cluded in the figure).
We found that 23.5% out of 33,925 owners who withdrew tweets, have one or more
conversation in total around her withdrawn tweets. Figure 6.6 shows the number of common
connections between the conversing users for the owners with one or more conversation
around their withdrawn tweets. We note that for 28.7% of these owners there is one common
connection within the conversing users, and for 50% owners the number of common
connections is more than 10.
We again focus on these owners for whom there is exactly one common connection
between the conversing users around her withdrawn anonymized tweets. We found that
1,784 owners, i.e, 5.3% of the 33,925 owners who withdrew their tweets, can have their
identity de-anonymized using social connections of the conversing users. This fraction is
certainly higher than the case when each withdrawn tweet is independently anonymized, but
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this anonymization scheme still protects identities of 94.7% of the owners who withdrew
their tweets.
6.5.3.3 Improving our anonymization scheme: Future directions
So far, we considered a possible anonymization strategy for Twitter as a longitudinal
exposure-control mechanism which partially retains the quality of historical data. Our
strategy involved simply anonymizing the withdrawn tweets by replacing a user’s iden-
tity with a random string. We found that our strategy provides partial protection against
deanonymization upto certain degree when an attacker leverages the Twitter social graph
and the social connection of users conversing with withdrawn tweets (via replying to tweets).
In fact, in the case of per-withdrawn-tweet anonymization, 99.5% of owners would remain
anonymized against such deanonymization attacks. In the case of per-owner anonymization,
94.7% of owners would remain anonymized against such attacks. The social media operators
can choose which anonymization scheme will be suitable for their service, based on to the
extent to which they want to honor the intent of users in the exposure set. They might
further improve their anonymization schemes; we propose two concrete directions: First,
the OSM operators can just keep a fixed number of residual activities associated with each
withdrawn post (and remove the link to withdrawn tweet for other conversations), so that
de-anonymization is nigh impossible. Second, the OSM operators can further strengthen
anonymization by removing personally identifying information (PII) while anonymizing
withdrawn posts. We leave the exploration of these further schemes as a potential direction of
future work. Finally, an intermediate step before deploying this mechanism in platform like
Twitter would be to give them the choice to either “anonymize” and “delete” old posts. This
step would be useful in measuring the response of different actors regarding anonymization.
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6.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we surveyed popular OSMs to identify the actors in the deletion ecosystem of
these OSMs and the longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms available to these actors. We
concretely identify the key research challenges to systematically explore and improve the us-
ability of the longitudinal exposure-control mechanisms today. We proposed three improved
exposure control mechanisms using real-world data to show that different longitudinal
exposure control methods better respect the intent of some actors. Specifically, we evaluated
the effectiveness of—age-based withdrawal, inactivity-based withdrawal and anonymization.
We point out that inactivity-based withdrawal is an improvement over age-based withdrawal.
However, anonymization provides a good balance between respecting the intent of owner as
well as other actors. In the next chapter, we will conclude this thesis by summarizing the
results of our investigation so far and pointing out the future work in this space.
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CHAPTER 7
Concluding discussion
Today billions of online users use OSM sites like Facebook and Twitter to create and share
hundreds of billions of pieces of content. The popularity of these OSM sites has renewed
a discussion of online privacy. Particularly, OSMs created a fundamental shift in content
sharing—prior to the advent of OSMs in the online world the majority of users were content
consumers, however in OSMs users are content creators as well as managers. Thus, in
addition to uploading content in these OSMs, users are also expected to manage the privacy
of each and every piece of content they upload. Consequently, OSM users are facing a
privacy management crisis today as pointed out by news reports, blog posts and research
studies.
In this thesis, we addressed a key research challenge in this space: How do we provide
improved privacy controls to OSM users for managing privacy of their social content from
other users? We identified that the majority of OSMs today use access control as the
dominant model to provide privacy management tools to their users. However, while useful,
access control model is insufficient to capture many real-world privacy violations as well as
multiple dimensions of privacy pointed out in prior privacy theories. To that end, in order to
extend the current access control mechanisms, we introduce the model of exposure control.
We define the exposure of a content as the set of people who actually view the content.
We showed that exposure control in conjunction with access control effectively captures
majority of the dimensions of privacy pointed out in earlier theories. Furthermore, exposure
control captures privacy violations not captured by access control. Thus we argue that OSM
operators should provide users better tools to control the exposure of their content. To that
end, we investigate how to better control exposure in three different real-world scenarios in
this thesis.
Firstly, we identified that, today an easy and widely available method to better control
exposure in OSMs for users is to specify social access control lists (social ACLs, or SACLs);
SACLs are conservative access control lists which allow only a subset of their social contacts
to access a content. However, so far no study attempted to understand how SACLs are used
in the real world and how to improve their usability. To that end, in this thesis we present the
first large-scale study of real-world in-use SACLS of more than 1,000 Facebook users. We
found that the set of friends included/excluded in SACLs shows little correlation with either
profile information, activity or social network structure—Thus making it hard to predict
SACL membership. Fortunately, we found that SACLs are often reused, thus caching recent
SACLs and making them available to users is likely to improve the usability of exposure
control method via SACLs.
Secondly, we found that when users upload content in OSMs, third party crawlers or
bots are quite possibly not in their expected exposure set. However, these crawlers collect
and hoards the data of hundreds of millions of users and violate the exposure control of
content. To that end, we propose Genie, a system for OSM operators to protect privacy via
controlling exposure from large-scale third party crawlers. Genie is a credit network based
solution which exploits the fact that the browsing patterns of honest users (i.e., non-crawler
users) and crawlers are very different: even a crawler with access to many accounts needs to
make many more profile views per account than an honest user, and view profiles of users
that are more distant in the social network. Our experiments using real-world data gathered
from Renren (a Chinese OSM) show that Genie frustrates large-scale crawling while rarely
impacting honest users. Effectively, Genie provides a way to control the exposure of OSM
users’ content from third party crawlers.
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Finally, we investigated longitudinal exposure control in OSMs. The challenge of
managing longitudinal privacy for a user refers to the difficulty in controlling the exposure of
the user’s socially shared data over time. Our study leveraged real-world data from Twitter
to discover that a significant fraction of users withdraw a surprisingly large percentage of
old publicly shared data—more than 28% of six-year old public posts (tweets) on Twitter
are not accessible today. However, we also discovered that residual tweets (replies to Twitter
posts from other users or posts mentioning a user) pose a severe problem to longitudinal
exposure control mechanisms in Twitter. These residual tweets leak significant information
about the inaccessible tweets and user accounts. We developed and deployed a Twitter
app (available at http://twitter-app.mpi-sws.org/footprint/) for Twitter
users to check the residual activities around their accounts and posts.
We identified a key research challenge while investigating how to improve longitudinal
exposure control mechanisms—In OSMs content from multiple users are effectively inter-
twined (via replies, comments, tags etc.). Thus in order to asses and improve longitudinal
control methods we need to understand the deletion ecosystem in OSMs. To that end, we
identified relevant actors other than the uploading user in the context of old content with-
drawal and present a detailed survey of deletion mechanism in OSMs. We present concrete
research questions in order to asses and improve longitudinal exposure control mechanisms
which are part of deletion ecosystem. We present three proof of concept improvements in
the deletion ecosystem of Twitter to show the potential of our approach.
One venue of future work is to provide a framework to compare and improve the
longitudinal exposure control mechanisms via investigating the intent of all the actors
involved (e.g., via semi structured surveys). Two more general venues of future work,
pointed out by this thesis are (i) to expand the model of exposure control and (ii) to apply
exposure control in other scenarios. Some researchers are already trying to do the first [42]
by providing a probabilistic notion of exposure. A concrete example of the second direction
is to improve search exposure—content retrieval mechanisms like search might increase
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unwanted exposure of old content, e.g, by unearthing decades old usenet posts of a user.
Thus, a concrete venue might be to use the concept of exposure control to argue about privacy
violation via search and design exposure control mechanisms to limit search exposure. A
very recent work tried to tackle search exposure [76].
To conclude, the concept of exposure presented in this thesis provides a novel way to
argue about privacy breaches in OSMs and lays the ground work for improving the privacy
management mechanisms. We strongly believe that, our exposure control model is an
important step towards providing better privacy control to OSM users. In fact, exposure
control provides a generic framework to the OSM operators and privacy researchers to better
understand the privacy requirements of their users and improve upon the existing privacy
management mechanisms.
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